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ABSTRACT 
 
THE GREAT WAR AND THE VISUAL MOBILIZATION 
OF THE OTTOMAN PUBLIC SPHERE: 
THE CASE OF “DONANMA” JOURNAL 
 
 
Süleyman Emre Sunu 
 
History, MA Thesis,2007 
 
Thesis Supervisor:  Assistant Prof. Dr. Selçuk Akşin Somel 
 
Keywords:  The Great War, the Navy League, Donanma Mecmuası, mobilization, visual 
propaganda 
  
  
This study tries to explore the Ottoman experience of the Great War through a 
preliminary analysis of the visual propaganda of the journal Donanma.  Although the 
Ottoman war propaganda suffered from serious infrastructural and superstructural 
setbacks and  hence doomed  to fail eventually, this thesis argues that the attempt of the 
government to penetrate the Ottoman public sphere, to manipulate the public opinion 
and to incorporate the society as a whole to the state’s war effort cut across the social, 
economical and cultural aspects of the Ottoman war experience and thus offers a 
valuable insight into it.  In this perspective, the present thesis proposes that Donanma 
was an efficient and preferable channel for the dispersion of the governmental 
propaganda due to its popular character, and that visuals aided  the journal by improving 
the accessibility of its propagandist message to the highly illiterate Ottoman society.  In 
this context, this study tries to analyze and identify the main arguments and symbols 
embodied in the journal’s visual propaganda during the last three months prior to the 
Ottoman intervention to the war and the war years.   
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ÖZET 
 
BİRİNCİ DÜNYA SAVAŞI VE OSMANLI KAMUSAL ALANININ 
GÖRSEL SEFERBERLİĞİ: "DONANMA" MECMUASI 
 
Süleyman Emre Sunu 
 
Tarih, Yüksek Lisans, 2007 
 
Tez Danışmanı:  Yrd. Doç. Dr. Selçuk Akşin Somel 
 
Anahtar kelimeler:  Dünya Savaşı I, Donanma Cemiyeti, Donanma Mecmuası, seferberlik, 
görsel propaganda 
 
  
Bu araştırma, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Birinci Dünya Savaşı tecrübesini 
Donanma Mecmuası’nın görsel propagandasının bir ilk incelemesiyle ele almaya 
çalışmaktadır.  Osmanlı savaş propagandasının ciddi alt ve üst yapısal yetersizliklerden 
muzdarip ve dolayısıyla başarısızlığa mahkum olmasına karşın, bu tez, hükümetin 
Osmanlı kamusal alanına nüfuz etme, kamuoyunu manipüle etme ve toplumun 
tamamını devletin savaş gayretine dahil etme girişiminin, Osmanlı savaş tecrübesini 
toplumsal, ekonomik ve kültürel eksenlerde kestiğini ve dolayısıyla bu tecrübeye 
yönelik önemli bir içgörü sağladığını öne sürmektedir.  Bu açıdan sözkonusu tez, 
Donanma’nın popüler karakteriyle devlet propagandasını yaymak için etkili ve uygun 
bir kanal olduğunu, görsellerin ise büyük çoğunluğu okur yazar olmayan Osmanlı 
toplumunda dergiyi daha geniş kitlelere ulaşabilir kıldığını savunmaktadır.  Araştırma 
bu bağlamda derginin hem Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun savaşa girmesinden önceki son 
üç ayındaki ve hem de savaş sırasındaki görsel propagandasının ana konularını ve 
sembollerini incelemeye ve belirlemeye çalışmaktadır. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“This war requires the awakening of the national feelings and the 
taking place of these within the people’s spirit.” 
 
-Talat Pasha-1 
 
 
 
 
The Great War was a novel phenomenon that destroyed and consumed beyond 
any imagination.2  The belligerent countries fought over an unlimited geography with 
vaguely defined aims, pushing their economic and military capabilities to the ultimate 
end.  A war that was expected to end quickly turned into an elongated, vain and gory 
confrontation.  The unlimited nature of the new warfare required the participation of the 
societies as a whole into manufacturing violence, which in return, necessitated the 
manipulation of the public opinion for this end.  Talat Pasha’s emphasis as the minister 
of the interior addressed at the same need: the incorporation of the entire Ottoman 
public into general war effort and the transformation of popular feelings into material 
and spiritual support.     
This study is a preliminary work that attempts to analyze the Ottoman 
government’s propaganda effort to convert the masses to this particular goal.  In order 
to serve this purpose, the study adapts a particularistic approach and sets its framework 
around a single journal, Donanma, and its visual propaganda. 
There are two prominent reasons that determined this particular choice.  The first 
one bases on the fact that Donanma was the official publication of a popular semi-
governmental organization, the Navy League.  After its establishment in 1909, the 
                                                 
1 “Bu savaş milli duyguların uyandırılmasını ve bunun halkın ruhunda yer almasını 
gerektiriyordu.”  Talat Paşa, Talat Paşanın Anıları, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990), 
p.46. 
2 Eric J. Hobsbawm. The Age off Extremes, (London: Abacus, 1991), p.41 
2 
 
organization  managed to launch massive popular campaigns and achieved to gather a 
huge public support and credibility.  The widespread organizational network of the 
League inside and outside of the Empire provided it with a significant public appeal.  
Therefore, Donanma found the opportunity to reach a larger audience in comparison to 
the most of the Ottoman periodicals at the time, reaching at significant circulation 
numbers.  Its accessibility by the people was further enhanced by its relatively cheap 
price.  Right from its initiation, the journal tried to parallel and to substantiate the 
popular image of the League by identifying its audience as the whole of the population.  
It reserved particular coverage for each and every group of the society ranging from 
peasants to state servants and military officers.  The journal posed as a social forum for 
writers and thus contained a dynamic and various authors cadre.  Hence, on the eve of 
the war, the journal was already familiar and significantly experienced in mobilizing the 
masses and stimulating the people to serve for patriotic and nationalistic ends.   
As the League gradually forged closer ties with the ministry of the interior and 
turned informally into an office of the ministry, the journal adjusted to this alignment as 
well and became merely a propaganda tool of the government in the latter half of 1914.  
In this sense, it would not be inaccurate to regard Donanma as an affluent source to 
track the components of the government’s war propaganda for the period of 1914-1918. 
The second factor, on the other hand, directly relates to practical reasons 
concerning the emission process and the efficiency of the propagandist message.  The 
Ottoman Empire in comparison to the industrialized Western powers suffered from 
critical infrastructural and superstructural shortcomings in its ability to meet the 
demands of the total war.  This was also true for the planning and execution of 
organized wartime propaganda.  The Ottoman society was scattered over a large 
territory and deeply divided alongside social and ethnic lines.  Transportation and 
communication networks were too weak to alleviate the physical separation of people 
and to arouse the feeling of togetherness.  Governmental schools were limited in 
numbers and coverage, curbing further down the possibility to manufacture a 
standardized society by the imposition of common values and symbols.  In contrast to 
the great powers, the Ottoman  leadership found itself obliged to deal with a profoundly 
heterogeneous society.   
3 
 
The popular character of the Navy League and Donanma could offer a partial 
solution to overcome these setbacks.  Yet, how could a printed campaign expected to be 
feasible in a society where nearly 90 per cent of the population was illiterate?  One part 
of the answer is embodied within the public reading practices.  The illiterates were by 
no means isolated from the textual materials and reading aloud during public gatherings 
transformed the written culture into verbal form.  However, since this was a second 
hand testimony for the textual content, the credibility of the dispersed message might be 
lost partially or completely during this transmission depending on the public appeal of 
the individual that acted as the agent between the printed medium and the audience.  At 
this juncture, the intense illustrated character of the journal served to enhance the 
reliability of the message by providing the illiterate observer with the chance to bear 
first hand testimony to the emitted message.      
On the other hand, the image itself posed a powerful medium to disperse the 
propagandist message to the public.  The visual language used by it could easily 
communicate both with the literate and illiterate alike and blur the gap between them.  
The efficiency of propaganda depends by and large on its ability to deliver its message 
simply, swiftly and permanently.  In all these terms, visuals preside over the textual 
content to a significant extent.  The reader or the observer could grasp the content of the 
image in less than a few seconds and recall it at the same rate.  The visuals could be 
physically separated from the pages and circulated among the public with the capability 
of delivering their messages on their own.3  
In this context, the analysis of Donanma bears a considerable potential in 
providing an insight into the Ottoman war propaganda as it encapsulated the 
governments’ propagandist messages on the one hand, and on the other offered a 
popular public appeal.  The particular focus put on the visual propaganda proposes that 
the examined material could communicate with a larger section of the Ottoman 
population in a more efficient way and thus was more compatible with the totalistic 
nature of the world war propaganda aiming at the mobilization of the masses as a 
whole.  
                                                 
3 Palmira Johnson Brummett,  Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary 
Press, 1908-1911 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), p. 26-40. 
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The initial impetus of this study stems from the lack of interest shown to the 
Ottoman experience of the Great War by the national and international historiography.  
The affluent international academic literature on the war treats it largely as a European 
phenomenon and studies considering the experience of the English, French and German 
speaking countries dominate the field when compared to the ones on the rest of the 
participants of the war.4  Within this hierarchy of academic attraction and numbers of 
studies, Russia is followed by the Ottoman Empire and then by the Balkan countries, 
whereas stateless ethnic groups are studied only in terms of their relations to the great 
powers.5  The war is generally perceived as a European incident and the linguistic 
obstacles played a determinant role in the shaping of the academic literature.  
Another major factor for this negligence seems to be the established linkage 
between the modernity and the Great War.  One generally accepted assumption in the 
field is that the war separated the traditional 19th century and the modern 20th century.  
Assessed as an Oriental and Islamic field, the Ottoman Empire was considered for the 
most part outside of the modernity which was regarded as a Western phenomenon and 
hence outside of the scope of the Great War as well.6 
On the other hand, within the general narrative of the Turkish historiography, the 
First World War appears as a mere detail in the transition to the Republican Turkey.  
Social, economical, and cultural aspects of the Ottoman war experience could find little 
if any coverage.  In comparison to the War of Independence, the First World War 
appears almost as an unclaimed and alien series of battles.  The only exception to this 
negligence is the Gallipoli War.  It equaled to the War of Independence in terms of 
defending the “homeland” which is perceived as Anatolia and was appraised as a 
glorious antecedent to it.  Hence, a significant portion of the national historiography on 
the First World War deals with the battles at Gallipoli whereas it ignores other aspects 
of the war to a large extent.  
Another fundamental concern of this thesis is that academic studies regarding 
the 19th and 20th centuries’ Ottoman Empire resort on printed visuals mostly as 
                                                 
4 Erol Köroğlu, Türk Edebiyatı ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı, Propagandadan Millî Kimlik 
Inşasına (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), p.18. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., p.19. 
5 
 
complementary sources.  Although images were used independent from the textual 
content as of the last quarter of the 19th century, there exists only a limited literature that 
directly studies this type of imagery, and most of these works deal with the period 
before the Great War.7  Unfortunately, this study failed to spot any academic work that 
examined the wartime visuals separately.  Hence, this thesis humbly attempts to 
contribute to the field by analyzing the visual propaganda of Donanma during the First 
World War.  In this context, this study argues that the Ottoman experience of the war 
could have an independent and popular aspect that could transcend beyond a textual 
content and thus offers a historical and semiotic reading of Donanma’s imagery.  
The present study attempts to address that despite its fatal infrastructural and 
superstractural shortcomings, the Ottoman Empire tried to adapt and respond to the 
requirements of the total and modern warfare by utilizing and optimizing every 
available means it possessed, and thus argues that its experience of the war deserves a 
deeper and more comprehensive attention than already reserved.  Therefore, it aims to 
explore certain economic, social and cultural impacts of the war on the Empire through 
the analysis of the wartime visual propaganda. 
This study consists of three main chapters.  The first chapter will try to assess 
the propaganda value of Donanma by positing it within the general framework of the 
Navy League and the Second Constitutional Era.  In order to serve this purpose, the 
chapter will first focus on the League separately.  It will try to lay out its individual 
characteristics and examine its suitability to assist the state to pursue a massive 
propaganda campaign.  Then, the chapter will try to evaluate the significance of 
                                                 
7 Palmira J. Brummett’s work on the Ottoman revolutionary press is an exceptional 
study for the period 1909-1911. Brummett, Ibid.  Tobias Heinzelmann’s study on the 
Balkan crises and the Ottoman cartoon is another important work on the Ottoman visual 
media yet it also deals with the period before the Great War. Tobias Heinzelmann, 
Osmanlı Karikatüründe Balkan Sorunu (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2004).  Eyal Gino’s 
article on the Balkan Wars is a crucial study that covers the utilization of visuals for 
propagandist ends. Eyal Ginio, “Mobilizing the Ottoman Nation during the Balkan 
Wars (1912-1913): Awakening from the Ottoman Dream,” War in History 12, no. 2 
(2005): 156-177.  The only academic analysis of the Ottoman visual propaganda in the 
First World War that I came across during the process of this present thesis was a short 
section within Erol Köroğlu’s seminal work Türk Edebiyatı ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı, 
Propagandadan Millî Kimlik Inşasına.  Köroğlu, Ibid. 
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Donanma for the League and give a detailed insight into the journal’s general 
characteristics as a printed medium.  The rest of the chapter will try to evaluate visuals 
as a means to disperse propaganda within the context of the Great War and the journal 
itself.  
 The second and the third chapters will try to analyze the Ottoman experience of 
the Great War in two periods.  The period prior to the Ottoman intervention from June 
to October 1914 will be covered by the second chapter, and the period thereafter by the 
third.  Although there is a significant misbalance between these two periods in terms of 
the time they covered, the present study will try to put a relatively equal emphasis on 
both.  The primary concern behind this approach is that the pre-intervention Ottoman 
social and political dynamics are subjected to an oversimplifying treatment within the 
current historiography.  The Ottoman entry to the war is generally explained by the fait 
accompli of the Unionist leadership, yet the question how a war weary society was 
made to assume a pro-war stance is not asked.  Thus, the chapter will aim to delve into 
this period via the analysis of Donanma’s visuals and to locate a partial if not a 
complete answer to this question.  
The third chapter will try to deal directly with Donanma’s wartime propaganda 
and attempt to identify its major narratives to rally the support of the Ottoman public for 
the ends of the war.  The chapter will first focus on the representation of Jihad, and how 
it was designated as a selective call that limited its definition of the enemy only to the 
Entente powers.  Then, the chapter will look at the journal’s depiction of the enemy and 
to underline how its image was depreciated to boost the morale of the Ottoman 
population trying to convince them of the certainty of an oncoming victory.  In this 
sense, the chapter will undertake to venture through the self-image that the journal 
embarked upon its readers.  The rest of the chapter will try to go through the journal’s 
visual call for the material support of the Ottomans, the utilization of the photographs of 
the prisoners of war to prove the enemies’ decay, and the confrontation of the Ottoman 
armies with the new war technology and the journal’s effort to integrate the Empire into 
the experience of the modern warfare by propagating the Ottomans’ ability to 
effectively cope with it.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
“DONANMA” AS A MEANS OF PROPAGANDA 
 
On February 4, 1919, just two days before committing suicide, Doctor Reşid 
Bey8 recorded the following entry into his diary: “…There is nothing important in the 
newspapers.  Only that the properties of the Union [and Progress] were confiscated. 
The strange thing is that they also abolished the Navy League and the National Defense 
Society, which were founded at the time of the Union.  No government has ever been as 
heedless and immoral as them.”9  The first part of the statement was written in an 
indifferent tone, attributable to the psychology of loss at the downfall of the CUP and to 
an environment marked with intense anti-Unionist feelings.10  The anti-Unionist policies 
of the Damat Ferit Pasha government, even the confiscation of the CUP’s properties did 
                                                 
8 Dr. Reşid Bey (Mehmed Reşid Şahingiray) was among the founding members of the 
Committee of Union and Progress, in 1897, together with İbrahim Temo, İshak Sukûti 
and Abdullah Cevdet. During the course of the World War I, he was the governor of 
Diyarbakır and then Ankara.  After the signing of the Mondros Armistice, he was held 
responsible for the exodus and massacring of the Ottoman Armenians, and was 
dispatched to the military court on January 25,1919. Two weeks later, on Febrary 6, he 
committed suicide.  Ahmet Mehmetefendioğlu, Dr. Reşid Bey’in Hatıraları ‘Sürgünden 
İntihara’ (İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1993), p.15. 
9 “…Gazetelerde mühim bir şey yok.  Yalnız İttihad’a ait emâkine vaz’ı yed edildiğini 
yazıyorlar.  Garibi şu ki İttihat zamanında teessüs eden Donanma ve Müdâfaa-i Milliye 
Cemiyetleri’ne vaziyyet edilmiş.  Bu kadar gaflet veya sükut-u ahlak hiçbir hükümette 
görülmemiştir.” Ibid, p.108. 
   On February 2, 1919, The Navy League was integrated into the Ministry of Marine, 
and The National Defense Society into the Ministry of War by the government under 
Damat Ferit Pasha.  The properties of both were confiscated as well. 
10 Adjectives frequently used for the CUP triumvirate and the Unionists during the 
Armistice could be listed as follows:  “Robber, thug, of the ominous party, bandit, 
loathsome, ignorant, greedy, rascal, sanguinary, murderer, mob, despicable, wretched 
gang, marauding government, damned, bad spirited, crows acting as eagles, children of 
Salonica, infidels.” Orhan Koloğlu,  Aydınlarımızın Bunalım Yılı 1918:  Zafer-i 
Nihai’den Tam Teslimiyete, (İstanbul:  Boyut, 2000), p.95.. 
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not surprise Dr. Reşid Bey.  Nevertheless, the part on the fates of the Navy League 
(Osmanlı Donanma-yı İane Cemiyeti) and the National Defense Society (Müdafaa-i 
Milliye Cemiyeti) seems to have touched him deeply.   
 Dr. Reşid Bey’s lines express, thus, a rather ambivalent position.  His frustration 
with the government over the abolition of these two organizations directly contrasts 
with his composure over the confiscation of the CUP’s properties.  A clear explanation 
is quite hard to infer from his lines.  Nonetheless, a joint allusion in two specific words, 
“heedless” and “immoral”, could be traced at a larger socio-political and historical 
framework that linked the Navy League, its main means of propaganda Donanma 
Mecmuası (henceforth Donanma11) and the CUP’s attempts to transform and mobilize 
the Ottoman public sphere on a patriotic and militaristic axis, together.   
In the Post-1908 period, The Navy League and The National Defense Society –
together with the Ottoman Red Crescent (Osmanlı Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti)- emerged as 
semi-official civil initiatives and extensions of the Ottoman public sphere.12  
Marginalizing other charitable associations, these three menafii-i umumiye hadim 
(Service for the Public Good)13 associations possessed a patriotic and later a 
nationalistic tone and paved the way for the militarization and nationalization of the 
public sphere.14  At a time of ongoing wars, intensified patriotism and civil 
mobilization, these associations attempted and to a larger degree managed to transform 
the material and spiritual energy of the Ottoman elite and the masses to the fronts.15  
Thus, the abolishment of two of these organizations could be regarded as to obstruct the 
channels of translation and manufacturing of popular sentiments into “patriotism” and 
“nationalism.”   
                                                 
11 During its publishing life, the journal was printed under two names.  For the first 129 
issues the journal was titled as Donanma and then onwards as Donanma Mecmuası.  For 
practical reasons I prefer to use the shorter version.     
12 Nadir Özbek, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Sosyal Devlet: Siyaset,İktidar ve 
Meşrutiyet: 1876-1914, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), p. 260-269 
13 Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler,İkinci  Meşrutiyet Dönemi, Vol. I, 
(İstanbul, 1984), p. 449.  Donanma, No:6, 6 August 1910, p.525. 
14 Özbek, Ibid, p. 271. 
15 Hüsnü Ada, The First Ottoman Civil Society Organization in the Service of the 
Ottoman State: The Case of the Ottoman Red Crescent, (Unpublished MA Thesis, 
Istanbul, 2004), p. 9. 
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Dr. Reşid Bey, besides being a founding member of the CUP, was also an active 
member of the political and cultural organizations such as “Circassian Union and 
Solidarity Association,” “Northern Caucasus Association” and “The Committee of Free 
Caucasus.”16  Identifying himself as a “patriot” and a “nationalist”, he was most likely 
aware of the functionality and of the propagandist value of these associations in 
penetrating the public sphere and inciting civil mobilization.  Therefore, as the Entente 
powers occupied different parts of the Empire and pressured the Ottoman government 
to close these associations down, his emphasis on “immorality” and “heedlessness” 
might have intended to refer to an abeyance in terms of “patriotism.”17  It could also be 
argued that Dr. Reşid Bey saw the abrogation of the CUP’s legal framework as a 
replaceable process.  Once the crises were dealt with, it could re-establish itself as a 
political power.  Thus, the closing down of the Navy League and the National Defense 
Society could have meant to cut down the CUP’s power basis and its major means of 
mobilizing the masses. 
  In this context, this chapter will try to elucidate the particular historical context 
through which Donanma rose up to be one of the most significant propaganda mediums 
on which the CUP headquarters resorted during the First World War.  In order to serve 
this purpose, the chapter will be divided into three main parts.  In the first part, the Navy 
League itself will be put under focus within the particular context of the Second 
Constitutional Period and the Ottoman public sphere.   The second part will delve into 
Donanma as a publication and try to delineate its main characteristics within the 
framework of the League.  The last part, on the other hand, will theoretically and 
historically try to assess the value and the role of the visual propaganda in penetrating 
the public sphere and transmitting the messages of the Leaguers. 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Mehmetefendioğlu, Ibid, p. 10. 
17  Selahittin Özçelik, Donanma Cemiyeti, (Published PhD Dissertation, Ankara, 1987), 
p.366.  
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I.1 The Navy League and the Ottoman Public Sphere 
 
I.1.a Post-1908 Ottoman Public Sphere 
 
 
 Surrounded by a sui generis aura, the Constitutional Revolution of 1908 gave 
birth to a massive social rapture that rapidly translated itself into great expectations and 
immense hopes.18  As ecstatic crowds shrouded the streets of Istanbul, people rejoiced 
the advent of a new regime and regarded it as a panacea that would alleviate their 
distress and sufferings.19  Halide Edip, in her memoirs, reflected on the early days of the 
Revolution as follows: 
“There was a sea of men and women all cockaded in red and white, flowing like 
a vast human tide from one side to the other.  The tradition of the centuries 
seemed to have lost its effect.  […] Men and women in a common wave of 
enthusiasm moved on, radiating something extraordinary, laughing, weeping in 
such intense emotion that human deficiency and ugliness were for the time 
completely obliterated.  […] In three days the whole empire had caught the fever 
of ecstasy.  […] To the crowd the change in the clearest sense spelled the pulling 
down of a regime which meant oppression, corruption, and tyranny, while the 
new, whatever it was, spelled happiness and freedom.  […] The motley rabble, 
the lowest pariah, were going about in a sublime emotion, with tears running 
down their unwashed faces, the shopkeepers joining the procession without any 
concern for their goods.  […] It looked like the millennium.  […]  In every street 
corner someone stood up on a chair or on the box of a carriage and   made a 
speech to an admiring crowd.”20 
  
 What Halide Edip resembled to the “millennium” was indeed the sprouting of a 
civic spirit among the Ottomans.  A flood of newspapers and magazines accompanied 
the street orators on chairs and boxes, and in less than a year the number of the 
newspapers and journals culminated to 353.21  The free press was identified as the 
                                                 
18 Ahmet Emin [Yalman], Turkey in the World War, (New Heaven: Yale University 
Press, 1930), p.41 
19 Ibid, p.41 
20 Halide Edib Adıvar, Memoirs of Halidé Edib (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2004), 
p.258-259 
21 Until the end of the year 1918 this number raised to 918:  1908-1909 (353), 1910 
(130), 1911 (124), 1912 (45), 1913 (92), 1914 (75), 1915 (6), 1916 (8), 1917 (14), 1918 
(71).  Hıfzı Topuz, II. Mahmut’tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi, (Istanbul: Remzi 
Kitabevi, 2003), p.84. 
11 
 
symbol of the Revolution as opposed to the censorship in the Hamidian era.22  A similar 
burst was to be observed in the numbers of the volunteer organizations established in 
the following months of the revolution.  Before the end of 1909, 153 new associations 
were founded.23  The press hastily became a significant part of the expanding public 
sphere24; whereas, the public associations rather than political parties started to shape 
and define the Second Constitutional Era.25 
Incited by the vibrant atmosphere of the revolution, people from all parts of the 
society started to question the fate of their state and sought solutions to improve its 
position with high self-confidence. 26  The ordinary people of the empire found 
themselves entangled within Juergen Habermas’ definition of civil society, which had 
an institutional core formed by voluntary organizations that remained outside the sphere 
of the state and the economy.  Thus, within the boundaries of a public sphere, the people 
transformed their self-assigned duty of saving the empire into the public opinion 
through the process of “people’s public use of their reason.”27 
The application of Habermas’ conceptualization of civil society; however, needs 
further elaboration to be able to reflect the Ottoman case in general and the Navy 
League in particular.  Nadir Özbek merges Habermas’ triadic paradigm with the 
Gramscian notion of “hegemony” and formulates a non-conflictual state-society model 
that offers a more effective analytical framework suiting the Ottoman context.  
According to this model, the public-private sphere segmentation was rather blurred than 
                                                 
22 Hasan Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks:  Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the 
Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). 
23 Whereas only 7 new associations were founded in 1907, within the five moths 
following the Revolution 83 associations were established.  In 1909’da 70 more were 
fromed.  Mehmet, Ö. Alkan, “İstanbul’da Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları1856-1945: 
Toplumsal Örgütlenmenin Gelişimi”, Tanzimattan Günümüze İstanbul’da Sivil Toplum 
Kuruluşları, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998), p.99.   
24 Kayalı, Ibid. 
25 Tunaya, Ibid. 
26 Tunaya, Hürriyetin İlanı (İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1996), p. 1.  
27 Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An Inquiry 
into a Category of Bourgeois Society, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993), p.26. 
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strictly defined, and this very particular aspect indeed facilitated the transformation of 
the policies of prevailing political factions into dominant and hegemonic ideologies.28   
A public sphere formulated by diverse, competing and conflicting publicities 
needs thus to be taken into account, as it alludes for the Constitutional period a 
prominent transformation in itself that paralleled the Revolution.   The Unionist elite, as 
diverse as these publicities, was not indeed organically separate from them.  Hence, for 
the CUP it was not a difficult task to position itself within the ecstatic aura of the 
Revolution and utilize it for the consolidation of its power within the public sphere.  In 
this sense, charity (fukaraperver) organizations and semi-official associations founded 
by the adherents of the CUP played a key role in facilitating the consolidation of the 
Unionists’ political hegemony.  For the CUP, the penetration of the society on various 
points and diffusing its political influence turned out to be a feasible outcome.  This, on 
the other hand, meant the hasty disenchantment of the Hamidian monarchical welfare 
system by restructuring it on an increasingly more bureaucratic basis.29  The former 
system that aimed at forging the feeling of belonging and loyalty to a paternal family 
and its patriarch was to be replaced by one that sought to strengthen the idea of loyalty 
to the state and the homeland.30  
In this framework, the sequence of political traumas faced immediately after the 
Revolution and the wars that followed, triggered the accumulated social energy of the 
Ottomans and enabled the Unionist elite to mobilize and rally the masses under the 
themes of patriotism and militarism via voluntary organizations.31  Three semi-official 
menafii-i umumiye hadim institutions, The Navy League (Osmanlı Donanma-yı İane 
Cemiyeti), the National Defense Society (Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti)32 and the 
                                                 
28  During the Hamidian era the Sultan’s and the post-1908 period the CUP’s. 
29 Özbek, Ibid, p.44 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid, p.295-296, 306. 
32 The National Defense Society was founded on 1 February 1913 in order to pursue a 
patriotic propaganda campaign during the Balkan War.  The organization executed aid 
campaigns for the army as well as establishing voluntary troops.  Also it formed a 
hospitals committee to aid the military health organization.  Nazım H. Polat, Müdafaa-i 
Milliye Cemiyeti, (Ankara, Kültür Bakanlğı Yayınları, 1991), p.50-59. 
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Ottoman Red Crescent (Osmanlı Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti)33 managed to marginalize 
other voluntary institutions, channeled the material and spiritual energies of the public 
into action and translated the public self-fulfillment into mass campaigns.  In return, this 
process resulted in the transmission of the public reasoning into militarism and 
patriotism, which simultaneously reshaped the public sphere alongside these lines. 
 
I.1.b The Navy League (Osmanlı Donanma-yı İane Cemiyeti) 
 
The initiation of the Navy League could be perceived as a direct public response 
to the ongoing social traumas.  Already distressed with the inability of the navy during 
the Cretan Crisis of 1908,34 the Ottoman public would further be concerned with the 
condition of the navy after the Naval Parade of 4 July 1909. 35  
                                                 
33 Ottoman Red Crescent was established as a result on going attempt since 1868 to 
form an organization to help the wounded soldiers.  Nonetheless, until 1908 a 
permanent organization could not be founded.  Especially, Abdülhamid II was not 
sympathetic towards such a permanent organization and supported temporary 
committees instead.  The organization cold be launched on 21 April 1911 during the 
Second Constitutional Era.  The organization defined itself as the civilian extension of 
the military health organization. Its main purpose was the total mobilization of the 
civilian population to support the military action.  Thus, Ottoman involved in various 
activities such as helping the poor, people suffering from catastrophes, fighting against 
contagious diseases, establishing soup houses and provision of shelter and food to the 
immigrants.  In this context, the organization marginalized other philanthropist 
associations and voluntary activities by extending its activity field and centralizing these 
services.  Özbek, p.307-322.  For more detailed information see also:  Ada, Ibid.  Nadir 
Özbek, “The Politics of Poor Relief in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1876-1914,” New 
Perspectives on Turkey, no: 21, (1999).  Zuhal Özaydın, Osmanlı Hilal-i Ahmer 
Cemiyeti Salnamesi, (Unpublished MA Thesis, Istanbul Üniversitesi, 1987)  
34  In May 1908, Crete declared its union with Greece.  It was the conclusion of an 
ongoing crisis that began on 1897 and ignited Greco-Turkish War of 1897.  The Young 
Turk government of the Revolution could not do anything against the unification but 
protest.  It was taken as a display of the military weakness, particularly of the navy, by 
the Ottoman public.  Among various laments published by the press over the years, one 
from Donanma was as follows: “Crete! My precious Crete!  Our Crete!  Until we will 
meet again; farewell to you momentarily.  Now we are feeble and helpless; we are 
poor! Yet, surely, sons of the country will wake up and the country will be saved.” 
Ahmed Hilmi, “Girit’e Selam”, Donanma, no: 1, March 1910, p. 32. 
35 After the parade various articles and competitions took place to figure out a way to 
ameliorate the navy. Özçelik, Ibid, p.7. 
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The parade, organized to celebrate the first anniversary of the Revolution, was 
supposed to symbolize the unleashing of the Ottoman navy from the Golden Horn, 
where it was “trapped” by Abdülhamid II.36  The dominant anti-Hamidian tone of the 
day prevailed upon the first reactions, and the liberation of the navy was contrasted with 
the Hamidian “despotism.”  Hence, the initial excitement and the interest of the public 
over the parade emerged as a corollary of these feelings and shared by the press.  One 
year later, the chief propagandist of the Navy League still referred to the parade as, “A 
memorable day for the Ottomans.  On this day, our navy makes a great parade… Freed 
from an alongated despotism it has reached to the dawn of felicity and now sails with 
the wind of liberty.”37 
Nonetheless, a simultaneous disappointment with the condition of the navy was 
already felt by the public and explicitly pronounced by the press.38  The article by 
Hüseyin Cahid published on July 5, 1909, voiced this concern as well.39  He regarded 
the event as an official induction of the navy rather than a ceremony and added: “If we 
do not want to delude ourselves we should confess that we will start to form the basis of 
our navy from now on; we will have a navy henceforth that is harmonious in itself, 
congruent to the current needs, and proportional to the requirements of the country.”40  
                                                 
36  In the post-1908 period, Abdülhamid II has been associated with the deterioration of 
the navy.  He was identified with a great fear of the navy that it might dethrone him.  
Although this aspect might have been overplayed, it was by and large true that the navy 
was downsized during his reign.  His preference to cut down the military expenses 
caused in return to lag behind in the armament race on the Mediterranean.  Mehmet 
Beşikçi, The Organized Mobilization of the Popular Sentiments: The Navy League, 
1909-1919, (Unpublished MA Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 1999), p.13.      
37 “Osmanlılar için unutulmaz bir gün. O gün donanmamız büyük bir resmi geçit 
yapıyor…Medid bir delil-i istibdaddan kurtulup subh-ı sa’adete eren donanmamız 
nesim-ı hürriyet içinde cevelan ediyor….”  Dr. Fazıl Berki, “Donanma Cemiyeti Nasıl 
Doğdu ve Nasıl Büyüyor?”, Donanma, No: 1, March 1326/1910, p.11. 
38 Özçelik, Ibid, p.7.  Hüsnü Kınaylı, “Donanma Cemiyeti”, İstanbul Ansiklopedisi, vol. 
IX, (İstanbul: Koçu Yayınları, 1968), p.4966.    
39 Hüseyin Cahid was the chief editor of the Unionist daily newspaper Tanin. 
40 “Dünkü merasim Osmanlı donanmasının bir resmi geçidi değil, bir resmi küşadı idi…  
Kendimizi aldatmak istemezsek itiraf etmeliyiz ki biz bahriyemizin esasını bundan 
sonar kuracağız;  mütecanis, ihtiyacatı hazıra ile mütenasib, memleketimizin icabatına 
muvafık donanmaya bundan sonar sahip olacağız.”  Hüseyin Cahid, “Donanmamız,” 
Tanin, 5 July 1909/22 June 1325, cited in Beşikçi, ibid, .15. 
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In the same article, he proposed several solutions to ameliorate the condition of the 
navy, including the launching of a semi-official organization.  
Apparently, Hüseyin Cahid’s article matched the public concerns on the topic.  
On 10 July 1909, Dr. Hafız İbrahim, Dr. Petraki Papadopulos, Dr. İsmail Hakkı and 
chief engineer Haşim Bey initiated an extensive campaign to form an association and 
invited reputable merchants, clerical authorities, executives of the press, municipal staff, 
representatives of legal clubs and associations to join.41  The initiative resulted in the 
establishment of the Navy League on 19 July 1909.  Yağcızade Şefik Bey was voted as 
the president of the League at the same day and headed the League until it was 
abolished on 2 April 1909.  The League was also granted the protectorate of the 
Sultan.42   
The constitution of the League, signed on 4 November 1909, defined the raison 
d’être of the organization as to form a naval force that would be capable of meeting the 
empire’s needs in restoring its position among the great powers.  Thus, the League 
rendered itself responsible for utilizing every moral and material means as long as they 
were legitimate.43  
The organization indeed complied with this principle and engaged in a wide 
variety of economical activities.  The range and diversity of the League’s enterprises 
was quite impressive.  On the one hand, it managed a quicksilver mine in İzmir and on 
the other a theater hall in Istanbul.44  Other activities included sale of matches, cigarette 
                                                 
41 Beşikçi, Ibid. p.17 
42 Beşikçi, Ibid, p.18. 
43 “Donanma-yı Osmani Muavenet-i Milliye Cemiyeti Osmanlı Devleti’nin düvel-i 
mu’azzama arasındaki mevkiini muhafaza ve menafi’-ı umumiyeyi ve münasebat-ı 
ticariyesini te’min için ihtiyacatmızla mütenasib bir kuvve-i bahriye vücuda getirmek 
maksadıyla teşekküş etmiştir.  Ve bu maksada vüsul için maddi ve ma’nevi lazım gelen 
tedabir ve vesa’it-ı meşru’aya müraca’atla mükelleftir.” Donanma-yı Osmani Muavenet-
i Milliye Cemiyeti Nizamname-i Esasisi ve Usul-I Cibayet Talimatnamesi  (Dersaadet: 
Edeb Matbaası, 1911), cited in Beşikçi, Ibid,  p. 19. 
     During the Republican Era, the naval parade of 1909 was regarded in a much more 
acerbic tone than the day.  One common description was “the tragic parade of the musty 
ships”.  Kınaylı, Ibid, p.4697 
44 Millet Tiyatrosu.  Özçelik, Ibid. 
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papers, postcards, flags; running a “Seyr-ü Sefain”45 company, management of navy 
fields, organizing sports events, gathering of animal skins46 and filming military 
exercises to display at schools and theaters.47  Nevertheless, for the entire ten years of 
the League, all these activities equaled only to 32 per cent of its total income of 
3.517.436 Ottoman Liras (OL).48  The remaining 68 per cent was generated by 
donations.   
Right from its establishment, the League had to thus reach to a maximum 
number of people first and then to convince them to donate.  In return, this meant a wide 
structural network and an effective means of propaganda to succeed.  Inclusion of all 
sections of the Ottoman public, regardless of ethnic, religious, professional and regional 
differences, was essential, and everyone donating 1 guruş (piaster)49 during a year was 
welcomed.50 As an Ottoman non-Muslim and one of the founding members of the 
League, Dr. Petraki Papadapulo dealt with this point in the first issue of Donanma as 
follows:  
“This nation consists of thirty million individuals.  Within this thirty million, I 
cannot imagine anyone that would not want to contribute to the advancement of 
his nation and homeland.  Hence, we should address to this thirty million.  Yes, 
we should reach to the whole, to the old, the young and the children, to men and 
                                                 
45 Maritime transportation company 
46 It would be interesting to note that this practice continues today as an indirect legacy 
of the Navy League.  The confiscated properties of the League were transferred later to 
the Turkish Aviation Society (Türk Tayyare Cemiyeti).  During the Republican Era, the 
organization was renamed to Turkish Aviation Institution (Türk Hava Kurumu). The 
latter organization is officially entitled to gather animal skins as a form of donation 
today. 
47 Özçelik, Ibid, p.218. 
48 In this sense it could be regarded as a medium scale company. 
49 Until 1914, non-Muslims were an essential part of the Navy League’s structure.  
Besides being donators, they were also active members of the organization.  A 
considerable number of the branches included non-Muslim members.  It was not 
uncommon for a branch to have more non-Muslim members that Muslims in their 
executive committees.  In this regard, it is worth to note that only 6 out of 23 members 
of the Merchant Commission of the League’s Central Executive Committee were from 
Turkish origins.  Monsieur Sadof, the head of the Ottoman Bank’s Istanbul branch, 
chaired this commission.  Beşikçi, Ibid, p.19. 
50 Beşikçi, Ibid. 
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women, to the Turk, Arab, Albanian and Bulgarian, to the porter, to the peasant 
and to the urban.”51 
 
With the backing of the Ministry of Domestic Affairs and local administrations, 
the League spread its organizational network quite fast.  In its first year, the 
organization achieved to establish 122 branches, and at the end of June 1910, the 
number of the League’s members just in Istanbul reached to 36.000.52  The 
effectiveness and largeness of its network became so well known that it was publicly 
praised and appreciated by other newly sprouting organizations.53 Soon, the empire-
wide organization of the League was to become an international one. Within a few years 
of time, the organization’s branches spread from Argentina to Java Islands and from 
Edinburgh to South Africa.  The main goal of these branches was to incite the non-
Ottoman Muslims to donate.  To a limited extend, the League’s campaigns abroad 
succeeded to attract non-Muslim donations as well.54    
The Leaguers perceived the Muslims of India and Indian China as potentially 
wealthy and generous donators.  Thus, the abroad campaigns of the organization 
focused particularly on them and missions were dispatched to India as early as 
November 1909.55  First Ali Asgar Bey and then Muhammed Abdurrahman Han of 
Haydarabad, took decisive roles in these campaigns.  Although both of them managed 
to create a high degree of social sensitivity and to initiate widespread donation 
activities, the amount of the financial support came from these regions never met the 
Leaguers’ expectancies.56 
                                                 
51 “Bu millet otuz milyon efraddan teşekküldür.  Bu otuz milyon içerisinde hiçbir ferd 
tasavvur edemem ki milletinin, vatanının te’alisini arzu etmesin.  İşte biz bu otuz 
milyona müraca’at etmeliyiz.  Evet biz bu otuz milyonun kaffesine, ihtiyarına, gencine, 
çocuğuna, erkeğine, kadınına, Türk’üne, Arap’ına, Arnavut’una, Bulgar’ına, hamalına, 
köylüsüne, şehirlisine müraca’at etmeliyiz.” Petraki Papadapulo, “İlk Hatve,” 
Donanma, No: 1, March 1326/1910, p.6-7.  
52 Özçelik, Ibid, p. 134. 
53 One example was the Turkish Hearths which stated that they should become as large 
as the Navy League.  Beşikçi, Ibid, p.21. 
54 Özçelik, Ibid, p.192-198. 
55 Ibid, p. 59-61 
56 Ibid, p. 277. 
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On the other hand, the establishment of a wide structural network provided a 
feasible infrastructure for a massive propaganda campaign that would gain the voluntary 
support of the people.  In return, this would guarantee the continuous flow of donations.  
The campaign within the empire sought to realize this goal by addressing at the patriotic 
feelings of the people and to manufacture them if needed. A fundamental part of this 
effort included the explanation of a dire need for a navy that would serve to the people’s 
own well being.  The manipulation of the anxiety of disintegration accompanied these 
efforts.  In this framework, the League’s propaganda employed Ottomanism (until the 
end of the Balkan Wars) and Pan-Islamism as uniting discourses.  Indeed, the latter one 
constituted the core of the campaigns abroad.  Pan-Turkism only made a limited appeal 
up until the beginning of the First World War. 
Over a short time, the League’s efforts turned out to be a unique campaign and 
exceeded the sole purpose of obtaining donations.  The organization increasingly aimed 
at inciting people to get rid of social inactivity and to display to the whole world that 
they could make a collective effort towards the patriotic ends.  Thus, gradually 
expanding its institutional network and its appeal to the people, the League established 
itself as an effective channel within the Ottoman public sphere and contributed to the 
expansion of it.57  In return, this blurred the segregation between the state and the 
society further and emerged a political context that rendered state-society distinction 
irrelevant.58  As the First World War drew nearer, the League and the state forged closer 
ties.  The semi-official character of the League became more intense, and the League 
nearly became a branch of the Ministry of Domestic Affairs.  The CUP; thus, found a 
very powerful means through which it tried to mobilize the Ottomans materially and 
spiritually for the ends of a total war that would start in 1914. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
57 Özbek, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Sosyal Devlet, p. 303-304. 
58 Ibid. 
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I.2 “Donanma”: A Printed Campaign 
 
During the Second Constitutional Era, printing posed an essential medium to 
diffuse ideas and affect the public opinion.  Books, handbills, leaflets, posters, journals 
and newspapers were extensively used to manipulate popular sentiments and stimulate 
popular action.59  Pursuing a massive popular campaign, the Navy League utilized these 
means right from the beginning.60  In less than a year after its establishment, the League 
launched its own journal Donanma in March 1910.  The League, already having set up 
an extensive structural network, faced little difficulty in distributing its journal and 
making it accessible to a large number of people.   
 Donanma reached a considerable circulation as by its first issues.  The first two 
issues sold ten thousand copies in a very short time.  Due to popular demand, it needed 
to publish five thousand copies more.61  In comparison to two popular newspapers, 
Tanin and Sabah, these numbers are remarkable.  The circulation of Tanin was 
estimated to be around 7.000 in 1909, and Sabah reached to a maximum of 15.000 right 
before the First World War.62  Although Donanma, as other publications kept its 
circulation numbers secret, it is estimated that it retained a constant readership level.63 
The journal frequently referred to a “popular demand” and “pressure from the 
readers.”64    
  On the other hand, it is also worth to note that the sale of the journal was not 
limited to the Ottoman territories.  Through the League’s international branches, 
                                                 
59 Beşikçi, Ibid, p.30 
60 Ibid. 
61 Donanma,  no: 5,  July 1910, p.527, 537-538 
62 Kemal H. Karpat, “Traditionalist Elite Philosophy and the Modern Mass Media”, 
Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1968),  p.268.  Alpay Kabacalı, Başlangıcından Günümüze Türkiye'de Matbaa, Basın ve 
Yayın (İstanbul: Literatür, 2000), p.96. 
63 Beşikçi, Ibid, p.32. 
64 Donanma,  no: 5,  July 1910, p.537-538.  Donanma, no.129, 23 July 1917, p.1274. 
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Donanma reached to a wider audience.65  Significant numbers of readers from quite 
different parts of the world, such as Germany, Crete, Egypt and Romania, subscribed to 
the journal.66  The stock market of Bern specifically demanded Donanma for its 
library.67  In this sense, Donanma emerged as an important medium that had a domestic 
and international appeal and a potential to diffuse the Leaguers’ messages. 
 A quick look at the Navy League’s budget would be helpful to assess what 
Donanma meant for the League.  For its entire publishing life, the expenditure done for 
the journal was 1.232.293,15 guruşs and the income recorded by the sale of Donanma 
equaled to 888.726,07 guruşs.68  This basically refers to a loss of 343.567,08 guruşs.  In 
other words, the loss made by the journal worth slightly more than one transportation 
ship.  On the other hand, if the Leaguers have not had invested any money on Donanma, 
they could have bought four transportation ships instead.  At a time when each of these 
vessels counted, and the lack of them felt deeply as in the Tripolitian War, the Leaguers 
could not have ignored such a loss.69  
The financial reports of the League indicate that each issue of Donanma cost 50-
60 para, whereas the journal was sold for 40 para right until the end of the World War 
I.70  Considering that the Leaguers occasionally had to rely on imported paper to publish 
Donanma, their insistence on keeping the journal at 40 para becomes more striking.  It 
is also worth to note that Servet-i Fünun, another popular journal of comparable quality 
at the time, was sold at 100 para.71   
Thus, the Leaguers should have obviously seen the loss made by the journal as a 
form of investment and regarded the journal as a propaganda channel worth of spending 
their hardly earned guruşs.  As Donanma defined its goal to record, publish and 
facilitate the efforts of the League, the specific emphasis on “facilitating” implied that 
Donanma was never a naval journal only.  
                                                 
65 Özçelik , p.380 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Beşikçi, Ibid, p. 32. 
70 Özçelik, Ibid, p.284. 
71 Ibid. 
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            I.2.a General Characteristics of “Donanma” 
 
Donanma published 192 issues between March 1910 and March 1919.  From the 
first issue until the 47th-48th on January 1914, it had been a monthly journal.72  After six 
months break, it was transformed into a weekly magazine.  The last five issues of the 
journal appeared again on a monthly basis.  The shift from a monthly periodical to a 
weekly one also marked a watershed in terms of the journal’s publishing policies.  For 
the former period, the journal had a more literary and historical character as opposed to 
a newsreel for the latter.73   
The change corresponded to the beginning of the World War I, and the journal 
tried to keep up with the rapidly altering political situation inside and outside the 
Empire.  Parallel to the intertwining of the League with the state mechanism, Donanma 
transformed itself into a propaganda tool of the CUP for the following period.  Its 
mission of manipulating the public opinion for the navy campaign was turned into 
arousing public support for the ends of a total war and the party that executed it.    
Besides its high accessibility and relatively cheap price, Donanma’s popularity 
was also largely due to its illustrated character.  As an extension of an organization that 
aimed to mobilize the totality of the population, the journal’s goal was to attract as 
much people as possible.  Thus, accessing to a loosely defined and largely illiterate 
audience could not solely be achieved by the written word.  In order to overcome this 
problem, as well as raising its appeal, Donanma utilized visual materials intensively to 
attract and convince its readers.  During the wartime, the weekly issues applied to 
visuals more often than the earlier period in parallel to its new character.  To optimize 
the utility of the visuals, the journal also changed its size.  From the 49th issue onwards, 
Donanma was printed on newspaper size paper of 25 cm to 36 cm instead of a magazine 
                                                 
72 This was a bundled issue. Donanma, no: 47-48, January 1913. 
73 Kınaylı, Ibid, p.4698. 
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size paper of 17cm to 23 cm.74  This aspect of the journal will further be discussed in 
the next part of this chapter. 
The volume of the journal ranged from 65 pages to 110 pages for the first 48 
issues and then 16 to 30 pages until the last issue.  It had an outer front cover, an inner 
front cover and a back cover.  The outer front cover of Donanma did not change much 
over time.  The first issues of the journal had an illustration of a ship and a plane with 
Turkish flags on them.  From 40th issue onwards, this was replaced by the picture of 
Ottoman people from all sections of the society welcoming a battleship with a plane 
flying over it.  The inner front cover differed in each issue, and for the most of the time 
reflected the agenda of that month or week, if it was not reserved for a generous 
donator.75  The back cover was reserved for the advertisements and announcements.  
Between its 128th issue on 10 February 1916 and 129th issue on 23 July 1917, 
Donanma was inactive for 28 months.  Although the journal did not make an 
announcement about ceasing its publication, the 129th issue stated that they began their 
publishing life again.76  The journal addressed at the shortage of paper as the reason 
behind this long break, and stated that it will ardently continue to serve: 
“ After a long and obligatory break, Donanma Mecmuası starts its service for the 
homeland again.  Exposed to the increasing demand of the reverend nation, the 
journal managed to overcome the shortage of paper and took over its duty taking 
the national holiday as a fortunate sign.”77 
 
                                                 
74 Ibid. 
75 Putting the photograph of the most generous donator of the month was a common 
practice for the Leaguers to incite the rich Ottomans to donate.  However, after the 
earlier issues, this method was gradually abandoned, and after the journal turned into a 
newsreel never used.    
76 Donanma,  no: 129, 23 July 1917.  It would be also interesting to note that Server 
İskit mentioned Donanma among the new publications of the year 1917.  Server R İskit, 
Türkiyede Matbuat Rejimleri (İstanbul: ülkü matbaası, 1939), p.110. 
77 “Iztırarî ve medîd bir vakfeden sonra “Donanma” mecmuası yine hizmet-i 
vataniyesine başlıyor.  Muhterem milletin mütezayîd bir rağbetine mazhar olan 
“mecmua” ta’tîl-i ihtiyarîye sebep olan kağıtsızlık ma’nisini son günlerde izâle 
edebilmiş ve millet bayramını fâl-i hayr bilerek işe başlamıştır.”  Donanma, “Muhterem 
Millete”, Donanma, no:129, 23 July 1917, p.1274. 
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The varying quality of the journal’s paper also indicated that the Leaguers quite often 
experienced this kind of a crisis.  Instead of white paper, Donanma was printed on 
yellow or pink paper as well. 
Over its publishing life, different presses printed Donanma.  For the first 21 
issues, Matbaa-ı Hayriyye, Matbaa-ı Ahmed Ihsan, Sırat-ı Müstakim and Matbaa-ı 
Osmani printed the journal, varying from one issue to another.78  Between 22 and 129 
issues, Donanma worked with Matbaa-ı Hayriyye and then with Matbaa-ı Ahmed İhsan 
and Ayyıldız Matbaası.  
The journal had its own executive commission under the CEC of the Navy 
League, the function of which did not exceed administrative duties.79  Although, it is 
known that Midhat Cemal [Kuntay] was assigned as Donanma’s editor from February 
1913 onwards, the data for the prior period is ambiguous.80  Thus, it could only be 
speculated that Dr. Fazıl Berki Bey81 or Ali Şükrü Bey82 were responsible for 
publishing Donanma for the earlier period. 
                                                 
78 Selahattin Özçelik referred to two different agreements with printing houses.  One 
was signed Matbaa-ı Osmani on 28 October 1911 and the other on 16 March 1912 with 
Matbaa-ı Hayriyye.  The latter agreement seems to have been much more consistent, as 
following 107 issues of the journal was printed by Matbaa-ı Hayriyye. Özçelik, Ibid, p. 
280. 
79 Some of the League’ incumbents that worked for this commission and their monthly 
saaries were as follows: 
    Kemal Bey (Director and chief accountant) 400 kuruş 
    Suphi Bey  (Sales and subscription incumbent) 600 kuruş  
    Mehmet Efendi (Post office incumbent) 300 kuruş 
    Asım Efendi (Caretaker) 250 kuruş 
    Mürsel Efendi (Caretaker) 250 kuruş 
    Haparsom Efendi (Caretaker) 250 kuruş 
    Süleyman Efendi (Caretaker) 259 kuruş   Özçelik, p. 346.  
80 It is also unknown for how long Mithad Cemal [Kuntay] retained this position.  
81 Dr. Fazıl Berki, apparently a doctor as the founding members of the League, 
represented a typical public activist profile coming from Ottoman schools of natural 
sciences, the students and graduates of which had been the most active element in social 
movements and the revolutionary ideas in the Ottoman Empire.  After joining the Navy 
League as early as 1909, he quickly became the chief of propaganda of the League and 
became the voice that spoke about the goals, the campaigns and the achievements of the 
League via Donanma and other written channels in order to substantiate the Navy 
League as a popular association. This particular aspect is quite important since most of 
the articles or announcements on the deeds of the League were signed by the journal’s 
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I.2.b An Overview of “Donanma”s Textual Content 
Donanma defined itself as an “illustrated, moral, literary, historical, scientific”83 
periodical that belonged to the nation.  Therefore, it embodied a simply written and 
wide textual content, which was designed to appeal to every strata of the society. The 
range of its substance varied from talks with peasants to naval technology and from 
international relations to literature and sports.  In this context, the journal possessed a 
dynamic and varying writers cadre instead of a constant one.  The contributors included 
popular and influential pens of the time, and young writers were also encouraged to 
participate (see Table-1).  All of the writers of Donanma took part on a volunteer basis 
and without any financial demand. 
 
    
Name of the Author: Appearances: Name of the Author: Ap.. 
    
Ali Rıza Seyfi 122 Ebu’f-Fuad Refik 14 
Abidin Daver 83 Ferid Vecdi 13 
Ali Şükrü 41 Haşim Nahid  13 
Hüseyin Kazım Kadri 38 Kazım Nami [Duru] 13 
Ali Fahri 34 Hakkı Tarık [Us] 12 
                                                                                                                                               
own name “Donanma”, whereas, Dr. Fazıl Berki Bey openly put his name under such 
articles on different occasions.  Considering the regulation of the Navy League that 
members of the CEC could not take part in other commissions of the League, including 
Donanma, it would be meaningful to note that he was absent from the CEC only for the 
period of 1910-1911, for the entire ten years of the League’s existence.  Thus, for the 
initial period of the journal, Dr. Fazıl Berki Bey emerges as a very proper candidate for 
the editorship of the journal. 
82 Ali Şükrü, on the other hand, appeared as another important propagandist of the 
League, who engaged in written polemics on the campaigns of the Navy League and 
tried to dissolve public suspicions about the necessity of contributing to the navy, 
mainly through Donanma and substantiated himself as the vanguard of the League in 
the public eye.82 He carried this stance even outside the boundaries of the empire and 
tried to influence the British public opinion on the Italian invasion of Tripoli.  Taking 
this background into account together with the fact that his name has been offered for 
the editorial post in the general meeting of the CEC on 25 Ocotober 1913, Ali Şükrü 
could be treated as a second possible candidate for the editorial post, prior to Midhat 
Cemal.82 
83 Donanma ,no. 1, March 1910, inner cover. 
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Necmeddin Sahir 29 Safvet Nezihi 12 
Mahmud Muin 26 Ömer Seyfeddin 11 
Ahmed Rasim 25 Şahabeddin Süleyman 10 
Ahmed Kemal 24 Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuad 10 
Ahmed Vahid 24 Ali Canip [Yöntem] 9 
Salime Servet Seyfi 24 Aka Gündüz 9 
Mithad Cemal [Kuntay] 19 Süleyman Nutkî 9 
Halid Fahri [Ozansoy] 18 Dr. Fazıl Berki 7 
Ali Haydar Emir 16 Enis Behiç [Koryürek] 5 
Cenab Şahabeddin  18 Nezihe Muhlis 5 
    
 
Table-1:  The list of authors with the most appearances 
 
 The textual content of Donanma could roughly be grouped under five major 
headings: i. News stories ii. Articles iii. Literary pieces iv. Sports and v. 
Announcements and advertisements.   
I.2.b.i News Stories 
The shift in the character of Donanma could be traced in the bursting numbers 
of the exclusive news stories.  During the first four years of the journal, texts that could 
be treated under this heading did not exceed 35, and 11 of them were simple reports on 
the general meetings of the Navy League.  From the 49th issue onwards84, for the rest of 
the five years, there were 95 exclusive news stories, which were accompanied by many 
smaller ones.  This was indeed an outcome of the World War I and its wide coverage by 
Donanma.  In this sense, Donanma appeared as a “war magazine” rather than a “naval 
journal.”   
Throughout the war, the journal depicted the Entente powers in a weak position 
and always on the losing side.  As opposed to that, it provided an extensive German 
propaganda and overstated the successes of the Central powers.85  The declaration of the 
                                                 
84 Donanma, no:29, July 1912. 
85 Beşikçi Ibid. p. 33 
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“Cihad-ı Ekber”86 on 14 October 1914 and its perception by the Muslims were strongly 
emphasized and represented in a way that it was welcomed with great excitement.87 The 
invasion of Britain by the Germans was also a frequently used theme as in “The British 
Fear of Invasion”88 or “The Bombardment.”89 The Ottoman armies on the fronts 
received a special attention.  Abidin Daver, for 37 issues between 29 April 1915 and 10 
February 1916, appeared as a war reporter and tried to inform the readers on Ottoman 
fronts.  The Gallipoli Wars received a special coverage in these narratives, whereas the 
deeds of the torpedo boat “Muavenet-i Milliye” or the sea mines were epitomized, 
which were indeed bought by the League.90  
I.2.b.ii. Articles 
Donanma, throughout its printing life, published articles on various topics.  The 
quantitative balance among the articles shifted in relation to the socio-political context.  
First World War particularly played a determinant role on the types of the articles as 
well as their content.  According to their substance, Donanma’s articles could be 
divided into nine subgroups: Military articles, scientific articles, historical articles, 
social and political articles; articles on economy, women, pedagogy, morality and 
peasants.  
I.2.b.ii.A. Military and Scientific Articles 
In terms of their content, military articles could be separated into two periods.  
Up until the beginning of the World War I, the main emphasis had been put on the 
battleships of the future, the weakness of the Ottoman navy during the Balkan Wars and 
                                                 
86 The Great Jihad 
87 “Arabistan Cihad’ıNasıl Karşıladı?”, Donanma no:79, 25 January 1915, p. 465. 
88 Arif Cemal, “İngilizler’de İstila Korkusu”, Donanma, no: 79, p. 488-490. (Referring 
to the British newspapers, the news told that the British were anxious and were in dire 
need of soldiers to dispatch to the fronts.) 
89Anonymous, “Bombardıman”, Donanma. no: 85, 15 March 1915, p. 577. (This 
particular news told that, although the Entente powers were losing both on the fronts 
and on politics, they insisted on bombarding the Dardanaelles.) 
90 Abidin Daver, “Muavenet-i Milliye’nin Gazası”, no:158-159, 18 March 1918, p. 
1761-1763. 
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the Tripolitian War.91  Most of the articles of this period used the Greek Navy as a 
reference point for its stronger position vis-à-vis the Ottoman Navy.92 
With the outbreak of the World War I, military articles started to deal also with 
in depth analyses of the prominent naval forces of the day.93  However, the constant 
                                                 
91 Some examples of  these kind of articles can be listed as follows: 
    Ali Fahri, “Nasıl Gitmişler”, Donanma, no: 53, 27 July 1914,  p. 69-70. (On how the 
Italians managed to go Tripoli without any interference.  This article was a series and 
continued to published after the Ottoman Empire’s entry into the World War I) 
    Ali Kâmi, “Sedefde Pırlanta”, Donanma, no: 36, February 1912, p. 539-543. (On the 
surprise attack of the Italians and that the Ottoman navy was 24 hours away from the 
African shores.) 
    Ali Rıza Seyfi, “Trablus Donanmasızlıktan Yanıyor”, Donanma, no: 17, July 1911, p. 
1528-1541. 
    Ali Rıza Seyfi, “Tarihi Müşebâhatlar”, Donanma,  no: 34-35, December 1911-
January 1912, p. 499-509.  (On   the reasons of the Ottoman losses during the Italian 
and Balkan Wars) 
    Ali Haydar Emir, “Donanmasızlık”, Donanma,  no: 43-44, September-November 
1913, p. 868-878. (On the weakness of the Ottoman navy and its effect on the fat of the 
empire) 
    Mustafa Kemal, “Müstâkbel Zırhlılar Nasıl Olacak?”, Donanma, no: 8, November 
1910, p. 690-695. 
    Mehmed Rauf, “En Yeni ve En Son Zırhlılar”, Donanma,  no:  19, September 1911, 
p. 1756-1760. 
    Yunus Nadi [Abalıoğlu], “Hâdisât- Câriyye Karşısında Hasbihâl” , Donanma, no: 31, 
September 1912, p. 295-299. (On the first Balkan War and the role of the Ottoman 
Navy in it) 
92 İsmet, “Zenginlerimize,” Donanma, no:8, October 1910, pp.684-685.  
93  Some important examples can be given as: 
    Abidin Daver, “İngilitere Muhasara Edebiliyor mu?”,  Donanma, no: 81, 15 February 
1915, p. 519-523. (About the surrendering of the British navy by German ships) 
    Ahmed, “Baltık Denizi’nde Rus Müdafaası’nın Esasları”, Donanma, no: 15, 3 
January 1918, outer front cover. 
    Ahmed, “Fransa’nın Sakit Donanması”, Donanma, no: 133, 23 August 1917, p. 1345-
1347. (The condition of the French navy during the war and the German naval assault 
on French shores.) 
    Ahmed, “İtalyan Donanması”, Donanma, no: 134, 30 August 1917, p. 1360-1361. (A 
review on the Italian navy since the beginning of the war) 
    Ahmed, “Düvel Müttehide-i Amerika Donanması”, Donanma, no: 139, 4 October 
1917, p. 1440-1441. (About the new navy building program of the USA and its support 
to the Entente powers) 
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emphasis on the “Greek threat” never disappeared from the content of the journal.94 The 
situation of the Ottoman army and navy was watched closely.  In this regard, the 
language of the articles became more optimistic and encouraging for the duration of the 
World War I.  The journal ceased to refer to the vulnerability of the Ottoman navy, and 
instead put strong emphasis on the bravery and the strength of the Ottoman soldiers.95 
The Gallipoli Wars were reserved a special place.  All the regarding articles 
overwhelmingly addressed at the incapability of the Entente powers to penetrate the 
Dardanelles and at their losses.96  
The Central powers and Germany in particular, were praised and represented as 
invincible vis-à-vis the Entente forces.  The journal reserved considerable space for 
these articles and identified Ottomans with those victories as well.97  The Battle of 
                                                                                                                                               
    Ahmed, “Düşmanların Sefâin-i Harbiye Zayiatı 1.000.000 Ton”, Donanma, no: 160, 
4 April 1918, p. 1779-1782. (An analysis on the destroyed Entente ships) 
    Anonymous, “Japon Donanması”, Donanma, no: 139, 4 October 1917, p. 1441-1442 
(On the new Japanese naval program)    
    Anonymous, “Bahr-i Sefid’de”, Donanma, no: 69, 22 November 1914, p. 328-330 
(On the military strength of Germany, Austria and France) 
    Anonymous, “Alman Donanması”, no: 169, 13 Haziran 1918, p. 1931-1932.  
(Accounts on the last 15 years of the German navy) 
94 As an example: 
     Ahmed, “Yunan Ticaret Donanması ve Sûret-i Tekâmülü”, Donanma, no: 143, 1 
November 1917, p. 1507-1509. (About the condition of the Greek navy during the 
World War I) 
95  Ali Rıza Seyfi, “Yiğitlik Meşaleleri”, Donanma, no: 185, 13 October 1918, p. 2176-
2179. (On how brave and self-sacrificing were the Ottoman soldiers on the sees and on 
the land) 
     Anonymous, “Türk Neferinin Nasiyesi”, Donanma, no: 27 September 1917, p. 1427.        
96  Some articles on this aspect: 
     Anonymous, “Zafer ve Harekât-ı Mezbuhane”, Donanma, no: 82, 22 February 1915, 
p. 529.  (About the British defeat and the bombardment of a slaughterhouse by the 
British ships) 
    Anonymous, “Çanakkale Bombardımanı”, Donanma, no:  83, 29 Şubat 1915, p. p. 
545. (On the inconclusive bombardment of Gallipoli) 
    Anonymous, “İkinci Çanakkale Muzafferiyeti”, Donanma, no: 91, 29 April 1915, p. 
673. (On the defeat of landing Entente powers.  Talks about the humiliation of the 
Entente soldiers.) 
97  Von Mavki, “Eamden’in Menâkıbı”, Donanma, no:  172-187, 4 July 1918-24 
October 1918. (A series of articles, translated by Ali Haydar Emin from the original 
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Jutland posed a great example to this.  Fought between British and German fleets on 31-
1 June 1916, the battle was regarded with high esteem and referred as a remarkable 
German victory, although the outcome of the war was inconclusive for both sides.98 
The fascination and curiosity about the new warfare technologies became 
prominent themes of the military articles as well as the scientific articles.   Besides 
dreadnoughts, which were hailed as swimming castles, zeppelins, warplanes and 
submarines were put under a closer look.99  Anything and everything about these war 
devices tried to be explained to the public in a simple language.   
Submarines and dreadnoughts were at the center of the military and scientific 
articles.  Military articles discussed their effectiveness and importance in the war 
strategies, whereas scientific articles focused more on their functioning.100 The new 
                                                                                                                                               
article German by the second captain of the German ship Eamden.  This ship was 
known with its pirate attacks on the Entente ships in the open sees, throughout the war) 
    Anonymous, “Muharebe ve Alman Metanet-i Ahlkaiyesi”,  Donanma, no: 92-93, 2 
May 1915-13 May 1915.  (On the dignity, resilience and bravery of the German soldiers 
in the War)  
   Yekta Bahir, “Alman Bahriye Topları”, Donanma, no: 96, 20 May 1915, p. 729-730. 
(On the efficiency of the german artillery) 
98  Abidin Daver, “İskajerak Muharebesi”, Donanma, no: 135-156. (A series of articles 
on the analysis of the Battle of Jutland, which was regarded as the greatest naval battle 
of the time.  Daver argued that the “proud” German navy instead of the British navy 
despite its superior number won the war) 
99 M.B İdris, “Zeplinler”, Donanma, no: 80, 8 February 1915, p. 508-510. (About 
Zeppelinsi their functions and importance in terms of war strategies.) 
    M.B İdris, “Saç Teyyareler”, no: 84, 8 March 1915, p. 573-574. (On hydroplanes and 
their impact) 
100 Examples for military articles on this aspect:  
    Abidin Daver, “Alman Tahtelbahirleri”, Donanma, no: 68-69, 16 October-22 October 
1914.  (Underlined the effectiveness of the German submarines vis-à-vis the Entente 
powers, and shifted the balance in the naval force towards Germany) 
    Abidin Daver, “Tatelbahirler Düşmana Aman Dedirtebilecekler mi?”, Donanma, no: 
129, 23 July 1917, p.1284-1286.  (About the abilities of the submarines)   
    Anonymous, “Tahtelbahir mi Zırhlı mı?”, Donanma, no: 52, 20 July 1914, p. 63-64. 
(A comparison between battleships andsubmarines) 
    S.B, “Drednought Müsabakası”, Donanma, no: 54, 3 August 1914, p. 90-91. (On the 
significance of dreadnoughts determining the power of a navy and the competition 
among the European powers to possess more dreadnoughts than others) 
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Ottoman dreadnought “Yavuz”, former Goeben, was regarded particularly as the “star” 
of the Ottoman navy and represented as a source of proud.101 
 
I.2.b.ii.B Historical Articles 
The dominant theme of this category had overwhelmingly been the narrative of 
the Ottoman naval victories and the heroes of the seas.  In this sense, the battles of 
Preveza, Djerba and Lepanto appeared as constant subjects and the names of Barbaros 
Hayreddin, Turgut Reis and Oruç Reis were frequently used.102  Considering this on the 
one hand, and the constant search for a golden past for the Ottoman navy on the other, 
most of the writers addressed at the 16th century as the heyday of the Ottomans on the 
sea.103  The conquest of Istanbul and the deeds of Mehmed II were also constantly 
                                                                                                                                               
    Tevfik, “Tahtelbahirler”, Donanma, no: 149, 26 December 1918, p. 1603-1604, no: 
151, 17 January 1918, p. 1636-1637. (On increasing importance of submarines in the 
war and their development)     
     Some of the scientific articles regarding this theme: 
     Abidin Daver, “Tahtelbahirler Mağlub Edilebilir mi?”,  Donanma, no: 130, 15 
August 1917. (Explains how to deal with the submarines and pinpoints methods to 
defeat them.) 
     E. Naci, “Bir Drednot Nasıl İnşa Edilir?”, Donanma, no: 37, March 1913, p. 590-
599. (Elaborates on how a dreadnoughts were built and technical details of them)     
101 Tahsin Nuri, “Yavuz’un Karadeniz Seferlerinden”, Donanma, no: 175, 25 July 1918, 
p.2023-2028. (On the “victories” of Yavuz in the Black Sea)  
    Anonymous, “Yavus ve Midilli’nin Menâkıbı”, no: 162-163, 18 April 1918-25 April 
1918. (An account of Yavuz and Middilli during their services for the Ottoman navy)  
102 A.R, “İnebahtı Muharebesi”, Donanma, no: 13, March 1911, p. 1198-1207.  
    Ahmed Refik, “Cerbe’den Dönerken”, Donanma, no: 1, March 1910, p. 57-63. 
    Ali Rıza Seyfi, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Deniz Muharebeleri”, Donanma, no: 
168-188, 19 June 1918-1 December 1918. (A series of articles on the lives and deaths of 
Oruç Reis, Hızır Reis, and Barbaros Hayreddin) 
    H[üseyin]K[azım] [Kadri], “Barbaros Hayreddin”, Donanma, no: 129, 23 July 1917, 
p.1280-1282.  ( Depicted Barbaros Hayreddin as the most prominent Ottoman seaman 
and recited is career)        
103 Anonymous, “Osmanlı Donanması 966-1000”, Donanma, no: 131, 9 August 1917, p. 
1319-1320. (The article regards the Ottoman Navy of the 16th century as the most 
glorious and victorious military force of all the time)  
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reminded to the people; whereas the Donanma writers tried hard to establish a linkage 
between him and Mehmed V, the honorary chairman of the Navy League.104  
Anti-Russian tones were heavily felt among the historical articles as they were 
in every other section of Donanma.  Particularly during the World War I, the journal 
attempted to give the message that Ottomans were always victors against the Russians.  
Thus, the Battle of Prut, Ahmed III and Baltaci Mehmed Pasha became strong reference 
points to justify this argument.105   
Using Islam as a mobilizing force inside and outside the Empire, the journal also 
tried to forge closer ties among the League’s Muslim supporters via articles on the early 
Islamic history and the military achievements of the time.106  During the World War I, 
the journal put peculiar emphasis on the German history and tried to arouse pro-German 
sentiments among the people.107 
 
I.2.b.ii.C. Social and Political Articles 
This category covered an extensive range of issues. A major branch was the 
analysis of international relations and shifting political balances during the World War 
                                                 
104 Faruk Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, “İstanbul ve Fethinin Ehemmiyet-i Maziye ve Hatırasına 
Atf-ı Nazar”, Donanma, no: 169, 13 June 1918, p.1917-1921. (On the history of 
İstanbul and its conquest by the Ottomans) 
    Anonymous, “Fetih ve Fatih”, no: 100, 17 June 1915, p. 791.  (About the conquest of 
Istanbul and Mehmed II) 
     Necmeddin Sahir, “Sultan Mehmedler”, Donanma, no: 177-186, 8 August 1918-17 
October 1918. (On the lives of the Ottoman sultans with the name “Mehmed”.  Relates 
Mehmed II and Mehmed V with each other) 
105 Hüseyin Ulvi bin Hacı Ahmed Bursevi, “Miratüzzafer”, Donanma, no: 58-68, 7 
September 1914-7 December 1914. (A series of articles on the War of Prut, Ahmed III 
and the commander of the Ottoman army at Prut Baltaci Mehmed Pasha) 
106 Hüseyin Ruhi, “İlk İslam Donanması”, Donanma,  no: 16, p.1500-1504. 
    M. Safvet, “İslam’ın İlk Ordusu”, Donanma, no: 15, May 1911, p. 1377-1380.  
    M. Safvet, “Tarih-i İslam’ın Şanlı Sahifelerinden”, Donanma, no: 13, March 1911. 
(Accounts on the early Islamic conquests)       
107 Yusuf Osman, “Almanya’nın Terakkiyat-ı Ahiresi”, Donanma,  no: 105-111, 22 July 
1915-14 October 1915. (A series of articles on the historical development of Germany 
with a specific emphasis on its progress in heavy industry) 
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I.108 Within this context, Donanma writers focused particularly on the Muslims in the 
world and their attitude vis-à-vis the Jihad and the Great War.  A remarkable attempt of 
the writers was to try to represent the position of the Ottoman Empire as the defender of 
the Islam and to list the numbers of Muslims around the world according to the 
countries they lived in.109  After the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, Donanma also laid 
claim on the Russia’s Black Sea fleet and published articles demanding the handing 
over of the Russian ships to the Ottoman Empire.110 
Donanma put a special emphasis on “patriotism” right from the beginning.  The 
definitions of “homeland” and “patriot” were handled over and over again.111  The 
                                                 
108 Abdurrahman Şerif, “Harb-i Hazırın Menşe-i”, Donanma, no: 107-156, 2 September 
1915-7 March 1918. (A series of articles dealing with the emergence of he World War I, 
the expectancies of the states involved in, and the developments during the war and 
their effects on international politics)    
109 Donanma, “Hem de Müslümanlığın Şiarı Budur”, Donanma, no: 102, 18 June 1915, 
p. 818.  (On the differences between the Muslims who fought against the enemy and 
who did not) 
    M.C, “Arzda Ne Kadar İslam Var?”, Donanma, no: 115, 11 November 1915, p. 
1050-1053. (An account on the population of the Muslims and where they lived) 
   Lütfullah Ahmed, “Müslümanları Tanıyalım”, Donanma, no: 74, 28 December 1914, 
p. 407-410. (About the numbers of Muslims with a specific emphasis on Russia) 
    Anonymous, “İslam ve Muharebe”, Donanma, no: 65, 26 October 1914, p. 262-263. 
(The articles states  that all other Muslim states did follow the position of the Ottoman 
Empire throughout the World War I) 
110 Abidin Daver, “Karadeniz Filosu Bizim Olmalıdır”, Donanma, no: 166, 23 May 
1918, p.1869-1870. (The author claimed that the Russian fleet belonged to Ottomans) 
   Abidin Daver, “Karadeniz Filosu Meselesi”, Donanma, no: 167, 12 June 1918, p. 
1895-1897.  (The article emphasized on the importance of Russian Black Sea Fleet and 
the necessity to confiscate it) 
   Ali Şükrü, “Rus Filosu Kimindir?”, Donanma,  no: 165, 9 May 1918, p. 1868.  
111 Mustafa Haluk, “Terbiye-i Vataniyyenin Avamili”, Donanma, no: 30, August 1912, 
p. 257-259. (The article dealt with the importance of raising the children as patriots) 
    Mustafa Haluk, “Vatanperverlik İhtiyacı”, Donanma, no: 28, June 1912, p. 149-154. 
(About the dire need of patriotism during the time of wars) 
    Mustafa Haluk, “Vatanperverlik Tarz-ı Telakkisi ve Fikr-i İnsaniyyet”, Donanma, no: 
27, May 1912, p. 10-106. (On different models of patriotism in various countries) 
    M. Safvet, “Halet-i Ruhiyemiz”, Donanma, no: 17, June 1911, p. 1571-1573. (The 
article dealt with the “inherited feeling of homeland” in Ottomans)  
    M. Ali, “Vatanperverlik”, Donanma, no: 41, July 1913, p. 795-797.     
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classical question of the 19th century reformers on “progress” was continuously asked 
and comparisons between the Ottoman Empire and Japan were drawn.112 For the 
duration of the World War I, German politics also became a major point of interest for 
Donanma writers.113 
I.2.b.ii.D. Articles on Economy 
Maritime trade was the main focus of the economical articles in Donanma.  In 
this regard, the capacity of the Ottoman Empire and prominent international powers 
were compared and analyzed.114  Questioning the condition of the Ottoman economy, 
Donanma writers sought solutions mostly in terms of maritime trade.115  The effects of 
the World War I on the Ottoman and foreign economies were also tried to be 
                                                 
112 Ali Şükrü, “Bir Millet Nasıl Terakki Eder?”, Donanma, no: 144-185, 8 November 
1917-13 October 1918. (A series of articles on the ways of progressing the Otoman 
Empire.  The articles usually referred to Japan as a role model) 
    Mehmed Rauf, “Türkiye Niçin Terakki Edemiyor”, Donanma, no: 22, December 
1911, p. 2002-2008. (An account on the reasons for the failure of the Ottomans to 
progress) 
113 Ali Rıza Seyfi, “Alman Hükümdarları”, Donanma, no: 70, 30 November 1914, p. 
343-346. (The article accounted on German rulers, their policies and how long they did 
reign) 
   Ali Şükrü, “Almanları İyi Tanıyalım”, Donanma, no: 128, 10 February 1916, p. 1267-
1270. (A political comparison of Germany with USA) 
114 Abidin Daver, “Sefain-i Ticariye Buhranı”, Donanma, no: 191, 1 March 1919, p. 
2274-2275. (An overall assessment of the maritime trade during the first World War) 
    Anonymous, “Amerikan Ticaret Filosu”, Donanma, no: 190, 1 February 1919, p. 
2263-2266.      
115 Ahmed, “Bahr-i Ticaret Meselesi”, Donanma, no: 167, 30 June 1918. p. 1891-1895. 
(The article states that the maritime trade was neglected in the Ottoman Empire for a 
long time, and that this played a determinant role in the economical stagnation of the 
empire) 
    Mustafa Suphi, “Deniz Ticareti”, Donanma, no: 11, January 1910, p. 990-993. 
(About the Ottoman maritime trade) 
    Soysallıoğlu, “Memleketimizde Ticaret-i Bahriye”, Donanma, no: 179, 22 August 
1918, p. 2083-2086. (The article deals with the maritime trade of the Ottoman Empire at 
the end of the World War I) 
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assessed.116 Midhat Cemal [Kuntay]’s translations from Karl Marx’s Das Kapital 
constituted a remarkable part within the economical articles.117 
 
I.2.b.ii.E Articles on Women 
Although the numbers of the articles on women remained quite limited in 
Donanma, the ones that were published should be noticed in terms of their content.  
Despite the scarcity of their numbers, one important subject of this category was on 
women’s right to vote. An anonymous article titled as “Suffrage Rights for Women” 
was published on the inner front cover of Donanma in four parts, between the 136th and 
139th issues of in 1917.118 Also, the 137th issue had in its inner front cover an article 
titled as “The Land of Free Women.”119  Women’s increasing participation into the 
public working life constituted another important theme with an emphasis on the 
employment of women in the unoccupied “male professions.”120  Kazım Nami [Duru]’s 
article on the female volunteers of the Hungarian Red Cross is also worth to mention as 
he addressed them as role models for the Ottoman women and referred their 
involvement into civic mobilization with high esteem.121  
I.2.b.ii.F. Articles on Pedagogy 
The articles under this category could be divided into two groups; military 
education and education of children in general.  The first group focused on specific 
                                                 
116 Abidin Daver, “Tahtelbahirler Kaç Ton Batırdı?”, Donanma,  no: 146, 22 October 
1917, p. 1556-1557.  
Ahmed, “Harbde Tüccar Sefaini”, Donanma, no: 110, 7 October 1915, p. p. 967-968. 
(The article underlined that navy was not just a significant part of a state’s wealth but 
also was an important tool in terms of trade, politics and military) 
117 Midhat Cemal [Kuntay] “Sermaye”, Donanma, no: 30, August 1912, p. 242-245.  
118 Anonymous, “Kadınlar İçin Hakk-ı İntihab”, Donanma, no: 136-139, 26 September 
1917-4 October 1917. 
119 Anonymous, “Hür Kadınlar Memleketi”, Donanma, no: 137, 20 September 1917, p. 
inner front cover. (An article on feminism and freedom of women) 
120 Kazım Nami [Duru], “Harb ve Kadınlarımız”, Donanma, no: 129-130, 23 July 1917-
2 August 1917. 
121 Kazım Nami [Duru], “Macar Salib-i Ahmer Kadınları’nın Faaliyeti”, Donanma, no: 
162, 18 May 1918, p. 1810-1812. 
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issues on the training, disciplining and education of the students at the Ottoman naval 
schools.122  The latter group, on the other hand, focused on the “proper” ways to raise 
and train children.123  It would also be crucial to note that a partial translation of Herbert 
Spencer’s Essays on Education and Kindred Subjects appeared within this category.124  
Considering that Spencer had been regarded as the father of “Social Darwinism,” and 
that he applied the term “survival of the fittest” to the human societies, it would not be 
inappropriate to state that this idea was adopted and utilized by Donanma for social 
mobilization and child education in the context of the World War I.125 
 
I.2.b.ii.G. Articles on Morality 
The social and economic depressions triggered by the continuous wars, also had 
their reflections on the pages of Donanma.  Besides numerous other articles that dealt 
indirectly with this issue, some writers put specific emphasis on the topic.  The journal’s 
writers addressed at “moral decay” in the Ottoman society and underlined it as a major 
obstacle in front of the state’s progress.  Within this context, suicide and beggars 
appeared as frequently recited themes.126  
                                                 
122 Yunus Nadi [Abalıoğlu], “Heybeliada Mektepleri”, Donanma, no: 172, 4 July 1918, 
p. 1966-1968. 
    Abidin Daver, “Mekteb-i Bahriyemiz”, Donanma, no: 169, 13 June 1918, p. 1924-
1926. (A comparison of the Ottoman and European naval schools) 
    Hami, “Kâtib Mekteb-i Bahriye-yi Şâhânesi”, Donanma, no: 180,  29 August 1918, 
p. 2099-2100. (About the first graduates and the new education system in these schools) 
123 Haşim Nâhid, “Tecdid, Mâruf”, Donanma, no: 106, 13 August 1915, p. 905-906.  
(About the relationship between child development and education)   
     Ömer Kemal, “Talim ve Terbiye”, Donanma, no: 96, 20 May 1915, p. 730-731. (The 
articlestated that education is a mean not an end)     
     Midhat Cemal [Kuntay], “Darüşşafaka Talebesine”, no: 14, April 1911, p. 1255. 
(Advices to the students) 
124 Herbert Spencer, “Talim ve Terbiye”, translated by Ahmed Kemal, Donanma, no: 
87, 1 April 1915. 
125 James G. Kennedy, Herbert Spencer. (Boston: G. K. Hall & Co., 1978). 
126 Bediî Nuri, “İntihar”, Donanma, no: 14, April 1911, p. 1278-1284. (The article dealt 
with the moral and philosophical dimensions of suicide) 
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I.2.b.ii.H. Articles on Peasants 
Written in a conversational format, these articles attempted to inform peasants 
on everything about the Navy League and the ongoing events with a simple language.127  
Applying to naïve examples and manipulating the anxiety of peasants, these articles 
mainly aimed at the civil mobilization in the rural areas and tried to substantiate navy as 
an essential means to save the people.  In these articles, the journal assumed the role of 
a father or a wise person and tried to dispose the League’s and the CUP’s propaganda in 
a didactic way.   
 
I.2.b.iii. Literary Pieces 
Donanma could be regarded as a colorful and rich periodical in terms of its 
literary content.  Prominent literary figures made frequent contributions to the journal 
and improved Donanma’s ability to appeal to people’s sentiments.  Although it was not 
only a literary journal, in terms of arousing and manipulating popular sentiments, 
literary texts proved to be essential in the general content of the journal.  Thus, it would 
not be inaccurate to say that this category posed as a medium through which the 
Leaguers and Donanma communicated with the popular masses on an intimate level.  
Categorization of the literary content can be done under five major headings: Poems, 
short stories, biographies and memoirs, literary articles and fantasy literature. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
      Kâzım Nami [Duru], “Sadaka ve Dilencilik”, no: 127, 3 February 1916, p. 1249-
1250. (An article about beggars) 
      Kâzım Nami [Duru], “Ahlak Endişesi”, no: 143, 1 November 1917, p. 1503-1504. 
(Accounts on the continuous press coverage on moral decay in the empire) 
127 Donanma, “Köylüyle Konuşma”, Donanma, no: 50-59, 68, 71, 81, 98, 5 July 1914, 3 
June 1915. 
      Anonymous, “Gel Köylü Seninle Dertleşelim”, Donanma, no: 101, 24 June 1915i 
p.801 
      Anonymous, “Köylü ile Dertleşme”, Donanma, no: 102, 1 July 1915, p. 818. 
      Anonymous, “Köylü ile Konuşma”, Donanma, no: 130, 15 August 1917, p. 1293. 
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I.2.b.iii.A. Poems 
Among the literary texts in Donanma, poems had been the most frequent form 
of writing and seem to have been preferred over other forms with their high capacity of 
delivering messages in terms of memorization and oral recitation.128  Thus, language of 
poems seems to have been kept as simple as possible.   
Poems in Donanma can be divided into two categories according to their 
themes.  The first category includes pieces mostly from the pre-World War I era and 
focuses on sea and the Navy League itself.  These poems emphasized on the necessity 
of a strong navy and the good deeds of the League.129 The second category covers 
poems on war, bravery, martyrdom, homeland and the flag.130  During the World War I, 
                                                 
128 The numbers of the literary pieces in Donanma can be listed as follows:  Poems 
(316), prosy poems (5), stories (53), biographies (12), memoirs (37), literary articles 
(64), Zehra Çakmaktepe, Donanma Mecmuası, (Unpublished MA Thesis, Erzurum, 
2002), p.654.  
129 Ali Riza Seyfi, “Akdeniz  ve Ben”, Donanma, no: 161, 11 April 1918, p. 1798. 
      E.A, “Deniz”, Donanma, no: 21 October 1915, p. 1001. 
      Ispartalı Hakkı, “Donanma Cemiyeti’ne”, Donanma, no: 155,  28 February 1918, p. 
1968. 
      Mehmed Hikmet, “Deniz Aşkı”, Donanma, no: 182, 12 September 1918, p. 2136-
2137. 
      Tahir ül Mevlevi, “Verelim Haydi Donanmaya Bütün Varımızı”, Donanma, no: 8, 
October 1910. 
      Üsküdarlı Talat,  “Sancak”, Donanma, no: 111, 14 October 1915, p. 985. 
130 A.E, “Yiğitlik”, Donanma, no: 121, 23 December 1915, p. 1151.  
A.Kazım, “Vatan Şühedası”, Donanma, no: 31, September 1912, p. 319 
Aka Gündüz, “Genç Türk Kahramana”, Donanma, no: 52, 20 July 1914, p. 51. 
Ali Rıza Seyfi, “Askerin Nişanlısı”, Donanma,  no: 19, September 1911,  p. 1716. 
Ali Riza Seyfi, “Sevgili Yurd,”, Donanma,  no: 59, 14 September 1914, p. 166 
Ali Rıza Seyfi, “Vatanıma”, Donanma,  no: 44-45,  July 1911,  p.963-964 
Cemal Edhem, “Şehidler Mezarlığı”, Donanma,, no: 163, 25 April 1918, p.1828. 
E. İlhami, “Türk Askeri”, Donanma, no: 3 October 1919, p. 2166. 
Hızırzâde Rüştü, “Seferber Oğluma”, Donanma, no: 124, 13 January 1916, p.1203 
Hızırzâde Rüştü, “Şahadet Anı”, Donanma, no: 121, 23 December 1915, p. 1151. 
İzzet Ulvi, “Ey Sancak”, Donanma, no: 17, July 1911, p. 1542-1543. 
Şeyh Abdülbaki, “Osmanlı Bayrağı”, Donanma, no: 41, July 1913, p. 788.      
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numbers of these poems increased significantly, and the Gallipoli Wars received a 
specific emphasis due to its profound impact on the lives and psychologies of the 
people.131  
 
I.2.b.iii.B Short Stories 
Short stories dealt with the same topics as the poems.  Bravery in war, self-
sacrifices of the Ottomans and the immorality of the enemies were dominant themes.132  
They tried to depict horrifying war scenes and “cruelty” of the enemy in a more vivid 
and detailed way.  Thus, short stories by and large focused on manipulating the 
imagination of the people and provoking their phobias.  In this sense, an increasing 
tendency towards naturalism, nationalism and romanticism was to be felt in style.  Short 
stories by Ömer Seyfeddin and translations from Emile Zola were prominent examples 
to these.133  On the other hand, it could also be speculated that Donanma, as in the 
                                                 
131 Mehmed Fevzi, “Çanakkale Kahramanzâdelerine”, Donanma, no: 116, 18 November 
1915. 
      Ömer Fevzi, “Çanakkale Kahramanlarına”, Donanma, no: 115, 11 October 1915, p. 
1055 
      Ömer Fevzi, “Çanakkale, 5 Mart 1315”, Donanma, no: 158-159, 18 March 1918. 
132 Ahmed, “Muharebeye Hazır Ol”, Donanma, no: 141, 18 October 1917, p. 1478-
1479.  
      Aka Gündüz, “Yarım Türkler”, Donanma, no: 65, 26 October 1914, p. 268-269. 
      Nüzhet Haşim,  “Şehid Anası”, Donanma, no: 120, 16 December 1915, p. 1142. 
      Seraceddin, “Kumkale    Siperlerinde”, Donanma, no: 148, 13 December 1917, p. 
1586-1587. 
      Salime Servet, “Çocuklarımı Hür Büyütelim”, Donanma, no: 15, May 1911, p. 
1354-1357. 
      Nüzhet Haşim,  “Şehid Anası”, Donanma, no: 120, 16 December 1915, p. 1142. 
133 Emile Zola, “Madam Nejon”, translated by Ziya Gevher, no: 52-55, 7 July 1914-10 
August 1914. (Published as a series) 
      Ömer Seyfeddin, “Beyaz Lale”, Donanma, no: 53-62, 27 July 1914-5 October 1914. 
(Published as a series) 
      Ömer Seyfeddin, “Yeni Bir Hediye”, Donanma, no: 140, 11 October 1917, p. 1460-
1462. 
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example of translated Sherlock Holmes stories, tried to attract popular interest as well as 
addressing public paranoia and spy-mania throughout the World War I.134 
 
I.2.b.iii.C Biographies and Memoirs 
As a way of increasing public support for the navy, Donanma utilized the 
biographies of the famous Ottoman admirals.  The journal used these figures as role 
models and symbols of a golden past, as it did in the historical articles.135  Although, the 
journal obtained a clear pro-CUP character over the time, only Talat Pasha’s biography 
found space on its pages.136  Thus, this point would be worthwhile to note, as it might 
clue on the power struggle within the triumvirate of the CUP.137  Since Talat Pasha was 
the Minister of the Domestic Affairs, and the Navy League intertwined with the 
ministry on an increasing rate over time, it would not be misleading to expect that he 
exerted his influence over the journal as well.138  
Memoirs were overwhelmingly on war, sea and the crew of the Ottoman 
battleships.139   
I.2.b.iii.D. Literary Articles 
Drawing comparisons between the Eastern and the Western literatures, literary 
articles in Donanma sought a proper form for the Ottoman case. One crucial theme of 
these articles was the issue of language.  Aiming at reaching to the whole of the 
                                                 
134 Arthur Conan Doyle, “Sherlock Holmes ‘Tehlike’ ”, Donanma,, no: 130-149, 15 
August 1917-30 January 1918.  
135 Ali Haydar Emir, “11. Asrın Barbaros Hayreddin’i Cezayirli Hüseyin Paşa”, 
Donanma, no: 2-12, April 1910-February 1910. (Published as series) 
      T.T, “Osmanlı Amiralleri”, Donanma, no: 2, April 1910, p. 154-155. 
136 Anonymous, “Talat Paşa”, Donanma, no: 129,  23 July 1917, p. 1275-1276. (On 
Talat pasha and his contributions to the voluntary associations) 
137 Köroğlu, Ibid.,  pp.62-68. 
138 Özbek, Ibid, p.304. 
139 Ahmed Rasim, “İzmir Kruvazörü’nde Bir Gece”, Donanma, no: 51, 3 July 1914. p. 
35-38. 
     Ali Haydar Emir, “Barbaros’un Baş Taretinde”, Donanma, no: 83, 29 February 
1915, p. 556-558. 
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Ottoman society, Donanma defended the simplicity in the language.140  Debates on 
“national literature,” and the efforts to define what it should be like, appeared as another 
prevailing topic.141  In this context, even the writers of the journal engaged into debates 
among them and replied each other via Donanma.  The most noticeable debate of this 
kind could be shown as the one between Köprülüzâde Mehmed Fuad and Hakkı Tarık 
[US] on prosody.142  As an essential part of their lives, Donanma’s writers also dealt 
with the influence of the war on literature.143 
 
I.2.b.iii.E. Fantasy Literature 
Among the rich literary content of Donanma, fantasy literature had its own 
particular part.  The overwhelming theme of this category was sea, and various aspects 
of the life on the seas were put under the focus.  Death, darkness and fog appeared in 
these texts quite frequently, and the prominent Ottoman sea captains occasionally took 
part in these stories, physically or spiritually.144 
                                                 
140 M.B İdris, “Lisan Bahsi ve Avam Dili”, no: 118, 2 December 1915, p. 1107-1108. 
      Hüseyin Kazım [Kadri], “Halka Doğru”, no: 22 August 1917, p. 1322. (About the 
debates on language) 
      Hüseyin Kazım [Kadri], “Evet Zavallı Türkçe”, no: 130, 15 August 1917, p. 1291-
1292. 
      Hüseyin Kazım [Kadri], “Pek Eski Bir Kavga”, no: 131, 9 August 1917, p. 1306.  
141 Yusuf Ziya, “Yamaçlarda Kaval”, no: 138, 27 September 1917, p. 1424-1426. (On 
the debates of “national literature) 
142 Hakkı Tarık [US], “Milli Vezin Makalesi”, no: 138, 27 September 1917, p. 1419-
1421. 
      Hakkı Tarık [US], “Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuad Bey”, no: 133, 23 August 1917, p. 
1340-1341. 
143 Ali Canib [Yöntem], “Garba İlk Nazarlar”, no: 82, 9 February 1915, p. 535-536. (On 
the effect of the war on literature) 
144 Ali Haydar Emir, “Sis tabakalarında”, Donanma, no: 33, November 1912, p. 440-
441. 
      E. Naci, “Ölüm Olmasaydı”, no: 43-44, September-October 1913, p. 915-916. 
      M. Şemseddin, “Barbaros’un Mevlidi’nde Bir Gece”, Donanma, no: 30, August 
1912, p. 271-275. 
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I.2.b.iv. Announcements and Advertisements 
Announcements were the most direct communication channel between 
Donanma and its readers.  The journal informed its audience on anything and 
everything on the Navy League and specifically reported on the amounts of the 
collected donations with the names of the donators and their professions.145  The latter 
type of announcements had a specific importance for the Leaguers as they assured 
people that their money was safe.  This was also a way to honor the donators and had in 
return a very positive effect on the people to donate.  Donanma appealed to the support 
of everyone and asked to donate at least 40 para or 1 guruş.146  In this context, the 
journal also promoted products of the Navy League including cigarette papers, matches, 
calendars and lottery tickets.147  
The advertisements not directly related to the League, provided hints on the 
economical livelihood of the Ottoman Empire, as well as minor glimpses on the 
readers’ profile of Donanma.  The majority of the advertisements came from Istanbul 
based enterprises or entrepreneurs.  The advertisements by large and medium scaled 
textile and clothing shops and banks were accompanied by individual advertisements 
ranging from tailors to doctors.148 
 
                                                                                                                                               
      Rabbani Fehmi, “Çanakkale Abidesi”, Donanma, no: 127, 21 January 1916. p. 
1251. 
145 Donanma, “Millet Ne Vermiş?”, no: 49-148,19 June 1914-13 December 1917. 
(Detailed accounts on the amount of donations)     
146 Donanma, “40 Para”, Donanma, no: 54, 3 August 1914, p. 81. 
147  Donanma, “Sigara Kağıtları”, Donanma, no: 26-97, May 1912-27 May 1915. 
148 “Şarkın En Büyük Elbise Mağazası [Tring]”, Donanma, no: 3-4,7-12, 21, April 
1910-November 1911.  
      “Macid Mehmed Karakaş”, Donanma, no: 13, March 111, back cover. 
      “Nevr-I İntibah”, Donanma, no: 96, 20 May 1915, outer back cover. (The 
advertisement of a tailor named Osman Zeki. The title was read as “Would not you like 
to promote a genuine Muslim artisan) 
      “Diş Tabibi Mehmed Hüdaverdi”, Donanma, no.184, 19 September 1918, outer 
back cover. 
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I.2.b.v. Sports 
Donanma regarded the age in which they lived as a time when power conquered 
the right.  Thus, it reserved a special meaning to the physical power.  According to the 
Leaguers, Ottomans had to be powerful on every aspect of the life to survive, which 
implicitly referred to social Darwinism.  The journal’s writers established solid linkages 
between a strong body and a brilliant mind. Donanma, in its supplementary pages called 
as “the Columns of Physical Training” (İdman Sütunları), dealt with this theme and 
provided information on different forms of physical and self-defense training, ways of 
improving bodily strength and various other sorts of sports events.149 
 
     I.3. World War Propaganda, visuals and “Donanma” 
 
 
 I.3.a. The Ottoman Empire and the War Propaganda 
 
The advent of the Great War meant a drastic break from the traditional warfare.  
It was the first total war in modern history, and the belligerent countries found 
themselves in a novel phenomenon that was to exhaust all of their available material 
and human resources.  The ability to survive such a war equaled to the capability of 
responding to its demands at the same rate.  Thus, the Great War required not only the 
mobilization of armies, but also of societies as a whole for the ends of manufacturing 
violence.150  The new definition of the war incorporated military and civilian spheres, 
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and the ultimate victory could only be won by succeeding on the home front as well.151  
Hence, controlling and manipulating the public opinion both at home and within the 
enemies’ territories were prerequisites to prevail for the warring parties.152   
In this context, a simple definition of war propaganda appears as “converting 
masses of people to desired view points.”153  By significant symbols, it influences 
opinion, saturates the public with selected and biased information and creates new 
desires.154  Therefore, it is epistemologically defective by essence.155  All forms of 
social communication -including visuals, reports, rumors and stories- could be 
employed by the propaganda effort.  It attempts to isolate counter-propaganda as well as 
demoralizing the enemy.  Mobilization of neutral and allied opinion in favor of the 
belligerent state parallels the effort to manipulate the home opinion.   
As an attempt of mass persuasion, the success of the propaganda depends on its 
ability to penetrate the unconscious.156  This, in return, requires an appeal to emotion 
rather than reason.157  Theoretical profundity and complexity are hence not desired.158  
Instead, the message should be simple, short, shallow, striking and easy to remember; 
nevertheless, at the same time elaborately designed and executed.  Thus, war 
propaganda needs a total and organized effort, which could only be diffused effectively 
through a strong and established material infrastructure and a relatively standardized 
society. 
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At the advent of the war, advanced European states had already completed their 
industrialization processes.  The shift from agrarian society to industrial capitalist form 
necessitated, in a Gellnerian sense, forging a uniform working force that would 
consistently and with an increasing efficiency support the needs of the novel complex 
economy.159  In return, this meant an effort to transform the populations of the 
industrialized countries into standardized societies and to integrate people around 
common norms, values, symbols and motives.   
A conversion of this sort simultaneously replaced heterogeneous rural cultures 
with uniform national ones.  Introduction of national education exposed pupils from 
different backgrounds to standardized national history, literature and geography.  A 
cultural industry consisting of newspapers, journals, printing and publishing houses 
dispersed national cultures through efficient transportation and communication 
networks, even to the most remote parts of the countries.160   
Already by 1900, male literacy rate in England reached  at 97 per cent.161  At the 
advent of the war, elementary education rates within Germany and France together with 
England converged to hundred percent.162  Thus, people found themselves incorporated 
into a designed common whole at an increasing rate.  They started to develop a feeling 
of belonging to their “imagined communities” through new symbols that were created 
by cultural industry and distributed through a strong material infrastructure.163   
Within this framework, countries such as Germany, France and England found 
little difficulty to execute and disperse their war propaganda.164  They possessed the 
resources to organize and control, as well as the ability to emit this power into all parts 
of the country.165  National culture was diffused into every aspect of people’s daily 
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lives, and nationalism could be activated and utilized against any apparent crisis.166 
Hence, these states could run extensive propaganda campaigns throughout the war and 
mobilize the masses for the ends of the war.  The major factor to determine the success 
of their efforts was to be the organization and the content of their messages. 
In these terms, the Ottoman Empire was at a quite disadvantageous position vis-
à-vis the Great War.  It had neither managed to industrialize its economy to meet the 
exhaustive demands of the new warfare, nor did it have the social and cultural 
infrastructure that would facilitate massive war propaganda. The economy of the 
Empire was still agrarian, and 80 per cent of its population was engaged in 
agriculture.167  On the other hand, its social structure was multi-ethnical, far from 
uniform and spread on a wide geography in isolated groups.  Religious and ethnic 
subgroups demanded a high degree of autonomy, and were disinclined to subjugate 
themselves to a strong central rule.168  
Unlike the major belligerent powers of the Great War, the empire’s education 
system was limited in coverage.169  Despite serious attempts for the nationalization and 
standardization of education in the post-1908 period, the state was unable to expose its 
population to a uniform national education.170  The school network directly under the 
control of the state was listed in the statistics of 1912-1913 as follows:  12.814 
elementary schools (596.460 students and 19.212 teachers), 153 middle schools (27.461 
students and 1.518 teachers) and 17 high schools (1.518 students and 368 teachers).171  
Private, foreign and non-Muslim schools were beyond the state’s sphere of influence.  
For the years 1913-1914, elementary schools that belonged to non-Muslim Ottomans 
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numbered to 2.596 with 4.000 teachers, and foreigners had 215 elementary schools, 80 
middle schools and 1.600 teachers.172  The education within the Empire had hence a 
cosmopolitan character, and its limited nature was not feasible to forge a standard 
citizenship identity injected with a homogeneous national culture.  
 A major outcome of the inadequate education system was high illiteracy rates 
within the empire.  Although definite statistics are not available for the period, it is 
estimated that at the turn of the century, literacy level was around 15 per cent at best.173  
Accounts for the Early Republican era were not more optimistic.  Nearly ten years after 
the war, in 1927, literates constituted only 10.6 per cent of the whole population.174  For 
places with 10.000 or more inhabitants, male literacy was at 41.5 per cent as opposed to 
1.4 per cent female literacy in villages.175  Considering that 80 per cent of the 
population still lived in the countryside, literates among male villagers was at 11.4 per 
cent.176  Since the majority of the military recruits came from among them, this number 
also provides a clue on the literacy within the army.177  
 Communication, on the other hand, was not a lesser problem.  In 1914, an 
estimated level of 19-23 million people were scattered over an area of nearly two 
million square kilometers.178  The population density in Rumelia doubled Anatolia; 
whereas, Anatolia’s population density was three times higher than Iraq and Syria, and 
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five times higher than the Arabian Peninsula.179  The only available fast and efficient 
communication medium to connect these groups was telegraph.  Although it had been in 
use for more than fifty years, available lines were only around 50.000 kilometers.180  In 
return, this network was inept to integrate a dispersed demography, and particularly 
during the war, failed to suffice the state’s needs.  Telephone had been in use since 
1909; however, it was not efficient at all, if practical.  The Istanbul Telephone 
Company, a British-American enterprise, had only 4.159 subscribers.181  The available 
telephone network during the war was able to connect Istanbul to Sofia, Vienna or 
Berlin, but not to the battlefronts.182 
 The physical mobility of people and goods was limited by the inadequacy of the 
transportation system.  Land roads were scarce in number and bad in quality.  The 
quantity of motored vehicles was ignorable. 183  By 1914, there were only 187 of these, 
and the majority of them were in Istanbul.184  In terms of land transportation, the 
railroads appeared as the best option.185  However, the Empire had only 6.486 km of 
railroads in 1911186, 1.700 km of which was on the Balkan lands.  After the Balkan 
Wars, a significant portion of this network was lost.187  In comparison to the Ottoman 
Empire, Germany had a railroad network of 64.000 km over an area of 540.000 km², 
France 51.000 km over 536.000 km², India 55.000 km over 3.160.000 km² and USA 
388.330 km over 7.739.524 km².188   
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Most of the Ottoman railroads were built by foreign consortiums, and aimed at 
connecting affluent commercial zones with their hinterlands.189  Thus, these railroad 
networks linked only a small friction of the Empire, and the eastern and the western 
territories did not have a direct railroad connection.190  During the war, this was to mean 
a two months trip for the army from Istanbul to the eastern front.191  In this context, a 
major part of the land traffic had to rely on transport animals, the population of which 
was low and troubled by contagious diseases.192   
Maritime transportation was more effective, yet impractical to connect all parts 
of the Empire.  Relatively shorter sea voyages were to be followed by lengthy land 
routes.  River transportation was fast and cheaper than the land routes for carrying 
goods.  However, it functioned only in one direction.193  The majority of the maritime 
fleet was consisted of small vehicles, and many of them were sailboats.194  90 per cent 
of the total tonnage of this fleet belonged to the European enterprises.195 
Thus, the Ottoman population was to a large extent immobile and physically 
separated.  Most of the people left their birthplaces only for obligatory reasons such as 
military duty or governmental appointment.196  Different localities outside the cities had 
little to share in common, and there was little visible evidence around them to feel or 
believe that they were part of a greater whole.  Mobility of the people and goods was 
limited even within the cities.197    
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Perceptibly, the infrastructure of the Empire lacked the capacity to forge organic 
as well as virtual bonds among the people.  A coherent superstructure that would arouse 
a strong solidarity among the population was absent as well.  The CUP was by and large 
a reflection of various publicities, and represented a loose coalition of differing 
ideologies.198  Pan-Turkists, Pan-Islamists, Westernists, Ottomanists and even 
separatists of various degrees were incorporated within the CUP.199  The Committee 
pursued varying policies before and throughout the war.  Until the end of the Balkan 
Wars, Ottomanism had the greater emphasis.  During the earlier periods of the Great 
War, Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism and even Ottomanism were utilized on varying 
degrees.  After the Arab Revolt, and the losses on the Iraqi and Syrian fronts, a Turkish 
nationalism that identified itself with Anatolia became prominent.200  
 
I.3.b. Visual Propaganda and “Donanma” 
 
On a rather unfeasible and futile infrastructural basis, post-1908 Ottoman 
governments had to find ways to forge a togetherness that linked different strata of the 
society.  Partial attempts at reforming the infrastructure had been taken as a long-term 
remedy. Nevertheless, the omnipresence of a constant state of crisis necessitated short-
term policies and pragmatic solutions.  Thus, in the absence of a strong infrastructure, 
optimization of the existent means seemed as the best possible option for the state. 
Donanma stood at the crossroads of two promising solutions.  On the one hand, 
the state had already applied to the semi-official organizations as a means to penetrate 
discrete social groups and been utilizing them for the mobilization of the masses on a 
patriotic and militaristic basis.  The Navy League was one of these institutions, and by 
1914 it had already executed a successful and massive propaganda campaign.201  It had 
established a wide structural network and forged a reputable profile among the Ottoman 
public, which the journal explicitly exposed as a point of reference (figure I.1).   In this 
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framework, Donanma had an ease of access to different social groups, and posed a 
feasible medium to dispatch the state propaganda.   
 
 
Figure I.1- The cover page of Donanma 202 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
202 Donanma, no: 50, 5 Temmuz 1914, outer front cover. 
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On the other hand, Donanma represented a case for optimizing the effect of the 
printed material in penetrating a highly illiterate society, which was to come by the use 
of visual materials.  As any other culture in which the majority of the people cannot 
read, the Ottoman society relied by and large on oral communication.  It was apt to emit 
any kind of message, in this case uniting and mobilizing, via oral expression, symbols 
and rituals.  In turn, illiterates or semi-literates could articulate their reactions and 
participate in the formation of a collective memory.203  However, the efficiency of such 
a culture was limited by its capability to enable people to communicate face to face.  
For the Ottoman case, this was possible within localities yet limited among them.  
Hence, the construction of a common memory still depended on a uniform medium that 
could expose these localities to a standardized message, which could yet be done by the 
printed media. 
Illiteracy was by no means an obstacle to access the written information.  
Printed or manuscript materials were exposed through public readings from very early 
periods on.204  In the latter part of the 19th and the early 20th century, Russia, China and 
Meiji Japan with high illiteracy rates resorted on public readings and manipulated this 
process to mobilize and transform their societies.  In China and Meiji Japan, village 
leaders, religious personalities and schoolteachers were assigned for reading aloud the 
newspapers to the illiterate rural populations.205  In Japan, participation to the public 
readings was compulsory.206  Zemstvos207 in Russia organized public lectures 
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throughout the World War I on historical, literary and scientific topics to which literate 
and illiterate peasants attended.208  Local teachers read newspapers aloud during these 
meetings, which in return led the Russian peasants to imagine themselves connected to 
a larger community.209 
In the Ottoman Empire, one major medium to access the public readings and the 
consumption of the periodical press was the coffeehouses.210  From its first appearance 
until the latter part of the 20th century, the coffeehouse was at the center of the Ottoman 
and post-Ottoman men’s public life.211  Those who were illiterate or could not afford the 
price of a newspaper could easily get an insight into the printed media.  Newspapers 
were circulated both physically and verbally.  In other words, these were places that 
contributed to the reproduction of the oral culture and the transliteration of the written 
messages into verbal medium.212   
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Nevertheless, the public reading was not exclusive to the coffeehouses.  In the 
privacy of homes, a less crowded but more gender balanced form of articulated reading 
was practiced.213  Inferential references to both forms can be found in Donanma:  
“Hello!  The Navy League hears that the word of navy has been circulating within the 
villages often; in the coffeehouses, homes, whenever a newspaper is read everyone has 
been paying attention to hear some words of it.”214   
Although literacy was not a fundamental obstacle between the public and the 
printed material, it was not completely feasible for the emission of propaganda.  The 
transmission of the written message into oral medium meant the transformation of the 
printed material into rumor.  The illiterate receptor of the voiced message received the 
message via an agent, and thus was alien to the written message itself.  Indeed, the 
receptor witnessed the articulated testimony of someone who read the written testimony 
of an unknown person.  One way to actively incorporate the illiterate into the public 
reading process and to render the orally transmitted written message credible was the 
use of visual material.   
Visuals in various forms (i.e. cartoons, photographs and drawings) blurred the 
gap between the literate and the illiterate cultures.  Using common symbols, drawing on 
instincts and dramatic visual imagery, these were apt to communicate with the receptor 
independently from the textual content.215  Indeed, until the first years of the Republic, 
visuals and textual materials were generally treated as different objects, and for the most 
of the time the image and the written material on the same page did not necessarily 
conform to each other.216  The visual could be loaded with its own message and 
accompanied by little or no descriptive text.  In this context, the image provided the 
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illiterate a way of communication without an agent and the receptor could consume the 
message at first hand. 
On the other hand, the independency of the image also freed itself from the 
physical integrity of the printed media.  In comparison to the textual content, they were 
freer and hence more mobile. It could be ripped off from its printed medium, circulated 
among people, pinned up and posted in the streets.217  In this aspect, the independency 
of the image provided the illiterate with the printed material that they could also 
consume individually.  Hence, the narratives and symbols of propaganda could extend 
its influence from the public world of the illiterate individual to the private world of 
his/hers.  A letter published in Türk Yurdu in 1917 addressed to such a need in the war:  
“Should you know how much desire do our soldiers in the trenches have to hear a 
newspaper to be read to them, even though they are illiterate?  Could they lay their 
hands on a piece that they could understand, even if they would have memorized it they 
would not hesitate to read it again.”218  The image, independent from the text, had the 
potential to provide the symbols and the narratives on which the people could lay their 
hands on, and make a meaning of it. 
Besides its ability to individually deliver the message, the image could also be 
employed to testify to the accuracy of the written material.  Photographs in particular, 
were regarded as to be able to reproduce the image of the reality and highly esteemed 
for their perceived truthfulness on an explicit and implicit level.219  Providing the reader 
and the listener with the experience of the event visually, the image could allow its 
receptors to a virtual testimony, which in return added up to the credibility of the text 
itself. 
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Nonetheless, the influence of the increasing incorporation of visuals into the 
printed media was not limited to the illiterate.  In reference to John Berger, seeing 
comes before words in communication and interacting with the environment.220  The 
image could convey a message much quicker than the text and could create a more 
pungent impact.221  Arousing an illusion of testimony as in the photographs, 
reanimating the event via drawings or satirizing people, politicians and during the war 
time the enemies with cartoons, the visuals can create highly sentimental responses and 
express what cannot be openly said in the text.  Hence, they can penetrate the 
unconscious and be remembered easily.  In terms of propaganda, they could easily 
suffice the need to deliver the message simply. 
Within this framework, image and visual propaganda had been highly esteemed 
by the belligerent countries throughout the World War I.  Relying on the efficiency of 
the visuals in the short term, countries engaged in the production of films, photographs 
and paintings of the war.   Images of the war were utilized to boost the moral of the 
people in the home front and the soldiers at the battlefront.  The military and the civilian 
propaganda bureaus of the belligerent countries ardently designed one-sided 
representations of the war to express their glory in the battles both to the inside and the 
outside.  
The influence of the visuals was not a recent discovery for the Ottoman vis-à-vis 
the World War I.  The integration of the image into printed media came within the last 
quarter of the 19th century in the Empire, and Abdülhamid II was among the first to 
appreciate and utilize it as a means of political propaganda.222  His account on the image 
clues on the perception of the visual as such a means: “ A picture is an idea.  A picture 
can inculcate political and sentimental meanings that could not be expressed with a 100 
pages text.”223  Possessing an extensive photo collection of approximately 34.879 
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images, Abdülhamid II put these into use to impress the public via periodicals.224  On 
the other hand, the advent of the Second Constitutional Era marked a breakthrough for 
the use of the image.   With the abolishment of the censorship, satirical press that 
heavily relied on caricatures and cartoons became a prominent actor.225  At the same 
time, periodicals in affluent numbers started to use the title musavver (illustrated) as a 
means to enhance their prestige and attract the interest of the readers.226  Nevertheless, 
publishing an illustrated periodical was costly and almost impossible to continue 
without a strong financial support.227  The publishing lives of these mostly weekly 
periodicals usually varied between a couple of issues and 30-40 issues.228  Only rarely 
these numbers were exceeded. 
 As already mentioned in the previous section, Donanma was a costly enterprise 
for the Navy League as well and in total meant a significant financial loss.  However, its 
functionality as an illustrated propaganda medium rendered the journal as a profitable 
establishment and a means to optimize the available infrastructure of the empire for the 
ends of influencing the public opinion and establishing a common memory, in this case 
a visual one.  By 1914 the journal was quickly incorporated within the state’s attempts 
at visual propaganda.    
Donanma’s transition from a monthly magazine to a weekly one could be 
regarded as a part of this integration.  From its 49th issue onwards the journal was turned 
into a newsreel, and its visual character was enhanced.  Donanma abandoned its 17x25 
cm size for 25x36 cm and increased the numbers of the images it published as well as 
their sizes.  Excluding the affluent number of ship photographs, the journal used 
approximately 1.552 images throughout its 9 years and 192 issues.  For the first 48 
issues, the number of the visuals amounted to 596 and for the rest of the 144 issues to 
956.  Considering that the journal had 65 pages on average for the former period, this 
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meant 0.18 visuals per page.229  Estimating the average page number for the latter term 
as 16 (excluding the last five issues which were published as monthly), the rate of the 
visuals per page was 0.44.  The frequency of the images increased more than double 
times in the post-1914 period.  On the other hand, the sizes of the visuals were also 
enlarged in parallel to the paper size.  The diagonal length of the images on the inner 
front cover of Donanma ranged between 13.5-14 cm for the pre-1914 period.  In the 
latter period, this range was extended to 19-21 cm, corresponding to an increase of 1.5 
times.  Hence, the journal’s visual appeal was boosted significantly in the latter period 
that in return added up to its capability in emitting the visual propaganda.   
    In this context, Donanma as an illustrated propaganda tool was comparable 
almost only to Harb Mecmuası, which was published as an expression of the state’s 
prestige.230  The latter journal was printed on a paper of best quality, and its textual 
content was dwarfed by its visuals.  Hence, it appeared more as a photography journal 
rather than an illustrated periodical.  In terms of its material quality and the frequency of 
the visuals used per issue, Harb Mecmuası was clearly superior to Donanma and a 
complete novelty by itself with regard to visual propaganda.  However, Harb Mecmuası 
was titled as a bi-weekly journal yet published -except January and February 1916- as 
monthly.231  The journal had 27 issues from its first publication in October 1915 to the 
last in June 1918; whereas, in the same period, Donanma published 105 issues.  
Therefore, it could be argued that Donanma reached the Ottoman public on a more 
frequent basis than Harb Mecmuası did and hence was more dynamic in responding to 
the ongoing events.232 
  
   
                                                 
229 Including the lists of the donators the amount of the pages per issue equaled to 78 
and images per page reduced to 0.15.   
230 Köroğlu, Ibid, p.190 
231 The journal had on average 16 pages per issue as Donanma. 
232  Nonetheless, it should be noted that Donanma ceased its publications for 28 months 
between February 1916 and July 1917.   Harb Mecmuası was not published for 
September 1916, January/February 1917, June 1917, September 1917 and 
January/February 1917-April 1918. 
58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 
PRELUDE TO THE WAR: “LÂ’LÎ’S CHOICE” 
 
“What would she do?  What would she do now?  Here, every part of her was 
smeared with the wicked spittle of the enemy that did not respect purity.  Her 
chastity was being torn apart violently.  Nobody responded her screams, nobody 
came to her succor.  So, she was going to be the toy of a wild beast’s most filthy 
and loathsome pleasures.  No, no, no… No! But how would she escape?  Her 
power was exhausted, she was unable to move.  She could hardly budge her 
arms.  It was as if iron rings were put around her neck, as if she was dressed in 
an invisible and leaden straitjacket. She stuttered sobbingly: Stop, stop, let me, I 
am fainting…  Let me rest…  Let me rest and then… […]  Lâ’lî walked to the 
open window tottering like intoxicated.  And disappeared with a sudden 
move.”233 
 
Appearing first within the pages of Donanma between July 27 - October 5, 1914, 
Ömer Seyfeddin’s Beyaz Lale embodied a gory hate story filled with extreme nationalist 
repulsion.  Its “innocent” and “heavenly” Turkish female protagonist Lâ’lî stood for a 
metaphor par excellence that denoted the “fallen” Ottoman Empire.  She was trapped in 
her house with a Bulgarian major Radko Balkanesky alluding the “West”, who 
murdered Lâ’lî’s family, ordered the massacre of the Turkish inhabitants of her town, 
deceived Lâ’lî with lies to enter her home and was now trying to rape her.  She was 
depicted in an ultimate despair: “an ambrosial and obstinate prey in Radko’s claw,”234 
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alone, vulnerable and defenseless.  The only way to avert disgrace seemed as a solemn 
death which Ömer Seyfeddin reserved to her.  Nevertheless, even death itself could not 
help Lâ’lî’s body.  Radko took her back to the bedroom and fulfilled his “most wicked 
desires.”235  
 The story was written nearly one year before its publication, on 15 September 
1913.  It reflected an extreme nationalist response to the Balkan Wars that deprived the 
Empire from most of its European territories, exhausted its material and human 
resources and caused a profound social trauma.236  The defeats suffered during the 
period explicitly displayed the military incapability of the Empire, and the ruling cadres 
of the state found themselves increasingly isolated within the international power 
play.237  The Empire apparently lacked the means to recover and seemed inapt to hold 
itself up alone.238  The treaties that settled the Balkan Wars during the summer of 1913 
divided the Empire into influence zones among the Western powers.239  The 
capitulations were perceived more burdensome and malevolent than ever.240  The 
prevailing fear was that the “Eastern Question” was about to be concluded, and that the 
future of the Empire was left at the mercy of its arch enemy Russia.241  The militarist 
wing of the CUP predicted this as an inevitable process that would result in the partition 
of the country.242  Until the later part of 1914, there seemed little hope for a change in 
these circumstances.  The Empire was in dire need of outside assistance to carry out 
major reforms at a time when a great European war was expected.  The attempts at 
securing an alliance with the major groupings of Europe seemed futile, and the Empire 
even failed to convince the Balkan states to agree upon such a pact.243 
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 However, the historical context in which Beyaz Lale was written and published 
differed notably, hence its metaphorical value and utility as well.  The last episode of 
the story portraying Lâ’lî’s struggle with Balkanesky and her suicide appeared on the 
62nd issue of Donanma on October 5, 1914; at a time when the Empire had already 
signed a secret alliance with Germany and was drifting into war as a payoff for ending 
its diplomatic isolation.244  The story ended with the depiction of Lâ’lî lying on the bed, 
“her arm hanging over a bloody pillow as if she was trying to hold on the abysses of the 
nonexistence.”245  These lines were accompanied by two photographs on the same page, 
that of a German cruiser “Emden”246 on the top left corner and that of a British torpedo 
boat “Bullfinch,” being sunk by German torpedoes on the bottom (see figure II.1).247  
Lâ’lî’s screams that fell on deaf ears within the text were now compensated by the 
military potency of Germany, and she was now given something to hold on instead of 
an abyss.  Further, the reader was even assuaged by the tragic image of “Bullfinch,” as 
it was represented as a retaliation for the atrocity done to Lâ’lî, at the expense of 
intermingling fantasy with the reality. 
 The original story, intact from visual manipulation, crystallized the general 
theme of the nationalist propaganda in the post-Balkan Wars period: the exploitation of 
the collective anxiety and the popular sentiments for the ends of mobilizing the masses 
to act materially and spiritually against the detrimental effects of the war.  It intended to 
forge a strong repulsion and a need for revenge among the public to redeem the disgrace 
suffered during these wars.   Indeed, the story was a literary effort that paralleled the 
CUP’s attempts to nationalize and to militarize the public sphere.  Yet, the published 
version of Beyaz Lale, modified the propagandist message of the story and utilized the 
very same feelings aroused by it to justify the alliance with Germany, to buttress the 
general mobilization announced on 2 August 1914 and to convince the public for the 
need to intervene the war.  The element of insecurity was going to play a pivotal role in 
managing the public opinion for the next three months following the Ottoman-German 
alliance and to establish a popular support around it.  
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Figure II.1 – The last page of Beyaz Lale 
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In this context, the propaganda of Donanma, as it was the case for other pro-war 
publications, appeared as an optimistic call for the people to assault its enemies and 
offered great promises dressed in Pan-Turkist and Pan-Islamist dreams.248  On the one 
hand, the war was represented as a struggle for existence, yet on the other, it was 
depicted as an irredentist campaign that would merge the whole Turkish and Islamic 
world together.  Nevertheless, it was clear that such grandiloquent pledges were ill-
founded without addressing at a benefactor even with an ardent and zealous popular 
support.  Thus, the guarantor of these dreams was designated as Germany, the image of 
which was exalted as a great victor whom the Ottomans ought to follow along the path 
to the glory. 
On the other hand, the catastrophic outcome of the war gave rise to a series of 
apologetic arguments by the CUP’s leaders, which shared the metaphorical fabric of 
Beyaz Lale.  The portrayal of a graceful death versus an ignominious passivity prevailed 
in their statements.  Cemal Pasha, as a member of the CUP’s triumvirate, advocated 
their decision by claiming that to fight heroically as a “brave and chivalrous” nation 
until the last drop of its blood, and to say that “I have lost everything but my chastity” 
was preferable over submitting itself passively and dishonorably to the “cruelties” of 
Russia, Britain and France.249  Said Halim Pasha, the grand vizier of the Empire until 
1917, regarded neutrality as something that would end in “an eternal shame, depriving 
the Empire even of a graceful death that would suit its glorious past.”250  As another 
prominent figure of the CUP and the triumvirate, Talat Pasha spoke in a similar tone in 
the post-war period.  Addressing at a British authority he stated: “However, you were 
avoiding us. […] And we were trying to find a way to hold us up. […] You pushed us to 
the arms of Germany.  We did not have any other choice.  Other options were either 
death or being divided.”251  The prevailing expression depicted the Empire as “a prey in 
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the claw of Russia” and “a man beset in a forest by robbers.”252  In this context, it was 
“Lâ’lî’s choice” between death and disgrace that would be utilized to justify and 
legitimize the Ottoman intervention in the post-1918 period. 
Basing on this framework, this chapter will try to provide an insight into the 
politics of insecurity, and how this element was used by Donanma through visuals to 
fuel the public support for the ends of the war in the antebellum Ottoman Empire.  In 
order to serve this purpose, first the pre-war dynamics within the Empire will be 
analyzed, and then looked at how insecurity was switched on and off to consolidate the 
CUP’s power.  Subsequently, the journal’s efforts to support the Ottoman general 
mobilization will be evaluated.  The rest of the chapter will deal with how Germany was 
casted as a role model for the Ottoman mobilization and recovery, with the promise of 
absolute victory.  
 
II.1. Taking Sides: Extremists versus Moderates 
 
At the advent of the Great War, the Ottoman government was far from a united 
front vis-à-vis the Great Powers and the war itself.  The preferences and intensions of its 
members were deeply divided.  For the time, Ali İhsan Sabis identified four major 
factions: (i) the ones who were “blindly” adherents of Germany; (ii) the proponents of 
France, Britain and Russia; (iii) those who preferred neutrality until the deficiencies 
were ameliorated and advocated an intervention on the German side only after; and (iv) 
those who were complete pacifists.253  Ahmet Emin Yalman, on the other hand, drew a 
simpler picture.  According to Yalman, there were just two groups: the extremists and 
the moderates.254  The latter formulation seems preferable as it takes the pragmatic 
orientations of the Unionists’ into account, whose attitudes were anything but fixed. 
Their personal sympathies and proclivities towards particular European powers were 
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only of marginal importance.255 The essential difference between both parties emerged 
at picking the most profitable course of action that would serve the state’s interests.256 
On the one hand, the moderates suggested keeping the Empire out of the war.  A 
major European confrontation would give the state the time it direly needed to recover 
from the trauma of the Balkan Wars.  Domestic reforms could be instigated, the army 
and the navy reinstated and the empire could have been gradually raised out of misery 
by patient work.257  Hence, the war seemed as an exceptional opportunity that would 
assure the Empire’s survival.258  They calculated that it was unlikely for a belligerent 
state to assault a neutral country that possessed a military force of one million hardened 
soldiers.259  The clock would tick in the favor of the Empire, and as major powers 
curbed each other’s power down, Ottomans could strengthen themselves and remain 
fresh for the aftermath of the war.260  
Yet, the predictions of the moderates suffered from one miscalculation.  The 
Empire lacked the resources to engage in any kind of reform and required the assistance 
of one great power or the other.  Since all of them would be in war and would therefore 
need all their materials for their own war effort, it was quite unlikely for the Empire to 
secure any significant form of help from the belligerent parties by staying neutral.261  At 
the outbreak of the war, the initial position of the moderates was to be replaced with 
averting the intervention as long as possible.   
On the other hand, the extremists regarded moderation as the imposition of the 
current status quo, and sought to alter it in the first apposite occasion.262  They drew 
upon mainly from the newly awakening Turkish nationalism that called aggressively for 
the cleansing of the smirch cast upon the Empire by the Balkan Wars.263   Within the 
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discourse of the extremists, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism fed upon each other and 
formed a common ground around their discontent with a merely passive attitude.264  The 
extremists’ sided with the Central Powers right from the start since their irredentist aims 
could only be realized at the expense of Russia, Britain and France.265 
The moderates and the extremists were in agreement on one fundamental 
ground: the need for a strong ally.  Both parties were aware of the fact that neither of 
them could realize their projections with the resources available to the Empire.  For the 
moderates, the state needed a guarantor that would provide protection against any 
further aggression and for the extremists a war partner that would help it to reshape the 
new status quo on the Empire’s favor.  Thus, a frantic search for such an ally was 
launched immediately after the Balkan Wars.266  However, the outcome of this effort 
was to come quite late.  The German ambassador Freiherr von Wangenheim wired 
Gottlieb von Jagow, the German foreign minister, about Ottomans’ pragmatic attitude 
as late as 14 July 1914 as follows:  “[…] Turkey, in her present situation could assume 
no other position than that of swinging like a pendulum between powers, eventually 
joining the stronger and more successful group.”267 
The new international status quo that brought France, Britain and Russia 
together around Entente Cordial rendered it impossible for the Empire to exploit the 
balance of power among these three states.268  Desperately in need of Russia’s help 
against the Central Powers, France and Britain were not interested in resorting to their 
pre-Crimean War policies, and it seemed futile to seek any help against Russia on the 
side of the Entente. 269  In return, the Entente would politely turn down the alliance 
offers by the Empire during the course to the war, narrowing the options of the Ottoman 
leadership further.270   
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At this juncture, the alliance signed with Germany on 2 August 1914, came as a 
relief for both sides rather than creating a source of controversy on the preferred 
camp.271  It was largely accepted as a decision taken “uninfluenced in any way by the 
Entente, but under an overwhelming pressure by the Germans.”272  The treaty was 
highly confidential that was kept undisclosed even to the majority of the cabinet 
members, and concluded among Enver Pasha, Said Halim Pasha and Wangenheim.273  
Even two other prominent members of the triumvirate -Cemal and Talat- were informed 
later, and the treaty was shared as a secret between the Triumvirate, Said Halim, Halil 
[Menteşe]274, Cavid275 and Mustafa Hayri for a while.276 The prominent source of 
discontent for the moderates, represented by Cavid Bey, was the terms of the treaty 
which were regarded as unfavorable.277 
The document was written on 24 July 1914, and when it was signed on August 
2, its content was already obsolete as Germany had declared war on Russia just hours 
ago.278  The stipulations of the treaty were quite ambiguous, and it was not clear what it 
really stood for.279  On paper, the alliance did not directly force the Empire into the war 
and was limited in its sanctioning power.280  However, the real worth of the document 
stemmed from its secrecy.  The physical existence of the document, rather than its 
terms, emerged as a means of influence and presented a value in enforcing secondary 
actions.281  The mere presence of the treaty threatened the Entente on the one hand, and 
on the other enabled Germany and the extremists to manipulate the Empire into the war 
as swiftly as possible. 
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On the eve of the war, the moderates as well as the extremists acknowledged that 
the Ottoman Empire would have to intervene the European confrontation whether to 
secure its survival or to protect its interests.282  It was of general recognition that the 
state was “virtually committed to fight at least in a limited war.”283  As of August 1914, 
the question of “when” rather than “why” seems more relevant for the conflict between 
both parties.  The moderates resisted on adjourning the intervention as long as possible 
to take advantage of the intra-imperialistic clash, to reserve the Empire the time it 
needed to rest and recover, and to join the war at the most favorable point.284  The 
extremists, on the other hand, were encouraged by the initial victories of Germany, and 
wanted to side with the seemingly victorious faction as promptly as possible.  They 
predicted a short war that would end soon around Christmas, or in the summer of 1915 
at the latest.285  Thus, they seemed eager to risk to drive an unprepared empire into the 
war vis-à-vis an exceptional chance of glory.286  The time spent in neutrality, which the 
moderates perceived as an advantage, occurred to them as to miss the opportunity to sit 
at the peace table with the winning side.  
The functioning of the Ottoman diplomacy complicated the struggle between the 
moderates and the extremists further.  The state lacked a centrally defined, coherent 
foreign policy, and relied on the individual efforts of the CUP’s inner circle members.  
This, in return, resulted in a total chaos in terms of foreign policy making.  Personal 
charismas and contacts of the individuals prevailed over general institutional framework 
accompanied by multiple fait accomplis and secret plots.  In this context, the period up 
until October 1914 was marked with tremendous discrepancies in which almost no one 
was fully in control of the situation.287  The lack of coordination prevented the 
government from establishing a balanced control mechanism that could alleviate or at 
least delay the Empire’s drift into the war.288  The cabinet could array its diplomatic 
goals only as late as October 12, 1914, seemingly marking a victory for the moderates.  
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The decision of the cabinet was to procrastinate the intervention at least for a further six 
months.  However, the general accord was undermined in just two weeks of time by 
another fait accompli as the Ottoman fleet bombed Russian harbors on 29 October 1914 
by the order of Enver Pasha, the minister of war.289 
Although the extremists seemed to be in the minority within the government, 
they had the upper-hand in terms of their influence over the party organization and the 
army.  This, in return, rendered them far more powerful than the moderates when it 
came to individual politics.290  Enver Pasha headed the extremists in zeal for war and 
controlled the army.  Yet Talat Pasha’s siding with him as the minister of the interior 
and the head of the general committee of the CUP was at least as important as Enver’s 
influence over the military.   
Talat Pasha had the means to control and to manipulate the public opinion at his 
disposal, including the general directorate of the press.291  Kazım Karabekir, the head of 
the Ottoman military intelligence at the time, noted that already on August 3 the 
ministry of the interior was planning to take measures to control the press in order to 
prevent anti-war publications.292  İsmail Canbulat, the undersecretary to Talat Pasha, 
uttered the intention of the ministry to Karabekir as follows:  “All the newspapers and 
the journals except Tanin will be closed down.  […] What we fear is that other 
newspapers might oppose the war. […] We can coalesce the whole press under the title 
of Tanin and let them publish in equivalent volumes and numbers.“293  In response, 
Karabekir criticized Canbulat for trying to array the members of the press into military 
brigades and to offer them to the order and the commandment of Talat Pasha.294  The 
newspapers did not get closed; nevertheless, the general censorship announced on 7 
August 1914 brought the press under the strict regulation of the ministry. 
Tanin, the official publication of the CUP, quickly sided with the extremists.  
The change in its discourse was quite remarkable.  On July 30, the newspaper stated that 
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it did not foresee a general war, and the next day it claimed that there was still hope for 
a peace in Europe.295  On August 2, it predicted only a limited local war between Serbia 
and Austria-Hungary.296  On August 3, Tanin claimed that there was not any single 
person supporting risky policies in İstanbul, yet three days later it suggested that it was 
almost impossible to remain neutral.297  On August 8, the newspaper published Ziya 
Gökalp’s Kızıl Destan (The Crimson Saga) that said:   
“The lands of the enemy will be ruined!  
Turkey would grow into Turan! 
[…] The lands of the civilization will be covered in red blood!  
Apiece of its ends will become the new Balkan!”298 
 
 The general centre of the CUP encouraged Tanin for further pro-war 
publications.  When Kazım Karabekir complained about these to the general director of 
the press, Hikmet Bey, he received the following response:  “The general centre and the 
government, to be more precise Talat Bey, have pro-war intentions.  Tanin gets inspired 
by them!  They would sympathize anything but anti-war publications.  For this, Tanin’s 
writing cadre has been promoted.”299  Karabekir also received an indirect warning by 
Hafız Hakkı Pasha, the second chief of the Ottoman General Staff:  
“There had been several complaints to Talat Bey about soldiers and some staff 
officers.  Supposedly they were propagating against war!  It has been now 
ordered by Enver Pasha to warn these friends.  […]  By no means oppose the 
war!  About the press:  Do not bother with their regarding publications.  Our 
duty is to check and censor the military news.  Issues other than these belong to 
the ministry of the interior and the newspapers themselves.”300  
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When Karabekir objected Hafız Hakkı, the latter kindly reminded: “You know Kazım, to 
whom Tanin belongs!  For sure they know something.  Neither do have we the right to 
force them, nor do we have the power to do so!”301    
 The ministry’s efforts were paralleled by the itinerant pro-war campaigns of 
several Unionist deputies.302  Indeed, Enver Pasha felt the need to dispatch the above-
mentioned warning in reference to one of them.  The deputy of Istanbul Yağcızade 
Şefik Bey together with Übeydullah and Nesim Mazelyah Effendis organized a 
conference in the municipality of Bandırma and propagated for the immediate 
intervention of the empire into the war.  When they asked for the reaction of the 
audience, Cafer Tayyar Bey, the 4th Corps’ chief of staff, objected by avowing that such 
a case would result in a disaster.303  After their return to Istanbul, these deputies 
complained about Cafer Tayyar’s attitude to Talat.304  The minister conveyed their 
grievances to Enver and the latter to Hafız Hakkı.305  
 This particular event also provides a glimpse into the Navy League’s standpoint 
vis-à-vis the war.  Yağcızade Şefik Bey was the president of the League, and the 
ministry of the interior utilized the organic ties it had established with the institution 
right from the beginning of the war.306  Donanma followed the League in its campaign 
to arouse a popular pro-war support among the public with rising intensity.  On the eve 
of the empire’s intervention, the journal was full of pro-German and pro-war imagery 
supported by Pan-Turanist and Pan-Islamist textual content.  Kazım Karabekir noted 
with great displeasure one such issue of Donanma dated on 19 October 1914.  The issue 
contained photographs of German commanders grouped under the title of “the ones who 
drive Germany to the glory” which were followed by a poem under the name of “The 
Path of the Turk” signed by Fuad Nevzad.307  One verse of the poem was as follows: 
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“Look with careful eyes you would feel, 
 The deep longing for Algeria, Morrocco 
India, Tunusia, Zingiber, Java and Caucasia 
The love of the Turk is definitely all there”308 
 
 However, the ministry of the interior was by no means alone in manipulating the 
press and the public opinion for the ends of the war.  The German embassy ardently 
engaged in emitting its own propaganda and provided the press with news stories, 
articles and clichés.309  The provision of the latter was of utmost importance in shaping 
the visual preferences of the press.  Clichés were quite expensive and only a few of the 
Ottoman periodicals could afford them.  The ample supply of these plates suddenly 
flooded the pages of the periodicals with pro-German visuals.310  At the same time, the 
newly emerging German intelligence offices around the empire provided the public with 
illustrated war magazines and photo albums.311  Kazım Karabekir grudgingly regarded 
their own propaganda attempts as dim and unappealing in comparison to the German 
and Austrian embassies’ efforts which he described as affluent and attractive.  Drawing 
upon Ahmed Emin; “long before Turkey’s entry into the war, every Turkish paper had 
openly taken the German side.”312          
II.2. Forging Order and Peace at Home:  A Search for an “Eternal Tranquility”      
  
 At the advent of the war, the international isolation and the perceived outside 
threat to the state’s existence was the preponderant source of insecurity felt by the 
empire, nevertheless not the only one.  The post-1908 period witnessed a series of 
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political disturbances accompanied by intra-factional power conflicts that were 
characterized by unpredictable parades of violence.313  Assassinations, plots, counter-
plots, coups and incessant rumors referring to these plagued the domestic politics.314   
For a Unionist like Hüseyin Cahid [Yalçın], it was an act of dangerous acrobatics that 
aided the CUP to survive as “[…] various powers were trying to bring it down and 
dissipate it.”315 Nevertheless, it was the very same act and the eagerness of the 
Unionists to resort on every possible means to hold onto power that oriented coercion 
and bloodshed as a part of the daily life. 
 Hence, throughout the period, the CUP’s name was strongly associated with 
violence.  The “big stick elections” of 1912 and the raid on the Sublime Porte on 
January 23, 1913, added up to its reputation. 316  Even as late as the period of the general 
mobilization, a rumor such as that Enver and Cemal Pashas dueled during a cabinet 
meeting, and the latter shot the other, could be revered publicly.317  In this context, the 
CUP found itself in a continuous need to remedy its menacing image on the one hand, 
and on the other to sooth the profound public anxiety stirred by the international and 
domestic traumas.   
 Having restored its power against the opposition as of the first months of 1913, 
the CUP tried hard to alleviate itself as the guarantor of the internal peace and the 
protector of the empire in the international arena.  The assassination of the grand vizier 
Mahmut Şevket Pasha provided the Unionists with the opportunity to put a public 
display of its “power” on both spheres.318  Foreign and Ottoman statesmen, military 
personnel and prominent civilians were invited to the funeral by the order of Cemal 
Pasha, the Guard of Istanbul at the time.319  The people of the capital showed a great 
interest in the event as well.320  In his memoirs, Cemal Pasha estimated the number of 
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the  participants as 150.000 and took pride of himself and the impact of the funeral by 
quoting an Italian admiral:321 
“That Cemal Bey must be a great entrepreneur!  To organize such a funeral the 
next day of the assassination, at a time when not all of the killers are arrested, 
assembling all the foreign ambassadors and particularly the foreign admirals in 
such a narrow place, should indicate a moral courage and a trust in the perfection 
of the security measures.  If someone would throw a hand grenade at us now, 
and some of us would get hurt even slightly, Istanbul would be occupied by the 
crews of our battleships.  […]  Yet we are here and nothing has happened.  If he 
could apprehend the murderers and their aides, Cemal Bey would pay a great 
service to his country.  Because, in my opinion, the first outcome of it would be 
the departure of foreign fleets from the capital and the restoration of the normal 
conditions in the Bosphorus.”322  
Regardless of the historical validity of this statement, Cemal Pasha’s narration 
and wording of it refer to the CUP’s aim to modify its image as the patron of the 
empire’s security, strongly relating domestic and international safety together.  On the 
same page with the quote, it is possible to underscore his emphasis on “establishing an 
eternal tranquility from now on,” and on the following page “the intention to illuminate 
the public both at home and at the outside, and to prove how monstrous [were] the 
accusations casted upon the CUP.”323   
On the other hand, internal order did not only suffer from the violent political 
confrontations.  The law enforcement was quite problematic, and the police forces were 
derided and criticized for their inaptitude to prevent crime.324  The satirical press in 
particular, regarded the efforts to reform the police forces as cosmetic, and depicted the 
police as brutal, inefficient, corrupt, lazy, and indifferent.325  Thus, the CUP had to 
either resolve or to redress the urban crime and lawlessness in order to be able to 
enhance its image as the safeguard of order and peace.  In the face of a major European 
conflict, the persuasion of the public to this seemed more crucial than ever to mobilize it 
for the ends of the war. 
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Donanma, in its pre-war propaganda, assisted the CUP to forge the image of 
domestic tranquility and the strength of the government to effectively prevent crime.  
The set of visuals published in the 54th issue of the journal, on August 2, 1914, were 
quite remarkable in this sense.  Printed in the middle pages of the journal, these images 
portrayed the preferred aspects of the assassination attempt on the life of the Khedive of 
Egypt, Abbas Hilmi Pasha, which created a great tumult in Istanbul at the time.326   
The attempt took place right at the heart of the government, in the Sublime Porte 
on July 25, 1914.  Having visited the grand vizier Said Halim Pasha and the minister of 
interior Talat Pasha, the Khedive was leaving the Sublime Porte through its main gate  
in the presence of mounted officers, gendarmerie and police forces.  A popular crowd, 
wishing to see the Khedive, was piled up on both sides of the road, out of which an 
Egyptian student Mahmud Mazhar came running towards the Khedive’s car and 
managed to fire his pistol five times.327  Two of the bullets hit the Khedive’s right cheek 
and wrist, and a third one wounded his son-in-law, Celaleddin Pasha, crippling him 
permanently.328  Yet none of the hits were deadly.  The would-be assassin injured a 
civilian incumbent shortly before killed, and some of the people within the crowd also 
got hit by stray bullets.329  
Having heard the gunshots, Said Halim, Enver and Talat Pashas came to the 
scene of the assassination as the Khedive received his first aid in the headquarters of the 
1st army corps, the seat of the Guard of Istanbul.330  The incident was an international 
one, and the Khedive was paid visits by the foreign ambassadors in Istanbul as well as 
the prominent Ottoman figures.  The telegraph office in Çubuklu required additional 
incumbents to deal with the excessive numbers of messages wishing health to the 
Khedive.331 
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The attempt was unsuccessful; however, it had failed only slightly.  Taking the 
place of the assault into consideration, the incident could be regarded as a fiasco on 
behalf of the Ottoman security forces.  The Khedive was shot right after a meeting with 
the grand vizier, in the middle of the Sublime Porte and just meters away from the seat 
of the Guard of Istanbul.  This was a strong challenge to the  CUP’s claim for the 
patronage of security both on the internal and the international spheres, and the 
Committee needed to find a way to maneuver out of the humiliating situation.  This 
time, the CUP would resort on printed visual propaganda instead of a grandiose political 
ritual of power as was in the case of Mahmut Şevket Pasha’s funeral.   
 Donanma published three images regarding the incident (see figure II.2 and 
figure II.3), and presented them to the readers as the “latest” photographs of the scene.  
These were accompanied by a two paragraphs story announcing that although the 
incident might have created a tumult among the ones who heard the gunshots, it did not 
result in a regrettable situation.332  The journal praised the government stating that it 
“[…] gave an exemplary lesson to the ones with evil intentions by proving that it was 
alert and anticipatory with regard to the instantaneous incident.”333 Donanma also 
added that the bullets targeting the Khedive and his son-in-law did not hit anywhere 
dangerous, and the assassin was killed immediately by the security forces.334 
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II.2 - The dead body of Mahmud Mazhar335 
 
 
 
 
 
                   Figure II.3 – Mahmud Mazhar being carried away336 
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 The journal’s publication was a full testimony in favor of the government’s 
aptitude to prevent crime by turning the incident into a complete success story. The 
coverage even dismissed the threat that the attempt presented by leaving unclear 
whether the Khedive got hurt.  The images enhanced this testimony further.  Figure II.2 
portrayed the inanimate body of the would-be assassin lying at the feet of a soldier.  The 
scene was a brutal one yet it was also a display of the government’s strength, and how 
quickly and powerfully it could repress crime.  The face of the soldier standing next to 
Mahmud Mazhar’s body was left out of the frame.  His mere presence in attention 
position with a proper uniform, military boots and holding his rifle seems as the 
depiction of the government, representing an omnipresent, alert and anticipatory stance.  
The frame displayed the superiority of the government over the criminal that was 
literally crushed by its legal forces.  The criminal was completely neutralized as he lied 
in blood, and his pistol stood unreachable under the feet of the anonymous soldier.  
Hence, the photograph alluded two points; the presence of crime and the effectiveness 
of the government to stop it. 
 On the other hand, figure II.3 portrayed the removal of the assassin’s body from 
the street, which in return could be regarded as the restoration of the order, as the last 
remnants of the menace was being put into a car. Once the body was cleared away from 
the street, the incident would end merely costing the life of the criminal and leave the 
prior status quo intact as no one else got hurt.   
This was in harmony with another image published five pages before, on the 
same issue (see figure II.4).  The photograph was independent from the textual content 
and portrayed Talat Pasha and Cemal Pasha with other ministers and deputies at the 
new section of the Gülhane Park.  They enjoyed a public appearance, possibly for the 
celebration of the anniversary of the Constitution. The park was situated just a few 
hundred meters from the scene of the attempt, yet the two members of the Triumvirate 
looked quite pleased and relaxed.  Although the precise date of the photograph is 
unavailable, the image seemed to be utilized to testify for the undisturbed order and 
peace as the prominent political figures were depicted among the public in a clearly 
comforted pose and without any sign of worry.   
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Figure II.4 - Cemal Pasha (1) and Talat Pasha (2) in Gülhane Park with other 
prominent members of the CUP337 
 
  
 II.3. Call to Arms: The Ottoman General Mobilization 
 
 
 The Great War was referred as seferberlik (mobilization) among the Turkish 
public even many years after its end.338  Indeed, the war did not earn this name for 
nothing.  Issued on August 2, 1914, the order of mobilization requested all men between 
the ages of twenty and forty-five to apply to the nearest enlistment office within three 
days.339  The order did not exempt anyone including the disabled until their conditions 
were documented by medical tests.340  The ones who were late or did not show up at all 
were subjected to death penalty. 341  The number of the obligators that applied for 
enlisting just in Istanbul was not less than 250.000, and the overall number for the 
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whole empire was estimated around a million.342  For the first time in the empire’s 
history, pamphlets and posters were used in order to announce mobilization.343  The 
launching of the enlistment offices were a novelty as well.344    
The pro-government press assisted the mobilization effort with their publications 
and Donanma took its place within it. The visual propaganda of the journal was two-
folded with regard to mobilization.  On the one hand, it tried to represent the order as a 
cheerful call to which everyone responded with great enthusiasm to protect the future of 
the empire, and on the other it tried to redress the tremendous repercussions caused by 
the mobilization. 
Figure II.5 and figure II.6 represented the first part of this campaign.  The former 
photograph depicted a group of young Ottomans circled around a boy dressed in a white 
mariner’s uniform and gazing at the announcement of the mobilization.  Two of the 
figures addressed with their fingers at the poster, attracting the attention of the readers 
to it.  Their poses were in harmony with the caption of the photograph that said 
“Soldiers to arms: The posters printed for the mobilization.”345  The image, on the one 
hand, tried to raise awareness to the announcement posters, and on the other, intended to 
remind the public why they were called up to arms.  The boy at the centre of the scene 
served to emit this message.  Ever since the beginning of its campaigns in 1910, 
Donanma used the image of boys in uniforms and girls holding flags in white dresses to 
represent the future of the empire, which required the aid of the people for protection 
and was yet to grow eventually.   Rallying under the poster and surrounding the boy, the 
young men in the photograph seemed to secure him.  All of the figures looked pleased 
vis-à-vis the call, and even the boy appeared eager to enlist in the army.  The officer 
marching towards the building next to them addressed the direction of the call; the 
enlistment office.   
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Figure II.6 portrayed an excessive crowd of obliged men of Istanbul marching 
up from Sirkeci towards the Sublime Porte, and the caption of the photograph was read 
as “cheerfully to the service of the homeland”348  Consisting of various age and social 
groups, the crowd was unified under a single flag to enlist into the army.  The obligators 
were headed by elder figures who in return presented an example to the readers of the 
journal.  Despite the apparent heat of August, most of the figures seemed quite happy 
and smiled towards the public watching them.  The reader was situated by the 
positioning of the camera right next to the spectators.  Hence, the image seemed to 
testify for its caption and called the readers overtly to join the happy crowd for 
enlistment. 
However, the execution of the mobilization was quite chaotic and suffered from 
poor planning.349  The sheltering, nourishing and clothing of large masses of obligators 
were not taken into consideration.350  When the would-be soldiers showed up at the 
enlistment centers, they found out that these offices were quite small and inadequate to 
deal with the excessive amount of the applicants.351  The obligators had to wait in queue 
for weeks and even months.352  Their position was quite ambiguous as they were neither 
regular soldiers nor free men.  They were not provided with military rations and hence 
quickly ran out of food which they brought with them.  Most of them had to seek shelter 
in the mosque halls.353 Yalman noted that the circumstances in large cities quickly 
turned into “congestion, misery, hunger and sickness.”354  The parents of the obligators 
yearned aloud for the gloomy conditions of their sons and carried food, blankets and 
clothing to them.355   
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The general mobilization was about to turn into a deadly blow for the pro-war 
campaign.  The populations of the cities were depressed and traumatized by the 
suffering masses which they saw amassed in the mosques.356  A considerable number of 
peasants deserted and took the risk of death penalty as they could not afford to supply 
themselves.357  Eventually, they turned into outlaws having no other option.358  In the 
long run, the empire’s economy also suffered from this large recruitment attempt, as all 
the economic and productive classes of the empire were called to arms at once.  The 
promising harvest of 1914 could not be completely gathered, and the empire faced 
famine during the war.359   
In this context, Donanma participated in the government’s effort to cover the 
repercussions of the general mobilization by the images it published under the title 
“towards an armed nation.”  Using this caption, the 58th issue of the journal put 
particular emphasis on the alimentation of soldiers by displaying their photographs at 
different stages of their nourishment (see figures II.7-II.9), and the explanatory 
subscripts of the images repeated “eating” and “food” persistently.360  The soldiers 
appeared as carrying the cauldrons of food, waiting in proper order for the delivery of 
their rations or sitting on the ground in groups and eating.  The content of the 
photographs seemed quite trivial and a regular part of the daily lives of the soldiers.  
Nevertheless, within the framework of the mobilization they addressed one 
preponderant failure of the government; to feed the masses of men called to arms.  
Thus, these visuals appeared to testify for the government’s capability to take care of its 
soldiers and tried to respond the public concern over the condition of the obligators 
piled up in large groups in the cities. 
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Figure II.7 – Soldiers off to lunch361 
                    
Figure II.8 – Soldiers waiting for the lunch362 
 
 
 
Figure II.9 – Soldiers eating their lunch363  
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II.4. Swift Victories and the “Secrets of the German Glory”  
 
 
An essential part of Donanma’s pro-war campaign was to portray the Central 
Powers as the triumphant party.  The name of Germany was always prefixed with the 
title “victorious” and the visuals depicting battle scenes narrated crushing defeats of the 
Allied forces at the hands of the Central Powers.  The armies of the former were 
represented as scared, routed, annihilated and deserting from the battlefields, whereas 
the forces of the latter were designated as determined, powerful, disciplined and in the 
pursuit of the running enemy.  Generals of the double Alliance were portrayed as 
glorious military geniuses who marched their countries to the ultimate conquest.   The 
power gap between both parties was largely exaggerated, and the setbacks of the 
German offense in the initial phase of the war were not mentioned at all.  The language 
of the images assumed an absolute victory on the side of the Central Powers, addressing 
at a quick and easy win over the Entente.   
Indeed, the messages embedded in these figures were the transliteration of the 
extremists’ pro-war arguments into the visual field.  The publication of these images 
within Donanma was a part of the massive persuasion campaign that tried to manipulate 
the public opinion to favor the Central Powers and the war.  It was an attempt to assure 
the masses that the Entente was doomed to collapse, and the glory was to come swiftly.  
Hence, the Ottoman public, profoundly traumatized by a series of humiliating defeats, 
was called overtly to restore its losses by joining the victorious Germans and Austria-
Hungarians and to avenge the grievances caused by the Entente states.  
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Figure II.10 – “Victorious Germany”364 
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Published on the back page of Donanma’s 60th issue, figure II.10 presented a 
vivid example to this set of images.  The scene depicted German soldiers charging on 
French forces, and the former side was represented as winning a heroic victory.  At the 
centre of the illustration, a German private captured the worn out French flag, signifying 
the prevailing of the Germans over the French.  The French soldier right behind him 
was most likely the standard bearer who just lost the flag and gazed at it in great despair 
and pain as a German soldier next to him was about to thrust his bayonet into his chest.  
Acting faster than his enemy, another German pierced his opponent with his bayonet 
and was possibly shouting a battle cry that epitomized the scene.  Right between them, a 
different German soldier was depicted in a heroic act.  Falling on the ground in the 
middle of the chaotic scene, he managed to fire his gun killing the opposing French 
soldier before the other could point his pistol.  The French army looked incapable to 
stand against the German assault and more German soldiers seemed about to appear 
from the right end of the illustration.  The journal added the caption “triumphant 
Germany” under the image, enhancing the visual narrative further.  It would be 
worthwhile to note that the illustration was painted by Arno Grimm, a famous German 
propaganda artist at the time.  
The swiftness of the Central Powers’ victory occupied a particular place in 
Donanma’s visual propaganda prior to the empire’s intervention into the war.  Images 
within this category embodied flamboyantly dynamic elements in high velocities such 
as soldiers running after a routed enemy or cavalries rushing their horses.  Figure II.11 
depicts such a scene.  German mobile artillery forces were photographed in a rapid and 
aggressive move lifting dust and dirt from the ground, while other German troopers on 
the scene looked at them with reverence and astonishment.  Riders on the horses sat 
ostentatiously and gave the impression of a strong determinacy as they seemed to go 
after the enemy.  The caption of the image addressed the scene as “the secret of the 
glory: the German gunners on four heels.”365  
                                                 
365 “Sırr-ı muzafferiyet: Alman topçuları dört nala.” 
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On the one hand, the title referred to the pace and rapidity of the victory, and on 
the other, to the military might of Germany which was greatly exalted and admired 
within the pages of Donanma.  In this context, the journal strongly emphasized on the 
Central Powers’ technological advancements and tried thus to assure the readers of their 
certain victory.  Images of German and Austria-Hungarian weapons were published to 
testify this message (see figure II.12). 
Yet, the journal did not limit the secrets of glory merely to military and 
technological might.  Germany, in particular, was presented as a raw model for the 
Ottoman society in terms of its social cohesion and solidarity.  Donanma explicit stated 
that the most prominent benefit from the ongoing war would be to watch and learn from 
the Germans and underlined boldly which aspects of German society should be adopted:  
"What earned Germany the glory as promptly as this is the respect for order and 
self-sacrifice of the people.  It is to serve to the ideal, to serve to the cause.  It is 
if necessary to die voluntarily.  […]  That is the greatest benefit for our nation to 
take from the Great War.  We should confess that we have lost a lot from our old 
virtues.”368 
 
 In this context, the journal published numerous images testifying for these 
aspects of the Germans and alluded that the Ottoman public should act accordingly.  
Figures II.13 and II.15 propagate for the social solidarity among the Germans regardless 
of their social status.  The former image shows the queen of Baveria and the princes 
sewing for the German soldiers on the fronts, at the Women Association of Mainz.  The 
image suggests a high level of social unity among the Germans as they were depicted as 
serving for the common good of the country together.  The latter image, on the other 
hand, diplays the children of the German auxiliary soldiers being served food by a 
voluntary organization.  The photograph exalts the German social unity by overtly 
claiming that the country acts as one while a part of it fights the other part takes care of 
the rest.   
                                                 
368 “Almanlar’a bu derece ceraiti neticede muvaffakiyeti temin eden intizamperverlikti, 
fedakârlıktır.  Mefkureye hizmet, gayeye hizmettir.  İcabı takdirinde vatan için güle güle 
ölmeyi bilmektir.  [...]İşte milletimizin harb-i umumiden edeceği en büyük istifade 
budur.  İtiraf etmeliyiz ki, biz eski fazailimizden pek çok şey kaybettik.”  Donanma, 
“Umumi Harp’ten İstifadeler,” Donanma, No: 58, 7 September 1914, p.146. 
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Furthermore, Donanma’s regarding imagery also addressed at the German 
mobilization as a success while praising and lionizing the self-sacrifice of the society.  
Figure II.14 presents a vivid example to this message.  The photograph shows a German 
family that sent the father and the seven sons of the house to the fronts.  The mother 
sitting in the middle of the picture completes the family appearance while explicitly 
displaying her proud.  The captions of all three images referred to the scenes they 
displayed either as the “soul of the victory” or “the secret of the German glory.”  In this 
context, the journal called its readers to follow the German example in order to march to 
the ultimaye triumph.  
 
 
 
 
Figure II.13 – The queen of Baveria sewing for the German soldiers369 
                                                 
369 Donanma, No: 59, 14 September 1914, p.165. 
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Figure II.14 – A German father and his seven sons going to the war together.370  
 
Figure II.15 – The children of the German auxiliary soldiers.371   
 
                                                 
370 Ibid., p.173. 
371 Ibid., p.169. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
                           “A WAR TO END ALL SUFFERINGS” 
 
 
“With the desire of wisdom and maturity, I have retreated to the school of knowledge 
A brusque wind has blown, and I have retreated to a mountain in the desert 
Why should I not cry, the ephemeral life is wasted away 
And now, on a ferocious mountain, I have retreated to the stage of the hereafter 
Although there is silence in the front, it is as if it does not exist 
Forgive me my commandant, for now; I have retreated to the Sinai Mountain 
As we are alert to destroy the army of the infidel 
The soldiers are in the trenches, and Ragıp has retreated to his pleasant torment.” 
  -“A Voice from the Cave,” Başkatipzade Ragıp Bey, 30 April 1915-372 
 
Neither were the lines of Ragıp Bey written in a cave in the desert, nor were they 
supposed to form a classical poem.  Indeed, Ragıp Bey commanded a small station on 
the hills of Sarıkamış covered in snow, and “A Voice from the Cave” was his first 
attempt to inscribe an official military report which intended merely to state that silence 
continued at the front.  Ragıp Bey was a medrese student when the general mobilization 
was announced, and even six months after the empire’s entry into the war, he seemed 
firmly held to this tradition.  His poetic account was anything but ordinary in any 
military sense and received with great frustration by the brigade commander in 
Sultantepe.  Ragıp Bey was immediately called back to the headquarters for 
investigation resulting in his repositioning as a teaching officer.  
                                                 
372 “Hâhiş-i ilm ü kemalle medrese-yi irfana çekildim 
Bir muhalif rüzgâr esti kûh-, beyâbâna çekildim 
Ben nice giryan etmeyeyim ki mahv oldu ömr-i şitâban 
Şimdi de bir gar-ı vahşette menzil-i ukbâya çekildim 
‘Cephede sükûnet var’sa da elbette yok gibidir 
Affet kumandanım şimdilik ben Tûr-ı Sînâya çekildim 
Düşman-ı dinin ordusunu mahv için her ân bîdar iken 
Asker siperinde Ragıp’sa çile-i tûbâya çekildim”  Başkâtipzâde Ragıp Bey, Tarih-i 
Hayatım, (Ankara: Kebikeç Yayınları, 1996), pp.61-62 
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The case of Ragıp Bey provides only a minor glimpse into the widely diversified 
experience of the Great War by the Ottomans.  His generation was the first in centuries 
that was called up to arms from medreses and had to go through the novel phenomenon 
of total war with the rest of the population.  The new warfare required the participation 
of the people as a whole to the war effort, which in return necessitated the stimulation of 
the consent and the willingness to do so.  Hence, the government had to forge a 
common perception of the war and create shared symbols in order to rally the public 
opinion to sustain the costs of the war that seemed to last much longer than expected.  
What the Empire faced was indeed a war which the British preferred to represent as “a 
war to end all wars.”373  Yet, for the Ottomans, it was one that was hoped to end all their 
sufferings.  The government shaped its propaganda accordingly throughout the war and 
made its demands as the last sacrifice to put an end to the ongoing catastrophies of the 
Empire. 
At this juncture, Donanma assumed its part in controlling the public opinion 
through symbols, which Harold D. Laswell addressed as the most prominent aspect of 
war propaganda.374  In order to serve this purpose, the journal would emphasize on the 
unrighteousness and the barbarism of the enemy on the one hand, and on the other, 
would designate it as feeble and beaten.  In this sense, the journal would suggest that the 
victory was near, and the sacrifices demanded from the people this time would be the 
last.  The war would be justified as a fight for saving the empire and a battle for the 
ultimate good of the people against the “greedy” Entente powers.  By veiling the bitter 
face of the war, Donanma would try to create the illusion that the empire was winning 
the war, and enhance this delusion by identifying itself with the military might of 
Germany.   
 
III.1. The Propaganda of Jihad: A Selective Campaign 
Two weeks after its entry into the Great War, the Ottoman Empire proclaimed 
the Jihad on November 14, 1914.  The expectancies from the Holy War were high on 
the side of the empire and the Central Powers.  It was hoped that the declaration would 
                                                 
373 Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring, (Boston: Houhgton Mifflin, 1989), p.92. 
374 Lüdke, Ibid, p. 96. 
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create chaos on the colonies of the Entente powers, as Britain was the foremost 
“Muslim Power” in terms of its demography, followed by Netherlands, Russia and 
France.375  In this context, the call for the Jihad and its perception by the Muslims 
constituted a significant part of Donanma’s wartime propaganda.  Although the textual 
propaganda of the journal had almost a balanced tone between Pan-Islamism and Pan-
Turkism, the visuals in the journal were dominated by the former. 
 Positioning the empire as the center of the caliphate, Donanma addressed it as 
the only protector of the Islamic world and called for the support and the obedience of 
all the Muslims: 
“Over many centuries only the Ottoman state, the great Islamic government, has 
been the only defender of Islam…Our religion now asks for the greatest political 
obligation from us.  From now on, each Muslim should augment the power of 
the holy Caliphate of Islam and the great Sultanate of Ottoman State, and should 
serve for the elevation of their fortune and power.”376 
 
The journal represented the Jihad as an opportunity for the liberation of the 
Muslims all over the world from oppression and identified the source of it as the 
Entente powers, asking the Muslims to take immediate action against them: 
“There are more than three hundred Muslims on the Earth.  How many believers 
of Islam have freedom of religion? Tell how many of you are happy?  Did not 
you become tired of living miserably in this world? […] Do not listen to those 
mean people who are occupied with the Russian bread, English and French 
wine…Free yourself from the Russian slavery, the English whip, the French 
sword.”377 
 
In this sense, the visual propaganda of the journal depicted the Entente powers 
as the ones who oppressed the Muslims, stole their freedom and tortured them.  The 
images that were used to testify this, aimed at transforming the worries of the readers 
                                                 
375 Ibid. 
376 “Nice asırlardan beri ancak Osmanlı devleti, hükümet-i muazzama-yi İslamiyesi 
hemen yalnız başına hami-yi İslam olmuştur…Artık dinimizin gösterdiği en büyük farz-
ı siyasi şudur ki min ba’d her müslüman hilafet-i mukaddese-yi İslamiye, ve saltanat-i 
seniye-yi Osmaniye hükümet-i muazzamasının velev bir zerre kadar olsun tezayüd-fer 
ve şevketine, te’aliyi ikbal ve satvetinehidmet etsin…”  “Müslümanların Bugünkü 
Vecaibi”, p. 770-775, cited in Beşikçi, p.44. 
377 “Dünyada üç yüz milyondan fazla Müslüman var.  Kaç müminin iman-ı serbestisi 
var? Söyleyin kaçınız memnun?  Bu alemde hor görülmekten bıkmadınız mı?  […] Rus 
ekmeği yiyen, İngiliz ve Fransız şarabı içen zalimlere inanmayın.  Kendinizi Rus 
köleliğinden, İngiliz krıbacından ve Fransız kılıcından kurtarın”  “Cihad Ya Müslimin”, 
Donanma, no: 68, 16 November 1914, p. 48, cited in Beşikçi. 
94 
 
into fear and stimulate them to act immediately.  As it could be observed in figure III.1, 
the Allied forces were portrayed as prepared to harm even old and defenseless Muslims 
without hesitation.  Tied to the to the barrel of a desert cannon, an elderly Muslim 
seemed in great pain alongside with numerous others, whereas the Entente soldiers 
stood indifferent to their suffering.  The scene gave the impression that the cannons 
were almost to be fired, and hence, symbolized the “cruelty,” “barbarism,” and 
“inhumane nature” of the Allied forces.  Titled as “To the attention of the Muslims,” the 
photograph called upon the immediate aid of the Islamic world.   
 
 
 
     
                     Fire    
Figure III.1 – “To the attention of all Muslims”378 
      
                                                 
378 Donanma, No: 73, 21 December 1914, front cover. 
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          (Figure 3.2) 
 
(Figure 3.2) 
Figure III.2 – “On the path of the God”379 
                                                 
379 Donanma, no: 81, 15 February 1915. 
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  The form of the aid was also vividly defined by Donanma.  Each Muslim was 
supposed to take up a weapon and resist the occupying Entente forces.  In order to serve 
this purpose, the journal used historical references and romanticized former rebellions 
as in figure  III.2.  The illustration depicted the assassination of  General Claire, who 
was assigned by Napoleon as the commander of the French army occupying Egypt.  The 
image was originally an Orientalist painting that displayed the romanticized and 
lionized death of a Western figure at the hands of a “noble savage.” Referring to the 
assassin as a “self-sacrificing coreligionist,” Donanma reversed the roles in the painting 
and exalted the killer as a hero.  In contrast to the former message of the image, the 
assassin’s dreadful act was  transformed into the “virtuous” resistance of the Muslims.  
The person who killed the general, leaned with a nearly impossible move to the forth 
and stabbed  his dagger into the heart of his enemy.  The mosque and the minaret 
appearing right behind the two characters previosly reflecting Orientalist elements, were 
shifted in meaning  and came to suggest that the victim did not belong to that 
geography.  Thus,  the assassination  was turned into a legitimate act that was performed 
for the sake of the religion. 
In this context, Donanma intended to convince its readers that the Jihad was 
received with great enthusiasm in the Islamic world, and all the Muslims were unified 
fervently against the Entente powers (see figure III.3). 
 
 
Figure III.3 – “On the way of the Jihad”380 
                                                 
380 “Cihad Yolunda”, Donanma, no: 77, 18 January 1915, inner front cover. 
97 
 
 
 
 
 
III.2. The Representation of the Enemy 
 
 An essential part of Donanma’s visual propaganda was to portray the enemy as 
deprived of any chance to win the war.  Thus, the enemy appeared as feeble, weak, 
desperate, helpless and deteriorating within the pages of the journal.  In this way, 
Donanma tried both to sooth its readers’ concerns suggesting that the Entente powers 
were not to be feared of and to testify that the victory would come swiftly and easily. 
Figure III.4 portrayed Britain as a fat and old man who was confined on its 
island, surrounded by German submarines which were drawn as sharks.  The man 
looked in great fear and desperation as he was isolated on a small piece of rock and had 
nowhere else to run.  A submarine lifting its head over the water seemed to be waiting 
for a minor mistake of its “prey.”  The game between the man and the sharks offered a 
certain victory for the latter as the old man would not be able to last without any outside 
help.  The scene intended to refute the perception of Britain as a naval giant, and to 
prove that its geography did not offer any immunity versus the Central Powers.  On the 
other hand, the image also reversed the Ottomans’ perception of themselves as a prey by 
positing the empire among the hunters and the former hunter as the prey. 
Figure III.5 ridiculed the triple Entente further by calling them “the caravan of 
the cripple donkeys.”  The Allies were depicted on the road to Istanbul, yet they 
completely lacked the capability to reach the city.  The one-legged British officer 
seemed hardly be able to pull the cart that carried a needy old man representing Russia, 
while a French soldier resting on his crutch tried to pull the cart up the hill.  The road 
looked long and acclivous, whereas at the end of it a mosque stood, emphasizing on the 
Islamic character of the city.  The road went through a deep valley overseen by two 
strong looking fortresses, presenting an allegory for the Dardanelles.  The attempt of 
these three figures to reach the city looked more than implausible.  The cartoon overtly 
aimed to assure the Ottomans that Istanbul was secure by all means, and it was unlikely 
that the Entente could reach city.  
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Figure III.5 – “The caravan of crippled donkeys”382 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
382  Donanma, No: 97, 27 May 1915, p.749. 
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III.3. The Self-image 
The general Ottoman propaganda from August 1914 to March 1915 resorted 
predominantly on the expansionist discourses and dreams of Pan-Islamism and Pan-
Turkism.383  It was both short termed, and unrealistic in terms of its goals.384  The 
prevailing argument of this rather aggressive propaganda was “not to miss the 
opportunity.”385  Yet, after the Empire’s intervention to the war, it was accompanied 
also by the themes of “salvation” and “independence.”386  As the Pan-Turkist and Pan-
Turanist propaganda gradually dwindled through the course of the war, the latter themes 
became even more decisive in determining how the general propaganda tried to shape 
the self image of the Ottomans.  The Great War was largely perceived as an alien series 
of battles –except the Gallipoli Wars- that was fought outside the homeland, and the 
Ottoman propaganda that tried to render it as a war of salvation was an attempt to make 
the public internalize it and to exalt the war effort as a righteous one.387    
Donanma’s wartime propaganda could be analyzed in the same framework.  The 
journal designated the image of the Ottomans as brave, heroic and powerful fighters that 
defended their homes, families and children.  In contrast to the “feeble,” “coward,” and 
“desperate” image of the enemy, the Ottoman soldier was depicted as always ready to 
fight and defeat his enemy with skill and honor.  In this sense, the journal’s imagery 
largely avoided to represent the impersonal and non-heroic nature of the new warfare 
and portrayed the battle scenes as epic struggles in which the Ottoman soldiers 
prevailed upon their opponents. 
Figure III.6 provides a compendium for the journal’s representation of the 
Ottoman’s self image.  The illustration, published as late as August 2, 1917, animates a 
battle between the Ottoman and British soldiers on the Sinai front, which could hardly 
be considered as a homeland for the Ottomans at the time.  Yet, the babies tied to the 
waist of the Ottoman soldier from their swaddles create an intimate connection with 
                                                 
383 Köroğlu, Ibid, p.175. 
384 Ibid. 
385 Ibid. 
386 Ibid. 
387 Özge Özgür, The Great Wars of  the Fırst Quarter of the Twentieth Century and the 
Representatıon of War In Selected Works In European and Turkish Literature, 
(Unpublished MA Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2001), p.91. 
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home and family.  The soldier attacking his British counterpart seems to protect the 
defenseless and innocent against the Entente “threat.”  On the other hand, the scene also 
propagates for the Ottoman dominance against its enemies.  The Ottoman private 
piercing his enemy with his bayonet looks strong, determinant and valiant, whereas his 
opponent shivers in fear and pain throwing his rifle away.  The abandoned rifle and hat 
of another British soldier together with the Ottoman soldier on the background chasing 
his opponent signal that the enemy has routed and running away.  The illustration 
contrasts the desperation of the “enemy” with the glory of the Ottomans.  In this 
context, the image argues both that the Ottoman war effort is a righteous one as it 
intends to defend the homeland and that the victory is near as the Ottomans are stronger 
than their enemies and constantly defeating them. 
 
 
 Figure III.6 – On the Sinai Front 388                           
                                                 
388 Donanma, No: 130, front cover. 
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III.4. The Call for Support 
 
The mass naval aid campaign of the Navy League in the pre-war years had been 
a significant experience for Donanma.  Using a dense patriotic discourse, the journal 
managed to manipulate the public to participate in the campaign and to mobilize the 
spiritual and material energies of the people for militarist ends.  During the Great War, 
this experience proved to be invaluable for the journal.  It tried to stimulate the Ottoman 
public to support the Empire’s war effort and called for the physical and material 
participation of the people.   
 An essential part of this propaganda was to sustain the supply of manpower.  As 
mentioned in the second chapter, the call for the general mobilization was poorly 
executed and caused catastrophic repercussions during the pre-intervention period.  
However, military recruitment became even more problematic for the Empire 
throughout the war, as only around 4 per cent of the population could be mobilized for 
active duty. 389  The picture gets more pessimistic when this ratio is compared to France 
which was one of the major belligerent powers.  Having a population almost twice as 
big as the Ottoman Empire, France managed to mobilize 10 per cent of its population, 
which in return meant an army nearly five times larger than the former.390  The size of 
the Ottoman army at any one time during the war was estimated to be around 
800.000.391  Considering that nearly 500.000 Ottoman soldiers deserted up until 1918, 
military recruitment seems to have shifted gradually from problematic to appalling.   
In this context, Donanma’s visual propaganda tried to address particularly to this 
issue by trying to render the military service as a jolly and heroic journey towards  
victory.  Photographs of jocund Ottoman soldiers marching to the fronts were published 
frequently on the pages of the journal, inviting the readers to join them in the fight.  The 
images of small children that seemed eager to march with the soldiers were also utilized 
to stimulate the public both as an encouragement and as a fear factor which alluded that 
the future of the Empire was indeed under danger.392 
                                                 
389 Zürcher, Ibid., p. 242.  
390 Ibid. 
391 Ibid., p.241. 
392 Donanma, No: 115, 11 November 1915, p.1047 
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on how the new machines of war functioned, and what they could do during a battle. It 
lionized and glorified them by publishing impressive images of the new war tools and 
asked the public for help to obtain them. 
Yet, once the Great War began, the new technology started to cast blight upon 
the battle fields, bringing about what Modris Eksteins calls “a panorama of 
devastation.”401  The new form of war was one that brought machines against machines 
as well as machines against men within an “impersonal storm of destruction.”402  The 
battlefields became industrial wastelands, at the opposing ends of which the soldiers of 
the confronting sides took cover in the trenches and shared the horrific view of charred 
stumps, endless mud, incessant gunfire and the dead bodies of fellow and enemy 
soldiers.403  The “wonderful” and silent machines of the pre-war era brought havoc, 
moral frustration and desperation, creating a deadlock that extended the duration and the 
geography of the Great War over time.  In return, the result was even more casualties. 
The experience of the Ottoman soldier with the new war technologies was 
further problematic.  The “new” also meant the “alien” as the Empire lacked both the 
industrial infrastructure and the know-how to produce it.  The state depended on the 
major European powers to import the “new”, yet still suffered from financial setbacks 
and international alignments to do so.  Thus, the Empire had to rely upon the German 
and Austrian military aids as of August 1914 to be able to respond the severe challenge 
of the new technological warfare.  Nevertheless, even with the assistance of the Central 
Powers, the Empire had to face a serious technological disparity against the Entente on 
the ground, in the air and on the sea.  Through the course of the war, the Ottoman 
soldier found himself fighting an extensive war against dreadnoughts, airplanes and 
tanks in many cases without the proper means to resist against them. 
In this context, Donanma’s wartime visual propaganda deviated from the all 
glorious and magnificent vision of the new warfare and assumed a more selective 
discourse.  The journal kept exalting the German and Austrian machines and regarded 
them as the examples of “good” technology that destroyed the Empire’s enemies, while 
                                                 
401 Eksteins, p.146. 
402 Cecil and Liddle, Ibid., p.3. 
403 Ibid. 
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it cursed the war technology of the Entente Powers as “evil.”404  The propaganda of the 
journal attacked this particular “evil” in order to make up the collective psychological 
deficit of the Ottoman public by claiming that these new machines of war were not 
indeed invincible and that the Ottoman soldiers could “heroically” destroy them despite 
the lack of resources and proper technology.  It would be worthwhile to note that the 
notion of the “evil” technology would evolve into a “one toothed monster” against 
which the Turkish soldiers set their” chests filled with “faith” within the national 
anthem of the Turkish Republic over the years to come.  In this sense, it is possible to 
identify certain precursory elements of the Turkish nationalism among the visuals of the 
journal. 
The figures III.11, III.12 and III.13 constitute vivid examples to this type of 
imagery that depicted the destruction of the “evil” machines of the Entente at the hands 
of the Ottoman soldiers in the air, on the sea and on the ground.  The first figure shows 
a blown up British tank on the Palestinian front.  Introduced to the battle fields first in 
1916 by the Allies, tanks were the mightiest war machines on terrain and the symbol of 
the latest technology.  In this sense, the journal utilized the image of the British tank as 
a testimony of the enemy in constant atrophy, which was indeed not the case.  The 
caption of the photograph claimed that the British were being defeated every day by the 
Ottomans and that the scene represented one such occasion.  On the other hand, the 
figure III.12 was an illustration of the French battleship Bouvet that was sunk during the 
first phase of the Gallipoli Wars.  The image depicted the ship as heavily hit by the 
artillery fire and going slowly under water covered in smoke.405  It was a scene at which 
the Ottomans prevailed over the strong Entente navy without a navy on the sea.  A 
similar claim was stated in the figure III.13 which displayed a French warplane crashed 
by the Ottoman soldiers and thorn into pieces.  The journal presented the photograph as 
one of the wings of the enemies that was broken by the Ottoman army.  The scene, as 
the previous two, was the propagation of the Ottoman domination against the Entente 
powers and its ability to deal effectively with the symbols of their military might 
representing them as feeble and dysfunctional. 
                                                 
404 Donanma, “Ruh-ı Zafer,” no: 85, 15 March 1915, p. 580. 
405 It should be noted that the main damage dealt to Bouvet came from the sea mines, as 
the most of the Ottoman artillery at Gallipoli were desert cannons incapable to pierce 
through the armor of a battleship. 
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Yet, while the journal claimed that the “new” was not invincible it also tried to 
render the Ottoman soldier indestructible against it.  As a regular Ottoman soldier could 
bring down a plane or destroy a tank, he was immune versus the shells, bombs or bullets 
fired by them.  The figure crystallizes this message in a quite concrete way.  The 
photograph displays a group of Ottoman soldiers from different age groups gathered 
around unexploded shells.  The caption of the image addresses at them as “incapable to 
shake the courage of the Ottomans.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure III.11 – A destroyed British tank in Palestine406 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
406 Donanma, No: 176, 1 August 1918, p.2030. 
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Figure III.13 – “The broken wings of the enemy”408 
 
 
 
Figure III.14 – “The 38 cm calibred enemy shells that could not shatter the Ottoman’s 
courage”409 
 
 
 
                                                 
408 Ibid., front cover. 
409 Donanma, No:102, 1 July 1915, p.821. 
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III.6. The Prisoners of War 
 
Perhaps, no other propagandist message could match the photographs of the 
prisoners of war (POW) in effect and intensity to convince the public on the 
“helplessness” and “spiritual decay” of the enemy.  In this context, Donanma reserved a 
special importance for this type of imagery within its visual propaganda throughout the 
war and tried to address at the “depleting” hopes of the enemy via the unwilling visual 
testimony of the POWs.  The journal integrated this message into its general 
propaganda as a proof of the approaching victory and that with a slightly more effort 
and zeal they could win the war. 
These photographs referred indeed to what Ernst Jünger called as the “new 
objectivity.”  The camera, turning into a mechanical eye, captured the element at which 
its objective was directed with a great indifference. 410  It separated the element, in this 
case the prisoner, from time and space, transferring its possession to an alien gaze.411  
Hence, the photographs of the POWs through mechanical reproduction reached the 
readers of the journal, and the POWs became not only the prisoners of the Central 
Powers but also of the readers as well. 
Figure III.15 constitutes an apposite example to this type of visuals.  Formed by 
the mug shots of five different prisoners, the collage exposes the POWs in a reluctant 
state of submission to the gaze of the reader from various angles.  The image entitles the 
reader with the authority to freely investigate them as objects, to penetrate their privacy 
and to possess their reproduced views.  The prisoners look jaded, desperate, shaken and 
feeble in apparently dowdy uniforms and bad personal hygiene conditions.  They seem 
in a completely war weary position and do not show any willingness to resist, let alone 
to fight.  In this sense, the image explicitly refers on the one hand to the athrophy of the 
“enemies” and on the other to the ability of the Central Powers to subdue them.  
 
                                                 
410 Ernst Junger, "Photography and the 'Second Consciousness: An Excerpt from ‘On 
Pain’”, Photography in the Modern Era: European Documents and Critical Writings, 
1913-1940 (New York: Aperture, 1989), s. 208. 
411 Ibid. 
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The journal also utilized the photographs of POWs in order to substantiate the 
image of the state as benevolent and merciful, while trying to justify its war effort as a 
fair one.  In contrast to the “barbaric” and “heinous” image of the enemy, the Ottoman 
Empire was depicted as a benign state that treated its prisoners kindly and munificently.  
Figure III.16 displays a group of wounded British and French prisoners receiving their 
treatment in the Taşkışla Hospital.  The personal hygiene of the POWs at the picture 
looks relatively decent.  The prisoners are dressed in clean clothes, and their wounds 
were apparently taken care of by the medical staff.  The Ottoman doctor standing in the 
middle of them seem to be diognasing and looking after the POWs.   In this manner, the 
photograph emits a dual message that the Empire is beneficent enough to bestow 
civilized living conditions even to the POWs who were wounded while fighting against 
it, and hence that it pursues a just war.  
 
 
III.7. “Spy  Scare” 
 
 
 
A fundamental requirement of the war was to be able to monitor the enemies’ 
military activities, communications and capabilities to sustain their war efforts.  This, in 
return, necessitated well organized and properly supported intelligence services.  Yet, 
prior to the war, the existent organizations were quite amateurish and suffered 
considerably from lack of funding and staff.414  They could launch only small scale 
operations with agents of limited skills and abilities.415  In general, they were incapable 
of uncovering any valuable information which further curbed down their credibility in 
the eyes of the governmental authorities.416  For the Middle East in particular, there 
were not any professional agents who could extract accurate information, and the 
specialists on the area were too few to cross-check the obtained information.  Therefore, 
the intelligence organizations found themselves obliged to rely on the local informants 
for the most of the time. 
 
 
                                                 
414 Lüdke, Ibid., p.57. 
415 Ibid. 
416 Ibid. 
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Still, at the advent of the war, the existence and the activities of these services 
seemed to trouble their counterparts.  Kazım Karabekir, the head of the Ottoman 
military intelligence at the time, expressed his uneasiness with the espionage operations 
within the boundaries of the Empire as follows:  “While spies could easily wander 
around in the country, missioners among the people could poison the public with vulgar 
propaganda and facilitate the actions of the spies.”417  For Karabekir, there were three 
main factors that assisted spies: (i) the hostility of the non-Turkish groups against the 
Turks and their avarice; (ii) the almost traditional trust and respect of the Turks in 
swindlers and (iii) intensive foreign influence and population that came through 
capitulations.418  Karabekir also listed possible disguises for spies, according to which 
anyone could be suspected as an agent ranging from a cook to a driver, from a journalist 
to a watchmaker, or from a translator to a maid.  Even though Karabekir’s lines seem to 
reflect an intense nationalist suspicion, similar concerns were also shared by his 
contemporary counterparts.  Walter Nicolai, the head of the German intelligence, 
complained also about the successful integration of spies among the German public and 
people’s cooperation with them.419 
It is beyond the scope of this study to assess the collaboration of the individuals 
with spies or their services as agents within the Ottoman Empire.  Rather, what 
constitutes a major concern for this work is that particular cases in which non-Muslims 
were accused of espionage fueled a government manipulated spy scare.  Espionage 
cases related to non-Muslims were indeed not rare.  Military and intelligence reports 
mentioned several assassination attempts against prominent officers.420 As a 
contemporary observer, Nicolai did not conceal his respect for Jewish and Armenian 
spies whom he regarded as “determinant”, “ruthless” and “very anti-Turkish” whereas 
he carped the Greek spies referring them as “cowards.”421  He even went further to 
                                                 
417 “Casuslar istedikleri gibi memlekette cirit atarken, halk arasındaki misyonerler de 
istedikleri gibi amiyane propagandalarla halkımızı zehirleyebiliyorlar ve casusların 
hareketini kolaylaştırıyorlardı.”  Karabekir, Ibid, p.104. 
418 Ibid., p.103. 
419 Walter Nicolai, Birinci Dünya Harbinde Alman Gizli Servisi, (Istanbul: Kamer, 
1998), p.69. 
420 In one case, a Greek cook tried to poison General Limon von Sanders during one of 
his inspection visits in Gallipoli.  It was reported that the poison was provided by a 
British agent.  FA/MA, Gempp-Report, 121, cited in Lüdke, Ibid., p.61. 
421 Walter Nicolai, Geheime Maechte, (Leipzig, 1924), p.92, cited in Lüdke, Ibid., p. 61.   
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claim that the fear of the Armenian spies had a significant role for the severe sanctions 
taken against the Armenian population of the Empire.  
Although the extent of these activities remains vague, existent cases provided 
the CUP government with the means to launch a public campaign through the course of 
1915 that based on the exploitation of the fear of spies.  A decree issued by Enver Pasha 
on 31 December 1915 marked the zenith of the process: “papers had been found 
proving the excessive level of enemy espionage against which now decisive steps will be 
taken.  Naval and army officers are instructed to maintain silence about any crucial 
information, as well as civil officials.  Those violating this directive are liable to suffer 
severe punishment.”422  Accordingly, all non-Muslims, regardless of the significance of 
their positions, were to be removed from military or civil service upon the receipt of the 
order within 24 hours, and the individuals under suspicion were ordered to be sent to 
non-sensitive areas.423 
The state media gave full support to the campaign via their publications and took 
their part in the creation of a spy scare propaganda.  The public was fed with stories of 
“dangerous” and “heinous” individuals serving for the enemies in disguise.  In return, a 
tacit consent for the extreme governmental sanctions, as Enver Pasha’s directive, was 
created among the population.  Thus, the CUP government managed to stiffen its 
political authority further and to eliminate its opponents while still representing itself as 
the disinterested guarantor of the peace, order and national integrity.424 
Donanma participated in this “spy scare” campaign as well and stimulated the 
public fear via its visual propaganda.  The messages entailed in the journal’s regarding 
imagery were of two types.  On the one hand, they served to render the “invisible 
threat” visible by repeatedly publishing the images of the arrested agents and spies.  As 
in the figure III.17, they were exposed to the reader in groups alluding that they were 
not  
  
                                                 
422 FA/MA, File RM40/V.20, 31.12.15, cited in Lüdke, p.79. 
423 Ibid. 
424 Ibid. 
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Figure III.17 – “Russian spies caught by the Austrian army” 425  
 
 
 
 
Figure III.18 – Russian spy under disguise426 
                                                 
425 Donanma, no: 102, 1 July 1915, p.825. 
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less in number, and that the danger was bigger than imagined.  The image showed a 
group of Russian spies imprisoned by the Austrian soldiers and exposed to the camera.    
On the other hand, as in the figure III.18, the journal published disguised spies in 
different appearances.  The figure displayed a Russian spy concealed as a peasant.  He 
was arrested by the German soldiers in the Eastern Prussia, and the caption called him 
“forever devilish.”  This was partly because that he was Russian and thus the “eternal 
enemy” of the empire.   However, the main emphasis of the image was that the agent 
was undercover and disguised as a common citizen.  Hence, he was represented as more 
“malign” than ever.  At this juncture, the journal’s propagandist discourse converged to 
Kazım Karabekir’s overly suspicious approach that spies could be anywhere in any 
guise and addressed to a constant threat for the public that evoked a strong apprehension 
and alarm.      
Both of the figures above, as various others under this category, depicted the 
agents as arrested and neutralized, suggesting that the Empire and its allies were 
powerful enough to detect and subdue the concealed threat.  Yet, the continuous 
publications of this imagery served to alert and scare the public that there were 
numerous others out that persistently posed peril to the Empire.  In this context, the 
government was singled out as the only potent defender against this menace, and its 
harsher measures were tried to be legitimized as a necessity of high priority.   
                        
III.8. Social Darwinism 
 
 
 
Donanma regarded the era in which they lived as a time when the “might 
prevailed over the right” and assumed a particular “social Darwinist” tone that claimed 
that the Ottomans should be strong on every aspect of life to be able to survive 427  One 
source of this power was seen in the physical strength of the people, and thus received 
an intensive and exclusive coverage by the journal under the heading “Columns of 
Physical Training”, the journal expressed this idea in a quite vivid way: 
                                                                                                                                               
426 Donanma, no: 75, 4 January 1915, p.429. 
427 Fatma Aliyye, “Donanmamız”, p. 629. 
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“Power is such a quality that gives dignity, virtue, respectability to those who 
possess it.  Even unskilled laborers who are remarkably powerful fellows hold a 
different status among their colleagues…  Even the school children realize today 
that neither intellect nor muscle can alone achieve something in life…[Young 
people] should work, run and jump for maintaining their bodily strength just like 
they run to the frontier to fulfill their military service.”428  
 
Thus, Donanma related physical training not just to physiology but also to psychology, 
and addressed the German victories over Russians as the victory of “trained and firm” 
bodies over the “miserable” others.429  The representation of Ottoman athletes through 
visuals and frequent emphases on the scientific aspects of “beautiful body” were 
completed by showing the readers the ways to defend themselves vis-à-vis a physical 
threat. 
               
 
               Figure III.19 – Cevad Rüşdü Bey 430 
                                                 
428 “Kuvvet öyle bir vasıfdır ki temellük edebilenlere fazla bir vakar, bir meziyet, bir 
hürmetbahş eder… Kendi muhitinde, meslekdaşları arasında müstesna kuvvetteki 
hamalların bile başka bir mevkiivardır… Yalnız dimağın veya yalnız adalenin iş 
göremeyeceği bugün mekteb çocuklarına varıcaya kadar anlaşıldı” Ali Seyfi, “Anasır-ı 
Kuvvet”, Donanma, no: 105, 24 June 1915, p. 66-67, cited in Beşikçi, p.69. 
“….veazif-i askeriyesini ifa için serhada koştuğu gibinerede olursa olsun metanet-i 
bedeniyesini muhafaza için çalışmalı, uğraşmalı, koşmalı, sıçramalıdır.” B. 
“Niyetimiz”, Donanma, no: 83, 29 February 1915, p. 1. Cited in Ibid. 
429 Ibid. 
430 Donanma, no: 98, 3 June 1915, p.770. 
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III.9. The Aftermath 
The sudden and swift collapse of the Central Powers in the last quarter of 1918 
resulted in ultimate defeat before the end of the year.  First Bulgaria, and then the 
Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary and Germany surrendered to the Entente forces 
respectively, triggering dramatic fractures in the domestic politics of these countries.  
The Mundros Armistice, signed on October 30, 1918, meant the end of the CUP’s 
political hegemony which it enjoyed since 1913.  The Committee grew largely 
unpopular among the public as the party that drove the country to the war and then lost 
it.  Accused by various war crimes, the Triumvirate alongside with many other 
Unionists absconded from the country.  Thus, the fading away of the CUP’s political 
power and its replacement by anti-Unionist governments forced Donanma to change its 
pro-CUP and pro-German propaganda. 
In this context, the journal shifted the focus of its criticism from the Entente 
powers towards Germany.  While billing the responsibility of the defeat to this country, 
the journal emphasized that the empire still stood on its feet despite all the sufferings 
caused by the war and utilized visuals for the sake of a different propagandist message. 
Figure III.22 is a photograph of the battle ship Yadigar-ı Millet (Memorial of the 
Nation) in the post-war period.  The ship was depicted as being put on the stocks in a 
dockyard.  Yadigar-ı Millet was among the first battle ships that were bought with the 
money collected by the Navy League’s aid campaign, and hence symbolized the dreams 
and the hopes of the people accrued around this campaign.  During the war, the battle 
ship was heavily damaged and half-sunk but was about to be repaired and floated again.  
Despite its serious wounds, Yadigâr-ı Millet was on the verge of a rebirth.  In this sense, 
it was strongly associated with the Ottoman Empire, and denoted the hurt yet surviving 
optimism of the people.   
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                                              433 
 
Figure III.22 – Yadigâr-ı Millet under repair 434 
 
On the other hand, the journal represented Germany as the ultimate loser of the 
war, and referred to its weakness as the cause of the Ottoman defeat.  Figure III.22 
illustrated the pre- and post-war German army and the navy.  The soldier in the first 
frame stood for the pre-war German army, and the soldier that could hardly been seen 
represented the latter period.  The same comparison was also done for the navy in the 
second frame.  In this sense, the journal implied that the admiration felt for German 
might was indeed for nothing.   
The failure of Germany was also depicted by photographs that showed the 
surrender of the German forces to the Entente powers.  Figure III.23 depicted German 
                                                 
 
434 Donanma, no: 189, Ocak 1919, p. 77. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
  
This study tried to explore the Ottoman experience of the Great War through a 
preliminary analysis of Donanma’s visual propaganda.  Although the Ottoman 
propaganda suffered from serious infrastructural and superstructural setbacks and hence 
doomed to fail eventually, this thesis argued that the attempt of the government to 
penetrate the Ottoman public sphere and to manipulate the public opinion cut across the 
social, economical and cultural aspects of the Ottoman war experience and thus offered 
a valuable insight into it.  In this perspective, the present thesis proposed that Donanma 
was an efficient and preferable channel for the dispersion of the governmental 
propaganda due to its popular character and that visuals aided the journal by improving 
the accessibility of its propagandist message.  
The theoretical ground of this study rested upon the rapidly extending Ottoman 
public sphere in the post-1908 era and its blurring boundaries with the state. The study 
argued that voluntary associations came to define the post-revolutionary public sphere 
and posed as mediums where the Ottoman citizens could translate their sentiments and 
ideas into organized action.  At a period of high expectations and great disappointments, 
these organizations unearthed the accumulated social energy via thrusting public 
channels into it.  The state utilized semi-official associations to mobilize this energy on 
a nationalistic and patriotic axis, which in return resulted in the marginalization of non-
governmental associations.  The Navy League was one of the most efficient and popular 
semi-official institutions, achieving to arouse a huge popular interest and mobilizing 
popular affections into one “collective destiny”, the navy. 
Donanma, as the mirror of the ideas of the Leaguers, appeared as the means to 
disperse the League’s propaganda.  Reaching a high and consistent circulation rate and 
expanding over a time span of ten years, it became the most vivid symbol of the 
popularity of this mass mobilization campaign.  It managed to achieve this; first, by 
addressing each and every group of the society; second, by acting as a social forum 
through which prominent figures and writers together with their young counter parts 
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could raise their voice for supporting the campaign; third, by keeping its price at a 
maximum low for a long time; fourth, by adopting an illustrated character that 
alleviated the gap between the literate and illiterate; and fifth, by using the widespread 
national and international network of the League for distribution 
This thesis put emphasis on visual propaganda as a valuable analytical 
framework as it promised a higher potential to communicate with a greater amount of 
people within the highly illiterate Ottoman society.  As of June 1914, Donanma 
enhanced its illustrated character and put a greater emphasis on its visual propaganda.  
This paralleled the League’s increasing alignment with the ministry of the interior and 
the extremists within the government.  The journal turned into a newsreel and the 
CUP’s war propaganda tool from this time onwards. 
The study analyzed the journal’s war propaganda in two periods: before and 
after the Ottoman entry to the war.  Although the former period expanded over less than 
a four months period, it has been equally emphasized as the latter by this study.  The 
choice was directly related to one particular concern.  The literature on the Ottoman 
experience of the Great War usually regards the intervention as a mere fait accompli of 
a few extremist Unionist leaders.  Yet, it overlooks the preceding complex social 
process and the heated confrontation among the moderate and the extremist groups 
within the government over the decision of intervention.  It is true that the Empire 
entered the war as a result of a fait accompli; however, it was preceded by an intensive 
pro-war public campaign that attempted to win over the public opinion and to convince 
it over the benefit of the intervention.  The campaign was rather successful and 
Donanma took its role within it.  Thus, the present study tried to render this largely 
overlooked aspect more visible by analyzing the components of the journal’s visual 
propaganda for the period preceding the intervention. 
The social insecurity deeply felt by the Ottoman public played a key role in 
shaping the propaganda of this period.  As Donanma adopted a clear pro-Alliance and 
pro-war position, the Central Powers were depicted as an element of power and safety.  
The ominous image of Germany and Austria prior to 1913 was replaced by a beneficent 
and a friendly one, whereas the revered position of Britain and France was relegated to 
treacherous and malign.  The Central Powers were represented as superior to the 
Entente in every aspect.  The former side was depicted as absolute victors on the 
battlefield literally crushing the armies of the Entente powers, whereas the latter were 
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represented as doomed to failure.  The triumph of the Central Powers looked swift and 
inevitable.  Hence, the journal tried to convince the Ottoman public that an immediate 
intervention on the side of Germany and Austria would be highly beneficial and the 
Empire should join them as quickly as possible.  Germany was addressed as a role 
model for the Ottoman Empire.  Its social cohesion, solidarity and technological 
advancement was highly praised and shown as an example to the readers.   
The Ottoman general mobilization constituted a significant part of the journal’s 
pre-intervention propaganda.  It represented the process as a cheerful event to which the 
Ottomans responded positively as a whole and tried to veil the catastrophic 
repercussions caused by it through encouraging imagery.  The German mobilization 
constituted a strong reference point as Donanma called for the participation of the 
Ottomans into the process.  On the other hand, the journal also attempted  to enhance 
the image of the CUP by representing the Committee as the guarantor of the internal 
peace and emphasized upon its ability to prevent crime and disorder.  The visuals of the 
journal regarded the CUP and its leaders as a remedy for the acute social insecurity. 
The Ottoman society was largely diversified along social, economical and ethnic 
lines.  Hence, the perception and the experience of the war by the population showed a 
great variety.  In response to that, Donanma’s visual propaganda after the intervention, 
tried to create a common war experience for the Ottoman society as a whole and tried to 
rally it under common symbols for the ends of the Great War.  The most prominent 
component of the journal’s wartime propaganda was Jihad.  Donanma’s imagery 
depicted the Entente powers as oppressors of the Muslims all over the world and called 
upon them to join hands in a war against those powers.  The journal suggested that Jihad 
was welcomed by all Muslims with great enthusiasm.  Nevertheless, the call for Jihad 
was a selective one and excluded the Central powers by designating them as “faithful,” 
“devotional” and “god-fearing” people.     
The image of the enemy was a rather ambivalent one.  On the one hand, it was 
represented as “greedy,” “dangerous” and “barbarian” and on the other, as “helpless,” 
“feeble,” and “beaten.”  For both cases, the journal designated the enemy as 
“unrighteous” and tried to persuade the public that the victory was near and the 
sacrifices made and demanded would soon be concluded by a decisive and swift 
victory.  The visual propaganda of the journal represented the war of the Ottomans as 
“virtuous” and “heroic.”  The fight was claimed to be for the salvation of the Empire 
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and the protection of its future.  The image of the Ottoman population and the soldiers 
were depicted as a march to the victory and the Empire was closely identified with the 
German and Austrian successes throughout the war and forged a close identification 
with them.   
The propaganda of the journal reflected a vivid social Darwinist character  
putting a bold emphasis on physical strength and assigned it a key role for the survival 
of the nations in a highly chaotic international environment which the journal defined as 
where the “might prevailed over the right.” The journal displayed the images of athletes 
as role models to the Ottoman society and reserved a special section for the self defense 
trainings designed for the civilians.   
On the other hand, the highly technological character of the Great War received 
a special emphasis among the journal’s imagery.  The confrontation of the Ottoman 
soldiers with the new war technology was represented as the victory of the former over 
the other.  Regarding images showed the Ottoman soldiers bringing down planes, 
destroying tanks and sinking battleships in an attempt to provide a psychological 
remedy for the material and technological lack of military equipment.   
The images of the prisoners of war (POW) were used to address the eventual and 
absolute fall of the enemy.  On the one hand, they expressed the desperateness of the 
enemy and on the other provided the readers and the observers the satisfaction of 
capturing and dominating the enemy.  The war weary POWs were displayed both to 
show the benign nature of the Ottomans and the Central Powers as they treated them 
mercifully and to celebrate the Central Powers’ victory as trophies of the war.  The 
images of the captured spies were used to assuage the feeling of insecurity and enhance 
the feeling of safety at home.   
There were two fundamental goals of Donanma’s visual propaganda throughout 
the war:  First, to keep the morale high both at home and at the fronts by claiming that 
the Ottomans and their allies were winning the war and the triumph was near; and 
second, to translate the popular feelings aroused by the war into material support by 
calling out for the contribution of the public. 
The anti-Entente propaganda of Donanma ended right after the surrender of the 
Empire in the Great War.  The journal shifted its visual propaganda for its last five 
issues to the survival of the Empire and tried to promote the idea that despite all of its 
128 
 
sufferings the state stood upon its feet.  Adopting a neutral tone over the Entente 
powers, Donanma directed its critics against Germany and depicted it as the loser of the 
war.  
This study tried to venture through the largely neglected Ottoman experience of 
the Great War within a very particular perspective.  Yet, in the final analysis, it is still 
far from being able to claim to be an exhaustive study of the Ottoman war propaganda.  
The major concern of this thesis was to put emphasis on the state’s effort to manipulate 
the public opinion for the ends of the war and the socio-political context upon which it 
based its propaganda.  Donanma offers an affluent source to pursue such a study and 
manages at least partially to address at the complexity of the Ottoman experience of the 
war overlooked by the national and international historiography. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
129 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Primary Sources 
Adıvar, Halide Edib.  Memoirs of Halide Edib. Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2004. 
Adler, Cyrus & Ramsay, Allan.  Told in the Coffeehouse: Turkish Tales. London &  
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1898. 
Başkâtipzâde Ragıp Bey.  Tarih-i Hayatım.  Ankara: Kebikeç Yayınları, 1996. 
Cemal Paşa.  Hatıralar: İttihat ve Terakki, I.Dünya Savaşı Anıları.  İstanbul: Türkiye İş 
Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2001. 
Donanma Mecmuası (The complete collection, 192 issues, betweenMarch 1910-April 
1919) 
Loti, Pierre.  Carmen Sylva and Sketches from the Orient.  London & New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1912. 
Mehmet Sait Halim Paşa.  Buhranlarımız ve Son Eserleri.  İstanbul: İz yayıncılık, 1991. 
Mehmetefendioğlu, Ahmet.  Dr. Reşid Bey’in Hatıraları ‘Sürgünden İntihara’. İstanbul: 
Arba Yayınları, 1993. 
Nicolai, Walter.  Birinci Dünya Harbinde Alman Gizli Servisi.  Istanbul: Kamer, 1998. 
Sabis, Ali İhsan.  Harp Hatıralarım, vol.1.   Istanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1990. 
Sunata, İsmail Hakkı.  Gelibolu’dan Kafkaslar’a.  Istanbul: Kültür Yayınları, 2003. 
Tahsin Paşa.  Sultan Abdülhamid: Tahsin Paşa'nın Yıldız Hatıraları.  İstanbul: 
Boğaziçi, 1996. 
Tanin, issues between 30 July- 3 August 1914. 
Tokgöz, Ahmet İhsan.  Matbuat Hatıralarım. İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 1993. 
University of Georgia Library, [http://fax.libs.uga.edu/wwpost/1f/world_war_posters.pdf] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
130 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Ada, Hüsnü.  The First Ottoman Civil Society Organization in the Service of the    
Ottoman State: The Case of the Ottoman Red Crescent.  Unpublished MA. 
Thesis, Sabancı University, 2004. 
Ahmad, Feroz.  İttihat ve Terakki, 1908-1914.  İstanbul: Kaynak, 1995. 
Ahmet Emin [Yalman].  Turkey in the World War.  New Heaven: Yale University Press, 
1930. 
Akyüz,Yahya.  Türk Eğitim Tarihi, Ankara: Pagem Yayıncılık, 2006. 
Albert A. Altman, “The Press and Social Cohesion during a Period of Change: The 
Case of Early Meiji Japan,” Modern Asian Studies 15, no. 4, 1981.  
Alkan, Mehmet Ö.  Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Modernleşme Sürecinde Eğitim 
İstatistikleri 1839-1924.  Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 
2000. 
-------- “İstanbul’da Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları1856-1945: Toplumsal Örgütlenmenin 
Gelişimi.”  Tanzimattan Günümüze İstanbul’da Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları.  
İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998. 
Anderson, Benedict.  Imagined Communities:  Reflections on the Spread of 
Nationalism. Rev. ed., London & New York: Verso, 1991. 
Berger, John.  Ways of Seeing.  London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1972. 
Beşikçi, Mehmet.  The Organized Mobilization of the Popular Sentiments: The Navy 
League, 1909-1919.  Unpublished MA Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 1999. 
Brummett, Palmira.  Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-
1911.  Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000. 
Cecil, Hugh and Peter H. Liddle (eds.). Facing Armageddon: The First World War 
 Experienced. London: Leo Cooper, 1996. 
Demm, Eberhard.  “Propaganda and Caricature in the First World War.” Journal of 
Contemporary History. Vol. 28, no. 1, January 1993. 
Eldem, Vedat.  Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun İktisadi Şartları Hakkında Bir Tetkik.  
Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1994. 
Erickson, Edward J.  Size Ölmeyi Emrediyorum!: Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Osmanlı 
Ordusu. İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2003. 
Gellner, Ernest.  Nationalism. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1997. 
Ginio, Eyal.  “Mobilizing the Ottoman Nation during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913): 
Awakening from the Ottoman Dream,” War in History 12, no. 2 (2005): 156-
177.   
131 
 
 
Gülersoy, Çelik.   The Khedives and the Çubuklu Summer Palace.  İstanbul: Touring 
and Automobile Association of Turkey, 1993. 
Habermas, Jurgen.  The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An Inquiry into 
a Category of Bourgeois Society.  Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993. 
Hanna, Nelly.  In Praise of Books: A Cultural History of Cairo's Middleclass, Sixteenth 
to the Eighteenth Century.  Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2004. 
Harrison, Henrietta.  “Newspapers and Nationalism in Rural China 1890-1929,” Past 
and Present, no. 166, February 2000. 
Hattox, Ralph S.  Kahve ve Kahvehaneler: Bir Toplumsal Içeceğin Yakındoğu'daki 
Kökenleri.  İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1998. 
Heinzelmann, Tobias.  Osmanlı Karikatüründe Balkan Sorunu.  İstanbul: Kitap 
Yayınevi, 2004. 
Hobsbawm, Eric J. The Age off Extremes.  London: Abacus, 1991. 
İnan, M. Rauf.  Bir Ömrün Öyküsü 2:  Köy Enstitüleri ve Sonrası.  Ankara: 1988. 
Jackh, Ernest.  The Rising Crescent: Turkey Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow.  New 
York: Farrar& Rinehar, Inc., 1944. 
Junger, Ernst.  "Photography and the 'Second Consciousness: An Excerpt from ‘On 
Pain’.” Photography in the Modern Era: European Documents and Critical 
Writings, 1913-1940.  New York: Aperture, 1989. 
Kabacalı, Alpay.  Başlangıcından Günümüze Türkiye'de Matbaa, Basın ve Yayın. 
İstanbul: Literatür, 2000. 
Kaestle, Carl F.  “The History of Literacy and the History of Readers.” Review of 
Research in Education, Vol. 12, 1985. 
Karabekir, Kâzım.  Birinci Cihan Harbine Nasıl Girdik.  İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 
1994. 
Karpat, Kemal H.  “Traditionalist Elite Philosophy and the Modern Mass Media”, 
Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey.  Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1968. 
Kayalı, Hasan.  Arabs and Young Turks:  Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the 
Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. 
Kemnitz, Thomas Milton.  “The Cartoon as a Historical Source.” Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 4, no. 1, Summer 1973. 
Kınaylı, Hüsnü.  “Donanma Cemiyeti”, İstanbul Ansiklopedisi, vol. IX.  İstanbul: Koçu 
Yayınları, 1968. 
132 
 
 
Kırlı, Cengiz.  “Coffeehouses: Public Opinion in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman 
Empire,” in Public Islam and the Common Good. Leiden: Brill, 2004. 
Koloğlu, Orhan. Aydınlarımızın Bunalım Yılı 1918:  Zafer-i Nihai’den Tam Teslimiyete.  
İstanbul:  Boyut, 2000. 
Köroğlu, Erol.  Türk Edebiyatı ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı, Propagandadan Millî Kimlik 
Inşasına. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004. 
Lutz, Ralph Haswell.   “Studies of World War Propaganda, 1914-33.” The Journal of 
Modern History 5, no. 4, December 1933. 
Lüdke, Tilman. Jihad Made in Germany: Ottoman and German Propaganda and 
Intelligence Operations in the First World War.  Münster: Lit, 2005. 
Micklewright, Nancy C.  “Personal, Public, and Political (Re) Constructions: 
Photographs and Consumption,” in Consumption Studies and the History of the 
Ottoman Empire, 1550-1922: An Introduction.  Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2000. 
O'Shaughnessy, Nicholas J.  Politics and Propaganda: Weapons of Mass Seduction.  
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004. 
Özaydın, Zuhal. Osmanlı Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti Salnamesi.  Unpublished MA Thesis, 
Istanbul Üniversitesi, 1987. 
Özbek, Nadir .  Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Sosyal Devlet: Siyaset,İktidar ve 
Meşrutiyet: 1876-1914.  İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002. 
--------- “The Politics of Poor Relief in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1876-1914.”  New 
Perspectives on Turkey, no: 21, 1999. 
Özçelik, Selahittin.  Donanma Cemiyeti.  Published PhD Dissertation, Ankara, 1987. 
Özgür, Özge.  The Great Wars of  the Fırst Quarter of the Twentieth Century and the 
Representatıon of War In Selected Works In European and Turkish Literature.  
Unpublished MA Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2001. 
Polat, Nazım H.  Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti.  Ankara, Kültür Bakanlğı Yayınları, 
1991.  
--------- Rübâb Mecmuası ve II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi Türk Kültür, Edebiyat Hayatı.  
Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, 2005. 
Quataert,Donald.  Osmanlı İmaparatorluğu 1700-1922. İstanbul: İletişim, 2005. 
Ross, Corey.  “Mass Politics and the Techniques of Leadership: The Promise and Perils 
of Propaganda in Weimar Germany.” German History 24, no. 2, April 2006. 
 
133 
 
Ross, Sheryl Tuttle.  “Understanding Propaganda: The Epistemic Merit Model and Its 
Application to Art.” Journal of Aesthetic Education 36, no. 1, Spring 2002. 
Seregny, Scott J.  “Zemstvos, Peasants, and Citizenship: The Russian Adult Education 
Movement and World War I.”  Slavic Review 59, no. 2, Summer 2000. 
Topuz, Hıfzı.  II. Mahmut’tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarih.  Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 
2003. 
Tunaya, Tarık Zafer.  Hürriyetin İlanı.  İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1996. 
---------- Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler,İkinci  Meşrutiyet Dönemi.Vol. I, İstanbul, 1984. 
Yerasimos, Stefanos.  Az Gelişmişlik Sürecinde Türkiye, vol.2.  İstanbul: Gözlem 
Yayınları, 1975. 
Zürcher, Erik Jan.  "Between death and desertion: The experience of Ottoman soldier in 
World War I." Turcica, Vol.28, 1997. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
